Europe was gripped by the shocking events that unfolded in Washington, D.C. as Congress met to fulfil its solemn responsibilities under the Constitution to count the Electoral College votes that would confirm Joseph Biden as President of the United States. While some had thought there was a serious danger that the U.S. Capitol could be a target after the rallying calls of recent weeks, the events of January 6, 2021 mainly surprised and dismayed those watching across the Atlantic. 

Now, as horror turns to anger that an outgoing U.S. President could have played a part in events that led to a mob terrorising people and destroying property, statements from European leaders have reflected their hope to see a return to more normal relations. In so doing, they look to President-elect Biden, whose markedly different tone in responding to these terrible events offered a glimpse into a future where Europe can feel more at ease with its most valuable partner. 

Some, like Hungary and Poland, had found common cause with a populist President Trump, who was prepared to be tough on Brussels and to push sovereignty of individual states above collective action. Slovenia, a small beautiful country with its own fairy tale castle, had hoped for a visit from their most famous export, Melania Trump, husband in tow. Some of Trump’s supporters in Europe have roundly condemned the violence but exonerated the U.S. president, either by saying his supporters were too “exuberant”, or that the election of President-elect Biden was “suspicious.”

But for the rest, there was a hope that the special relationship between Europe and the United States might return, and that an American President might once again champion the values and ideals of a strong transatlantic bond. 

Nowhere is that relationship regarded more importantly than in London. Ever since Winston Churchill declared in a 1946 speech that the relationship between Britain and the United States was “special,” British Prime Ministers’ relations with their U.S. counterparts have been judged on the spectrum of “specialness.” Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan claimed the crown, with only Tony Blair and George W. Bush snapping at their heels for the title.  Others were more mediocre relationships, like David Cameron and Barack Obama, or John Major and Bill Clinton. It mattered more to some than others: John Major’s focus was much more on Europe, Harold Wilson on keeping Britain out of Vietnam.  But regardless, none have wanted the relationship to be weak, and all postwar Prime Ministers sought to keep it in good shape, not least because the U.S. and UK share the world’s largest bilateral foreign direct investment partnership. 

For the current UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, the task is to find ways to engage the United States so that he ends up in the right part of the spectrum. Having had good relations with Trump is not a great criterion for success with a Biden administration, but to be fair, Johnson’s views have varied. Five years ago, he described candidate Trump as “betraying a quite stupefying ignorance that makes him frankly unfit to hold the office of president of the United States” when confronting Trump’s remarks on supposed “no go areas” for non-Muslims in London. 

However, for the past four years, both men have professed admiration for the other. Many comparisons have put Johnson’s way of working in the same mould as Trump’s, albeit in a more subdued form, and some around Johnson would have much preferred a second Trump term. Until now at least. UK Defence Secretary Ben Wallace explained recently that he would miss Donald Trump because he was quite a good friend to Britain. There were not many capitals of Europe where that sentiment would find an echo, and hardly any British politicians who would be repeating their previously positive views.  

Johnson’s own statements reflect the need to keep the special relationship as special as possible. This is high on the list of 2021 resolutions for the UK Government, especially as the country has left the EU. The usefulness of the UK to the U.S. as a bridge to Europe has now disappeared – although, in truth, it has been overrated in recent years. (Note the strength of the relationship between Obama and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, whom he regarded as his closest international partner.) 

Johnson needs to develop not just the special nature of the relationship, but its indispensable nature as well. Primarily that means demonstrating clearly that a decision to leave the EU is not a decision to leave the international stage, nor to damage links across the Atlantic. For the United States, there are opportunities to bring the UK and EU closer together on areas of policy that are important for American interests. 

Here are four areas that could afford the U.S. strong and unconditional support from the UK, and also fulfil the UK Government’s desire to put a “Global Britain” stamp on its actions. They are also opportunities for the EU, U.S. and UK to collaborate closely as a triumvirate – and a means to heal some of the wounds created by the rhetoric and reality of the brutal separation of the UK from the EU.  

The NATO Reflection Process: New Prospects for Partnership

In December 2019, NATO’s Summit in London decided to begin a consultation on the organisation’s future. A 

 was appointed, and received a variety of submissions, covering relations with China and Russia, climate change and cybersecurity, alongside the processes of decision-making within the organisation. At the end of November 2020, without fanfare, these experts reported back with a series of recommendations. “Nothing basic about the role [of NATO] has changed,” their report was keen to point out, with a focus on “military strength and political solidarity” at its core.  NATO would, for example, continue with its deterrence and dialogue approach to Russia but would devote more energy to China and the importance of climate change as a major security risk. On process, it wanted more meetings of foreign ministers and better transatlantic consultations on major strategic and political issues. 

NATO had been, in its own terms, the ‘most successful alliance” – and the UK Government (and Labour opposition) would endorse that view. While there has been a longstanding view that the EU required too much loss of sovereignty for UK Eurosceptics to stomach, there has been no serious suggestion that Britain should leave NATO. 

Intergovernmentalism, arguably, is more real in the EU decision-making on foreign affairs than in NATO, where U.S. dominance is the most important determinant of action. But for the UK, close alliance with the United States on defence and security matters is a key element of the relationship. Cameron’s failure in 2013 to persuade the UK parliament to support the U.S. on Syria is regarded as a massive failure of his government not easily forgotten on either side of the Atlantic. Support for U.S. action in Iraq cost Blair’s domestic reputation dearly, blurring public perception of many of the extraordinary achievements of his time in office, though he remains much admired in Washington, D.C.  

The decision by the UK to increase defence expenditure is a potent signal to NATO, and to the United States in particular, that Britain will remain a steadfast partner and determined member of the alliance. This also will manifest itself in policies on Russia and China, in support of renewed U.S. efforts on climate change led by the indefatigable John Kerry (the newly appointed Special Presidential Envoy for climate change), as well as in cybersecurity and modernised defence assets – from hardware to people. 

For the United States, one of the recommendations from NATO’s study is a closer working relationship with the EU, which will allow for complementary activities.   For example, in my time in office as High Representative/Vice President for Foreign Affairs and Security, the EU worked on research into Improvised Explosive Devices, [IEDs], as well as helicopter and mid-air refuelling training.   These efforts benefitted EU countries and NATO, and since that time work to strengthen the relationship has gathered pace. This will support a strengthened transatlantic relationship and U.S./UK/EU triangle through an alliance where there is much to gain from collaboration, and few if any political downsides.  

Over the years I chaired the negotiations with Iran, an ongoing concern of the Iranian negotiating teams was how far they could trust the United States to keep their side of the bargain. When the agreement was concluded in 2015, the election of President Trump seemed an unlikely outcome. But 15 of the 16 candidates for the Republican nomination had already indicated that they would either rip up or review the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action [JCPOA] agreed between the P5 plus 1 and Iran. As it turned out, Iranian fears were well founded. President Trump stuck to his election promise to pull out of the agreement, ratcheting up sanctions in the hope of forcing the Iranian regime to crumble. 

This posed a dilemma for the five other countries in the JCPOA. The deal did not belong to the United States, but without its endorsement, the rest of the P5 plus 1 found it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to fulfil their side of the bargain. For Iran, the prize of the deal had been the return of assets and, more importantly, the prospect of a strong economy – delivering President Rouhani’s election promises of strong economic growth. With U.S. sanctions preventing or deterring American and European business from any form of economic links with Iran, the prospect of a brighter economic future collapsed. For the E3 partners (Britain, France and Germany) and the EU as a whole, it took some determination not to let the deal quietly languish, and instead to forcefully declare they would stay within it.   

President-elect Biden’s administration will need to consider a range of factors, including how to get longevity into a deal that he can guarantee for only four years using Presidential powers, and addressing regional concerns about Iran’s activities.  He has Jake Sullivan (the incoming National Security Advisor, and a veteran of the JCPOA negotiations) and Antony Blinken (Biden’s nominee for Secretary of State) to support him, perhaps through parallel processes on the JCPOA and regional issues, as well as working with a hostile Congress to build support for their proposals. 

In doing this, Biden will have a supportive EU to rely on. They have a big role to play in delivering economic opportunities for Iran if business can be convinced that they are not jeopardising their future relations with the United States nor risking sanctions.  And within the EU, the new U.S. president will be able to rely on the E3, especially if he is able to convince them that the United States is determined to stay the course in finding a diplomatic solution. 

November 1, 2021 sees the opening of the 26th UN Climate Change Conference in Scotland.  It is a huge opportunity for Prime Minister Johnson to show his leadership on an issue of vital importance to the USA, EU and the planet. The UK became the first major economy to legislate for net zero emissions by 2050, last year, and is pushing for practical advances in achieving that goal – something the Prime Minister will no doubt wish to highlight in his speech in Glasgow. 

For John Kerry, the months before the conference are an opportunity to show the United States is back in the driving seat. He can get agreements on lower emissions in place, or ready to be endorsed. He will want to show American leadership returning, stronger than ever, and to prominently put the U.S. at the heart of action in Glasgow. 

Kerry has a lot to do, but he will find huge support from Johnson, and from the EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. The EU has released its ambitious Green Deal with a plan for a 55 percent cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, on the way to net-zero by 2050.  Its plans also include proposals on transport, farming, biodiversity and building renovation. Conscious of the difference in the economies across the EU, it has provided for large transitional payments to those areas of the EU that are most dependent on fossil fuels.    

This is an area of policy that there is no doubt that the UK will want to find common cause with the United States, with NATO, and with the EU. With U.S. leadership, there is an opportunity to build a strong transatlantic alliance to make the conference a success and take forward its conclusions.

Whatever relations were like with China when President-elect Biden was Vice President, they are different now.  Biden is seen to favour tougher policies towards a China that under Xi Jinping has taken a different direction. Concerns about China’s policies are reflected in the new EU strategy on China with its focus on democracy, rule of law, human rights, alongside achieving reciprocal benefits in its relationship, both economic and political.  The same concerns are reflected in the debates in London, which has moved away from the strong engagement of the Cameron premiership to a more sceptical approach. Debates on the shocking revelations of the plight of the Uighur people, who are subject to slave labour in Xinjiang, have been taken up in Parliament amid calls for tougher responses.  

The UK is especially concerned about the promises that China has made to protect human rights in Hong Kong – promises that London negotiated with Beijing less than 30 years ago. But, of course, the UK faces greater challenges in developing a policy focused on values and concerns as a lone state, removed from its links with the world’s largest trading bloc. It must try to navigate a bilateral economic relationship without the shelter of a huge economy and solidarity with 27 other countries. 

Along with the United States and the EU, Britain will want to find the balance between strong opposition to China’s actions towards both Hong Kong and the Uighur people, and collaboration on climate change and economic ties on the other. For everyone concerned, this will be difficult, but China policy points to yet another example of a triumvirate approach that could add greater strength to each. 

As 2021 arrives, there is hope and anticipation on both sides of the Atlantic that the transatlantic relationship will become stronger over the next few years.  There are wounds to be healed – and things that cannot be unsaid – from the United States to parts of Europe, and from the UK to Brussels and vice versa. The shocking events that saw democracy threatened at the heart of the United States is a sobering call to all who believe in it that the only future is one in which we stand together.  

While nobody expects a return to business as usual, there is hope that in a post COVID-19 world, there will be closer cooperation from those who share the same values and ideals if we are to build a better future.  There are no issues facing us that we can resolve alone.

served as the European Union's first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy from 2009 to 2014. She is Global Europe Chair at the Wilson Center, a Senior Policy Advisor to Chatham House, and a consultant to the Geneva-based Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue. 

On behalf of the UN Security Council, she chaired the negotiations that ultimately resulted in the agreement with Iran on its nuclear programme. She also worked with the Prime Ministers of Serbia and Kosovo leading to the Brussels agreement, for which they were all nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize. Previously, she was the first female EU Commissioner for Trade.

Prior to becoming an EU commissioner, she was a UK government minister in the House of Lords. She served in the Education and Justice departments, before being promoted to the Cabinet as Leader of the House of Lords.

Cover Photograph: President Ronald Reagan with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at Camp David on December 22, 1984. (National Archives and Records Administration)

Special 7.jpg

How the U.S., UK, and EU can renew a special relationship. 

Transatlantic Tranquility?

When Britain left the European Union in 2016, many people reassured themselves that we nonetheless remained European. We had exited an organization, a bloc, but retained our identity, if not our citizenship, as part of Europe. In reality, Britain has always had a “semi-detached” attitude toward Europe as something across the Channel. A famous if somewhat apocryphal newspaper headline, after severe fog struck the Channel, exemplified the feeling by exclaiming “Europe cut off by Fog.” It was not that this small island could find itself isolated by the weather, but rather this vast stretch of land with its myriad nations was cut off from us.

Even during Britain’s membership in the EU, many member states longed for stronger engagement from UK politicians and institutions. This sense of not quite being part of the club was portrayed when the Czech artist David Cerny presented his installation, 

, to hang in the European Council building in Brussels during Czech’s 2007 EU presidency.  His irreverent look at the stereotypes of each country drew great criticism, along with a sneaking sense that he had somehow captured some, if not all, of the funny side of how countries were seen. So, Romania as a Dracula style theme park, Denmark with Lego bricks, Sweden as an IKEA self-assembly kit, all brought wry smiles. If those seem familiar labels, then the UK should be viewed through the same lens. It was represented by an empty space. Not even semi-detached, it just wasn’t there at all.

The belief in democracy, human rights, and fairness is the cornerstone on which the EU was built, and it stems from the desire to promote those values inside and beyond Europe.

Since Brexit many Brits have grappled with what it means to be part of Europe but not its trading, political or security groupings. We don’t speak their languages, watch European TV (other than Scandi police or political dramas), we no longer work there in the numbers we did, or have the opportunities as school children and students we once had. We still buy much of our food from mainland Europe but not many really notice. Since 1688, Britain has had a continuous history of reform, without revolution, civil war, military disaster of the 20th century tyrannies of Nazism, communism or fascism, and no change to its external borders. To many people in Britain, the EU was an alien intrusion into a proud history. Arguably what Brexit did was confirm for many, especially those in the towns and villages of England and Wales, what was already true: Europe was a holiday destination, nothing more.

For others the rush to find ways to retain family connection with the prized EU red passport has eased the sense of losing something fundamental to who we are, and more importantly, who we aspired to be. Connected to each other.

The World War II generation understood the consequences of our failure to stand together and to allow those who seek the path of tyranny and chaos to fool us with winning smiles and easy slogans.

All this matters very little. The sense of belonging is based less on geography and more on the fundamentals of what kind of people we aspire to be. To be European is not just to live in a place, but to hold the same values and ideals. The belief in democracy, human rights, and fairness is the cornerstone on which the EU was built, and it stems from the desire to promote those values inside and beyond Europe. What is missing is the vision and the narrative that makes these values come alive, make sense, and define our actions. The stories we tell might vary depending on the political hue of center, left, or right, but the fundamentals of what we want should be common to all. Fairer societies mean lifting children out of poverty, looking after the elderly, offering opportunity to get on in life. To do that we need strong trading partners, sensible policies to protect us from harm (in all its forms), good housing, quality education and healthcare, and much more. How we achieve our goals might divide us into different political parties, but not the goals themselves. 

The World War II generation understood the consequences of our failure to stand together and to allow those who seek the path of tyranny and chaos to fool us with winning smiles and easy slogans. Lessons learnt but easily forgotten in times when so many feel they are battling to get their voices heard and where every day is an exhausting struggle. But the 21st century vision of what it is to be European should be the determination to continue the journey embarked upon by those who had seen war and destruction. It is why the transatlantic relationship is so important, and why we stand together to say, “never again.”

Baroness Catherine Ashton is the former vice president of the European Commission and high representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. She is a Wilson Center distinguished fellow.

Baroness Catherine Ashton explores the evolving concept of European identity in the post-Brexit era. She reflects on Britain’s historical relationship with Europe, the impact of leaving the EU, and what it truly means to be European in the 21st century.  

What Does it Mean to be European?

At the UN building in Geneva in the early hours of November 24, 2013, I reached for a microphone and announced that we had reached an initial agreement with Iran on its nuclear program. Standing with me were the foreign ministers of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council: France, the UK, the US, China, and Russia, who together with Germany had stuck together throughout the years it took to get us to that moment. Everything seemed possible—especially if we could harness the power of international institutions and its core members to work together across the world with common purpose. 

Now 10 years later, the moment has passed. The horror of the attacks in Israel and the unfolding humanitarian disaster in Gaza, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and rising concerns about China have made it impossible to imagine a repeat  collaboration. Even securing the survival of our planet has proved difficult to the point of dismay, despite the best efforts of some and the desperate needs of others. 

We must cherish the tankers. The United Nations was created out of the ashes of World War II. If it is allowed to rust, the prospects of recreating it are virtually nil.

At our disposal we have fundamentally two models of collaboration, which I describe as tankers and yachts. Tankers are big and difficult to maneuver, but they survive for long periods of time, despite rough seas and turbulent winds. The United Nations is such a tanker, as are NATO and the European Union. They can be slow and unwieldy, not always agreeing what to do, and often taking ages to reach a level of consensus. Nevertheless, they all do vital work, much of it unglamorous and under reported. And each was founded to further ideals based on rule of law, democracy, freedom, and human rights—even if these are sometimes honored more in the breach than the observance. 

In the last 20 years we saw the rise of the yacht as an alternative model of collaboration. Fast in the water if the wind is good, and able to maneuver  quickly to changing circumstances, but also prone to capsizing. Yachts are coalitions of the willing, brought together to tackle one issue, or with one purpose. Beyond that, they don’t sign up to membership, agreed values or views. Making sure Muammar Gaddafi did not murder the people of Benghazi led to a coalition, initially brought together in Paris under French and UK leadership. Eventually the tanker, NATO, took over the military work once the initial coalition had averted the immediate danger of a massacre. 

Both models are important; both have their place. But over the years, we have expanded the use of yachts and failed to renew the tankers. We scorn their slow nature, waving at them from the yacht that nips past them in a good wind. While yachts can make a big difference, they are designed to confront a specific challenge. They have a temporary function, not a lasting purpose. 

Walking through Benghazi and Tripoli a decade ago, following Gaddafi’s downfall, I was struck by the sense of optimism and hope in the cheers, laughter, and occasional rapid gunfire into the air. I knew from experience that it would not last; the euphoria would soon give way to the harsh reality of building the future. Different ideas and different expectations would clash in argument— or worse, as rival camps set their sights on winning, come what may. A country awash with guns and porous borders descended into chaos.  We had yachts, followed by a tanker for  military action, but had no viable plans to help the tankers in the reconstruction. Some of the failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have similar roots. 

Fast in the water if the wind is good, and able to maneuver  quickly to changing circumstances, but also prone to capsizing. Yachts are coalitions of the willing, brought together to tackle one issue, or with one purpose.

It was significant that the Iran talks were hybrid—both a tanker and yacht. Authority to do a deal came from the UN Security Council, which brought the five permanent members (plus Germany) together to work on ensuring the purely peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. The EU led and chaired the discussions through its Foreign Policy Chief.  It was rooted in a tanker—yet its activities were those of a yacht. 

It had only one issue to resolve; whatever else was happening was irrelevant to that goal. During 2013 and 2014, the Ukraine crisis began with the Maidan demonstrations and Russia’s invasion of Crimea. At the same time, as I sat with the Russians in Vienna I was working on sanctions against them—flying between Vienna where they were allies, to Kyiv, where they were invaders. People asked how we managed it; I explained we compartmentalized our work. It would have been hard to tell when we were together in Vienna that we were in a bitter dispute with them a few hundred miles away. 

What lessons can we learn for the future? First, we must cherish the tankers. The United Nations was created out of the ashes of World War II. If it is allowed to rust, the prospects of recreating it are virtually nil. Second, we must build more yachts, acknowledge that they exist to undertake specific tasks, and strengthen their ability to complete said tasks. Third, we must look for ways to combine the abilities of both kinds of vessel, to ensure we value long-term commitments as much as short-term action. 

If there is any proof needed of the importance of building new hybrid vessels it can be found in the two crises that confront us most urgently. One:  ending a war and ensuring Ukraine is a sovereign state, protected, and rebuilt; two: to find a long-term lasting solution to bring peace and security to Israel, alongside the Palestinian people who also need the same. Both have an urgency we cannot ignore, and both require long-term sustained action. A more flexible, hybrid architecture, in which big decisions are made in the tankers of set-piece meetings that give direction and authority, together with specific initiatives undertaken by yachts of the willing, could help us deal with both the short and long-term. When consensus is hard to find, and compromise is seen as weakness, we need to combine what we have and put it to work. 

The Right Honorable Baroness Catherine Ashton served as the European Union's first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy from 2009 to 2014. She earned wide praise as a negotiator, leading the P5+1 talks on Iran’s nuclear program and galvanizing agreement between Serbia and Kosovo. Previously, Baroness Ashton served as the first woman Commissioner for Trade in the European Commission and the first woman British European Commissioner. A Life Peer in the British House of Lords, she is a former nominee for the Nobel Peace Prize, among other accolades. Currently a Slater Family Distinguished Fellow, she served as a Distinguished Fellow at the Wilson Center in 2017.

In this short essay, Baroness Catherine Ashton recalls a time when collaboration was more possible and makes the case for a hybrid approach to achieve what is needed in today's complex world. 

Tankers and Yachts

Global Alliances: Tankers and Yachts

In this multimedia feature, Robin Quinville, director of the Global Europe Program at the Wilson Center, speaks with Baroness Catherine Ashton, who, among many other notable roles, served as the first woman commissioner for trade in the European Commission. Together, they examine the role that trade plays in helping Ukraine rebuild, in strengthening the US-UK relationship, and in helping to create a peaceful and stable Europe.

Cover photo: Ariel view of the Port of Odessa. Shutterstock/

Robin Quinville, Director of the Wilson Center’s Global Europe Program:

Hello from the Wilson Center, I'm Robin Quinville. I'm the director of the Global Europe Program here at the Wilson Center. And it's really a pleasure to welcome you to this 

Following on our discussion of strengthening supply chains and strategic competition, this issue of the 

 is reinvigorating a conversation on trade and investment to examine the unique role that European trade has in supporting Ukraine's postwar rebuilding.

We are happy to have the Right Honorable Baroness Catherine Ashton join us here at Wilson. She's a distinguished fellow with our program and it's a delight to have you here with us. Baroness Ashton served as the European Union's first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. So that's from 2009 to 2014. She earned wide praise as a negotiator leading the P5+1 talks on Iran's nuclear program and galvanizing agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on their future.

Before these impressive achievements, she served as the first woman commissioner for trade in the European Commission, and now she's written a new book titled, “

And Then What? Inside Stories of 21st Century Diplomacy

.” So, Cathy, thank you so much for being here with us today.

The Right Honorable Baroness Catherine Ashton, former European Trade Commissioner:

So as the EU's foreign minister in 2013, you know better than anyone the impact of Ukraine's decision to link its future to Europe's. The question of whether to sign the association agreement really galvanized events at that period, and it led to the change of government in Ukraine and it was all over this agreement to reduce trade barriers between Ukraine and Europe and Ukraine's European future. Tell us more about those negotiations and why they had this effect.

Well, as I say, it's great to be with you, Robin. So you have to imagine that for seven years by 2013, negotiations have been going on between Ukraine and the European Union. The purpose behind them was to offer opportunity for Ukraine in areas like their food production, the breadbasket of Europe. They were often described as [having] technology and the ability for some of their industries to rejuvenate, to recognize they needed to change, to grow and develop alongside that, because it was more than a trade agreement, you also had the opportunity to look at the judicial system, to look at anti-corruption measures, to do the kinds of things that we value so highly in terms of a democratic future and making sure the institutions are fit for purpose and provide for the citizens. So it was a broad agreement with trade at the real heart of it. Seven years of negotiation completed. It just needs a political signature to take it forward. And at that moment, as we all know, President 

 made the decision under pressure from Russia that he was not going to sign the agreement.

And events spiraled from there. That led us to where we are today.

You know, I think people have a bit forgotten that because at the beginning when Russia invaded Ukraine, people were saying, oh, it's about NATO. But it was about these early decisions on trade and on Ukraine's European future. Since Russia's invasion, Ukraine has shown this remarkable resilience. And Russia has deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure, obviously trying to cripple its economy as well as win a military victory. It's and it's striking at the economy, not only for the now, but for the for the future as well. How can the EU use trade policy positively in this instance to try and secure Europe, Ukraine's future with Europe?

It's going to be incredibly important when we help to rebuild Ukraine, that the infrastructure is not just seen as the buildings that are lying in twisted ruin right now, but also the infrastructure that makes it possible for people to live and work and thrive in an economy that's functioning. And that's going to depend a lot on the work done, of course, here in the US, but especially, I would argue, done in Europe.

And that's going to be opportunities to have no barriers to trade, the opportunities for Ukraine to get investment, foreign direct investment coming in from Europe, to get support from the European Commission, to redevelop its industries, its agriculture, and to be able to rebuild in that broadest sense, absolutely crucial, because also for the Ukrainian people, they want to have a thriving economy and not be dependent on us just giving them money and resources.

They want to be able to do this by having a strong economy.

Can the EU, as it negotiated this agreement and future agreements, actually put in some of the steps that need to be taken to meet the entry requirements into the EU eventually?

They certainly will. I mean, it's quite difficult getting into the EU as countries that have got here. And I will tell you it's something called the key. And the key is all of the legal requirements, the legislative changes you have to make. Your judicial system must be up to scratch. You have to show in each part of your system of government and in each part of your economy that you are meeting the standards and requirements of an EU member state.

And it can take a considerable amount of time to do it all. So one of the ways that the European Union helps is to put resources and people into that system and actually help develop the systems you need internally, the ways of doing things and so on. And that, I think from the experience of other countries, is incredibly important.

I remember years and years ago, of course, in the days when the UK was part of the EU, when Poland was coming in, and that we were working with the judicial system, our judges were talking to their judges, helping to support them, to develop the kind of work that was needed to make sure this system was appropriate and compatible. So there's lots and lots of things that will be done alongside side the giving of resources and, of course, support.

So it's more than just the suspension of import duties and things like that. It's practical assistance to make the system that is at work in Ukraine support of a fast or as fast as possible EU membership.

That's right. If you simply do like agriculture, there'll be lots of ways that the farming communities will be working together, ways in which you can provide machinery, ways in which you can provide opportunities to grow certain crops, support to do that, things that will be needed to kind of get the economy moving. All of those are available to Ukraine as a country that is moving closer and faster, of course, to Europe.

Right. How can US policymakers support EU efforts? And is there something that you could identify if you were talking to two US policymakers, as you sometimes do, that would you recommend?

I think it's important for the US to do what it does really very, very well, which is to offer a combination of financial support and also strategic support. You know, the US is good at bringing in expertise and knowledge, and especially when you're thinking about an economy like Ukraine's with a big reliance on agriculture, but also the potential of huge capacity in technology and beyond to make sure that there is a lot of work being done across the Atlantic to help support the growth and development of those technologies in those companies.

I also hope we'll see American investment, you know, companies coming into Ukraine and perhaps government can do some supportive work to help them do that in what will be initially quite challenging circumstances and business will do what business does best, but a bit of government support can go a long way.

I'm sure that Ukrainians are looking for that. If you pass their embassy here in Washington, it has a huge sign on it that says we are open for business, right? You were a European Union trade commissioner before you were a high representative for foreign and security policy. So can I ask you a little bit about where you see the US-EU trade discussions heading?

And where should they be heading, given all of your experience in this?

There's always this kind of dream of a free trade agreement across the Atlantic, and it's something the EU has long wanted, bearing in mind it's very complicated to achieve, and it's complicated because you're trying to do the best for your own country, or in the case of the EU group of countries, while also recognizing that getting a deal requires you to give a little, if not a lot in certain areas of your economy.

You know, trade deals are not 'everybody wins on everything.' They are a kind of a mixture. In some areas, perhaps your businesses will do less well, but they'll do very well in others. And the kind of combination helps to grow the economy, which means everybody does better. And those discussions, when you're talking with businesses who've got really strong interests in making sure either they can export as much as possible or that they can protect what they do as well as possible, are quite complicated.

And that was my experience. So when you're looking at, for example, we just mentioned agriculture in the context of Ukraine, think about it in the context of Europe. It's very complicated. Having said a lot, because we share the same values and ideals and we have markets that operate in very similar ways. There's a lot you can do on the way to getting to that magic moment of a free trade agreement, and I hope we'll continue to try and do that.

There's a lot of talk about whether both sides are becoming more protectionist in their attitude, and it's about protecting industries and communities while not falling into protectionism, which is about actually running industries that would be better off transforming into something else. And I think we're in the beginning of those discussions and debates. The pandemic, in a sense, brought them alive because of supply chains and so on.

But there's a lot more that we can do, and I hope we'll see the continuation of the ongoing dialog that's so valuable as a way of trying to address those issues.

Now, it occurs to me that it might be easier to do in a sort of sector by sector or a subject specific basis rather than an overall overarching trade agreement, at least to get there eventually.

What it can be. The only challenge with doing it sector by sector is that you always start with the easiest sectors and then you end up with the really tough ones and the really tough ones don't necessarily want to be thought of as just a sector. You know, if you're going to persuade an industry that actually it may have to put up with greater competition, you're only going to do it if it could see that there's a broader advantage.

And I remember negotiating trade deals where certain industries in Europe were going to have greater competition for sure. But what they could see was that if the other sectors worked well, they were going to have an advantage. Then the economy in Europe would grow anyway, and that means they would sell more of their goods at home as well as potentially abroad.

But it's the overview that that really pushes it and it also requires governments to be engaged with it so that they're talking to their industries and explaining what they're going to do, either to mitigate what they can see coming or at least to show the support to them and sometimes put a little bit of pressure on them to say, actually, this is good for the economy overall and the economy overall means the consumer.

The consumer should be the winner at the end of all this. And business should thrive because consumers are able to make good choices and have the goods that they want.

It's that balance which is so tricky to find. 

So the UK is negotiating its post Brexit trade agreements with countries, and I thought I'd ask you for you to look in your crystal ball and give us the prospects for a US-UK trade agreement.

Well, I think we've been talked about as being quite low down the list or even at the back of the queue, I think as I recall, and that's understandable for a number of reasons, most particularly because there are bigger fish to fry. As I say, from the US perspective, there are much bigger, more important deals to be done.

Having said that, there's a huge reliance from the UK's perspective on this amazing relationship. We call it the special relationship. It's not just a word that we use, we mean it. We think of the context of our relationship with the US as being extremely valuable and important. So trade is an expression of that. And even though I think getting to a trade deal with the huge nature of the US and its capacity versus the UK, that's going to be quite a challenging discussion to have for certain industries for sure.

But there's more we can do together, more investment, more capacity to be able to do things. More smaller moves, as you were saying, may be sectors, but maybe also just moving things a little bit, moving the dial toward a greater trade, sort of a appropriate relationship for the future that I hope we'll see, because it would be great if we could do that.

I have seen that they have been doing some discussions at the state level, so so maybe doing it at the subnational level and those are ongoing.

Well, if you take some of the states like California, I mean, they are huge economies. You could have fantastic arrangements for any country with even one of the states of that size. And that nature. So I think that would be good to do. But I guess in the end, the ultimate objective would be, you know, across the whole nation.

Well, you name checked my home state, so thank you for that. And thank you, Cathy, for this insightful conversation. I have really appreciated your insights into all of these things. And to our audience, I hope you learned as much as I have. I also hope that you will explore the rest of the Wilson Quarterly's spring issue available at Wilson Quarterly dot com.

In  this multimedia feature Robin Quinville of the Wilson Center's Global Europe Program and Baroness Catherine Ashton discuss the role of trade in helping Ukraine rebuild and creating a peaceful and stable Europe.

In this multimedia feature Robin Quinville of the Wilson Center's Global Europe Program and Baroness Catherine Ashton discuss the role of trade in helping Ukraine rebuild and creating a peaceful and stable Europe.

Trade the Future of Ukraine

Trade and the Future of Ukraine

In this multi-media feature, Robert Litwak, senior vice president and director of international security studies at the Wilson Center, speaks with Baroness Catherine Ashton, who served as the European Union's first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy from 2009 to 2014. Together, they explore the cascading effects of Russia's invasion into Ukraine, with a focus on the quickly evolving geopolitical landscape.  

In this multi-media feature, Robert Litwak, senior vice president and director of international security studies at the Wilson Centers, speaks with Baroness Catherine Ashton, who served as the European Union's first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy from 2009 to 2014. Together, they explore the cascading effects of Russia's invasion into Ukraine, with a focus on the quickly evolving geopolitical landscape.

In this multi-media feature, Robert Litwak speaks with Baroness Catherine Ashton, former EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Together, they explore the cascading effects of Russia's invasion into Ukraine, with a focus on the quickly evolving geopolitical landscape.