As millions of people worldwide prepared to observe Ramadan this year, one group of Muslims in western China were once again prevented from fully practicing the holy month’s traditions. The Uighurs, a Turkic-speaking ethnic group indigenous to the Xinjiang region, were limited in their religious observance by 

bans on fasting for civil servants, students, and teachers, and instructions to restaurateurs, including Muslims, to keep their businesses open

. Though met each year with by resistance and criticism, the fasting ban is now an annual occurrence for Xinjiang, the result of 

a complicated, and often tense relationship between the region’s Muslim Uighur population and Beijing

After Xinjiang officially became a part of Communist China in 1949, 

the Chinese government began encouraging Han Chinese to settle there in newly established industrial towns and farming villages

. Development projects have maintained this migration, pulling the 

the portion of Xinjiang’s population comprised by Han Chinese increased from 6.7 percent to 40 percent

. This demographic shift – combined with competition for economic opportunities and government constraints on the religious expression of Muslim Uighurs – has created a rift between the two ethnic groups and fueled calls for Xinjiang’s independence.

In recent years, conflict within the region has reached new heights. 

 between Uighurs and Han Chinese in Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, leading to the death of nearly 200 people. Since then, cities in the region have faced numerous attacks and clashes with police. Urumqi saw additional unrest in 2014: 

in April, three were killed and 79 injured by a group armed with knives and explosives

in May, attackers crashed cars and threw explosives into a marketplace, killing 31 people and injuring more than 90

. While the Chinese government has described the attackers as terrorists, it is unclear exactly who they are or what their motivations are – as explained by a BBC news report, “Information about incidents in the region…is tightly controlled.”

, Beijing has frequently characterized these attacks as organized terrorism and linked attackers to “international jihadi groups.” The increase in violent attacks and confrontations in Xinjiang has gone hand in hand with limitation of religious expression in the region — such policies are justified as being part of an effort to combat 

But Drennan points to various scholars and organizations who believe the government is exaggerating the Uighur threat. One of the more recent claims is that Uighurs have left China to join ISIS: 

, a news outlet with strong ties to the Chinese government, has reported that 

 are fighting with ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and 

 to join them. The reports also linked those joining ISIS to the Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), a 

small Islamic separatist group seeking regional independence

However, experts quoted by Drennan seriously doubt the number of Chinese ISIS recruits is as high as the 

 claims. Nicholas Bequelin, a senior researcher with Human Rights Watch, called the reported number “implausibly high,” while Sean Roberts, a professor at George Washington University who studies Uighurs, took a less strident tone: “I assume there are Uighurs joining ISIS, but I also assume the numbers are quite small in comparison to other groups throughout the world. We’re probably talking about 20 to 30 people max.”

The intent behind the reports, as explained by anthropologist Dru Gladney in Drennan’s article, may be “to make the Uighurs look as if they’re a threat, an Islamist terrorist organization.” Beijing is able to connect separatism and frustration with government policy regarding Xinjiang to global terrorism – essentially “conflating the Uighur people’s legitimate demands for human rights, religious freedom, and democracy with international Islamic terrorism,” as Alim Seytoff, the Washington spokesperson for the World Uyghur Congress, 

 (Seytoff’s organization uses an alternate spelling of Uighur).

Whether Beijing’s policies are meant to stem terrorism or quash separatist sympathies, they may only be making matters worse. Of the few Uighurs who may have joined ISIS, Gladney speculates that the motivation was more like likely simple resentment of China than the grand quest to establish a global caliphate. Further prohibition of religious observance would only increase this resentment, potentially driving some Uighurs to seek out jihadi groups.

Those groups certainly aren’t ignorant to the current situation. Last year, an 

 described Xinjiang as an “occupied Muslim land” to be “recovered [into] the shade of the Islamic Caliphate.” 

In July 2014, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, leader of ISIS

, mentioned that Muslim rights had been “forcibly seized” in China.

Nevertheless, the clampdown on religious practices continues. In addition to the fasting ban, 

the wearing of Islamic veils in public spaces has been outlawed in Urumqi

individuals wearing face veils, jilbabs, hijabs, long beards and star-and-crescent from boarding public buses in the cities of Qaramay and Ghulja

. As the restrictions pile on to years of ethnic tension, and radical groups lend an ear to local frustrations, Beijing may be creating the very problem it claims to be addressing.

Justine Drennan, “Is China Making Its Own Terrorism Problem Worse?” 

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Beijing is adopting new policies to combat terrorism, but its treatment of China's Muslim Uighur population may be making the problem worse.

The self-fulfilling prophecy of China’s anti-terrorism efforts

the number of people displaced by war has reached the highest level ever recorded

, Europe has seen a related rise in inbound migration. According to Frontex, 

153,000 migrants were detected at Europe’s external borders between January and May of this year, a 149% compared to the same period in 2014

. The largest migrant group is Syrians fleeing the civil war that has ravaged their country for half a decade.

After the Syrians, Europe’s next largest group of immigrants hail not from a wartorn nation — far from it; they come from Eritrea, 

a country that has recently reduced infant mortality, improved maternal health and worked to combat diseases like HIV and malaria

. And yet, according to the U.N. refugee agency, 

approximately 35,000 of its citizens arrived in Europe in 2014

Why are Eritreans fleeing their country when their government has seemingly been working towards improving their quality of life? A senior European Union official blames 

 in Eritrea and combat the sudden spike in migration, the EU is reportedly planning to provide aid to Eritrea. While an EU spokesperson told 

 that the exact amount is still being discussed, an early report described the aid package as 

Despite the kindly gesture, the evidence that unemployment and poverty are the driving forces behind Eritrean migration is slim, according to 

. Human rights organizations, reports from the United Nations and Amnesty International, and the accounts of Eritrean migrants all point to an alternative explanation: a repressive government that frequently uses violence to intimidate and coerce its citizens.

Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in Eritrea

 published on June 8 to detail conditions in the country, Groll describes the situation as a “modern-day police state” and “veritable house of horrors.” In Eritrea, journalists critical of the government have been arrested and imprisoned, and religious institutions are prohibited from “preaching against government policies” or “discussing or expressing an opinion on the policies and actions of the government.” Even the basic movement of people within the country is subject to restrictions, ranging from onerous requirements of special travel documents to the establishment of what the UN report describes as “ubiquitous check points.” According to Groll, this system is in place to catch those who may have skirted the country’s mandatory military service. Conscripted Eritreans can have their period of service extended indefinitely, and are often used for free labor. Soldiers’ wages are so low that they cannot cover basic needs, making Eritrea’s service requirement, a “state-run slavery system,” writes Cocotas.

Those caught criticizing the government or trying to escape the country are frequently subjected to inhumane prison conditions, described in Cocotas’ article as consisting of “pitch-dark underground cells or “metal shipping containers,” where “prisoners die from exhaustion, malnourishment, or lack of treatment for diseases.”

, Amnesty International quoted multiple previous detainees about the various torture methods employed in Eritrean prisons.

“I had to walk barefoot for approximately 2 kilometres. It was horrible. The heat blurred my brain. I couldn’t stop walking; if I had, my feet would have burned. When someone began to sway, they hit him. My feet were swollen and blistered.”

“The guy was tied in the helicopter [position] – ankles and wrists tied together behind your back with your stomach on the ground. The blood was pouring from his nose and mouth. The prisoners tried to give him first aid. Another officer ordered him untied.… The man died on the way to the clinic.”

“When you’re arrested because you try to escape the country the punishment is very hard. They beat me so badly, with plastic and wooden sticks, that I couldn’t move my body for ten days.”

To some extent, Europe seems to have acknowledged the human rights crisis in Eritrea — 

88 percent of Eritrean applicants were granted asylum by European nations last year

. Nevertheless, the EU has yet to show any intention to retract its aid to the Eritrean government. An EU spokesperson told 

 that the increase in aid will help the European community to engage with the Eritrean government, creating “the possibility of dialogue through which we can … insist on the importance of adhering to international standards on human rights.” While well-intentioned, this explanation lacks basis in past experience: the EU provided aid to Eritrea in 2008, yet the human rights situation since then seems to have only gotten worse.

At best, the EU is misinterpreting Eritreans’ reasons for leaving their country, and consequently addressing the wrong problem. In that gaping wound, mistrust of Europe festers. Eritrean human rights activists 

 believe that there is a possibility that the boost in aid is part of an implicit agreement with the Eritrean government to tighten its border controls.

Regardless of its rationale, the EU’s response to Eritrean migration overlooks its root cause. By misreading what drives mass flight to European shores, the EU risks failure in both addressing the dangers faced by migrants back home and alleviating the pressure on the countries currently serving as their refuge. In the end, the EU’s one success may end up being only in making the lives of Eritrean citizens much, much worse.

The EU wants to pay off a brutal dictatorship to help it solve its African refugee problem

North Korea on the Red Sea: Why Thousands of Migrants are Fleeing Eritrea

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In an attempt to halt mass migration, the EU is failing to address serious human rights violations.

The unintended consequences of the EU’s aid to Eritrea

Coverage of the 2014 Ebola outbreak in West Africa was dominated by incredulity at the rapidity of the virus’ spread and intense fear of potential transmission to the United States. As the body count grew and 

, the media’s focus frequently fell on African resistance to containment practices. 

secret burials that increased the risk of infection

 were met with disbelief and incomprehension.

This media narrative fed the misidentification of “ignorance” and “superstition” as the underlying causes of local noncompliance, writes 

. Relying on “familiar tropes of African ‘backwardness,’” Western journalists ultimately overlooked a more probable explanation: suspicion towards a government perceived by many as uncaring and corrupt.

an estimated 11,207 people have died from Ebola since December 2013

. Following two civil wars that spanned from 1987 to 2003, 

a transitional government facilitated democratic elections in 2005

, resulting in the election of the country’s current president, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf. While widely admired by the international community, among Liberian citizens, she has gained a reputation as untrustworthy — an image that grew with her first election victory, beset by charges of fraud.

Sirleaf’s reelection bid in 2011 was similarly marred by accusations and mistrust. Given that she had initially promised to serve only one term, the fact that she chose to run again raised concerns that she planned to hold onto power indefinitely. While the race itself was close, the sudden announcement that Sirleaf would 

 four days before the election was seen by many Liberians as a signal from the international community that it “would accept no other outcome than a second term for Sirleaf.”

Additionally, Sirleaf has appointed several of her sons to government offices, failed to significantly reduce unemployment rates or rebuild the educational system, and presided over numerous land concessions to foreign developers. Consequently, there has been a growing feeling that Sirleaf’s administration functions through a “politics of exclusion.”

In December 2013, as Ebola began to spread in Liberia, Sirleaf sought to convince citizens to comply with containment efforts, despite the fact that many citizens believed she had invented the crisis. The assistance of external humanitarian aid organizations only exacerbated the situation, inadvertently establishing a response system that lacked coordination or efficiency. Calls to hotlines intended to ease reporting illness and deaths, were often left unanswered. Burial teams had waiting periods as long as multiple days, leaving contagious bodies uncollected. Clinics in rural areas lacked the staff and equipment necessary to effectively treat people, and were rarely able to replace health care workers killed by the virus. In an attempt to slow the spread of Ebola, Sirleaf turned from her unreliable health care system to her military to cordon off sections of Monrovia in July 2014. This led to further disorder, as violence broke out between troops and residents, 

resulting in the death of a 16-year-old boy

One can see where a combination of lack of trust in the government and ineffective response to the virus contributed to an overall sense of abandonment. Many Liberians suspected that any aid sent to Liberia would only serve to make the president and her officials richer, while ordinary people were left to die in the streets. As resources to combat Ebola either proved inadequate or hurt citizens, there was little left to contradict this belief.

In the absence of meaningful assistance, communities banded together to trace contact with those infected, deliver food and care for the vulnerable, and share information on the virus. While Moran believes these actions contradict stereotypes about “irrational” Africans, she also suggests that they serve as “evidence of the crisis of legitimacy in Liberia,” as “people turned from looking to their government for help to relying on their own communities.”

declared the Ebola outbreak in Liberia over

. Although Sirleaf’s reputation internationally remains intact, the extent of the damage done to her relationship with her citizens remains to be fully understood. Global concerns about developing countries often center on more straightforward needs, like poverty, hunger, and infant mortality. But as evidenced by the chaos and loss of life during Liberia’s struggle with Ebola, the inability to trust in one’s government can have an equally devastating effect.

Surviving Ebola: The Epidemic and Political Legitimacy in Liberia

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The response of many Liberians to Ebola containment efforts demonstrates the dangers of unreliable governance.

Why didn’t Liberians follow government orders during the Ebola crisis?

As the Islamic State (ISIS) rages across Iraq and Syria, reports of atrocities committed by the group grow by the day. In recent months, the group has 

executed teenagers for watching a soccer game

killed hundreds of women and children in Palmyra, Syria.

With ISIS holding its ground in the Middle East and the threat of 

 on the rise, discussion of the terrorists’ motivations has gained attention. 

 copious, though some who claim to understand recruits’ rationales garner widespread derision — such was the reaction to State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf’s assertion that ISIS’s membership was spurred by a 

 She is not alone. America has something of an obsession with the cottage industry of terrorism psychology — much of which takes the same posture as Harf: that terrorism is bred from economic deprivation and instability.

suggests that this line of thinking is “often misplaced, given how little scholars actually know about terrorism and the people who are involved in it.” Consider the complex internal drives of individuals, as varied as 

“Jihadi John,” the notorious Brit-turned-ISIS member with solidly middle-class roots

origins he shares with many other ISIS recruits

whose millionaire father owned the largest construction company in Saudi Arabia

Nevertheless, academic explanations for terrorist actions abound. Cottee notes that studies of terrorism in the late 1960s cited “psychological abnormality or affliction” as the main force compelling individuals to become terrorists. From the 1980s onward, scholarly consensus dropped the emphasis on psychological explanations, claiming instead that outside circumstances were sources of terrorist motivation. This stems from the social science community’s current thinking on violence in general: it is, writes Cottee, a product of “historical, economic, or cultural forces over and above the individual,” rather than the result of an individual psychological condition. “[Violence] requires conducive social conditions rather than monstrous people to produce atrocious deeds,” 

wrote social psychologist Albert Bandura in the 1990s

. “Given appropriate social conditions, decent, ordinary people can be led to do extraordinarily cruel things.”

To ask “why” when discussing terrorism is to ask such a profoundly existential question that it is practically impossible to answer

Cottee concedes that this view has merit — 

a recent report from the Institute for Strategic Dialogue

 says as much, suggesting that Westernized jihadists are alienated by the secularism of the Western world. But Cottee also illustrates the flaws of relying on the “social conditions” explanation — mainly that such conditions often fail to match up with terrorist activity. Many individuals or groups who have encountered the historical, economic, or cultural hardships or conditions associated with terrorism do not themselves become terrorists. And many terrorists have not experienced these theoretical motivating social conditions.

Simply put, terrorists aren’t predictable. They can have multiple motives, private motives, or motives that are expressed as moral compensation for their actions. To ask “why” when talking about terrorism is to ask such a monumentally existential question that it is practically impossible to answer.

If not “why,” then what question should we ask? Cottee’s suggestion: “how?” 

 do people end up joining terrorist organizations? 

 do they induct recruits into existing cells? 

While motives are difficult to detect and prevent, a recruiting network can be disrupted by law enforcement. In 2015 alone, federal authorities have arrested 

, all thought to be involved in different forms of recruiting for ISIS. By arresting these individuals, authorities believe others will be less likely to join the Islamic State or, at least less likely to be assisted in doing so.

Concerns over the nature of terrorism are only likely to become more relevant as the fight against terrorism continues worldwide. Acknowledging what we don’t know about terrorists is an important step. So is asking questions. But even more important — especially if the global community hopes to make substantial gains in confronting terrorist groups — is knowing to ask the right ones.

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When combatting terrorists, trying to understand their motivations isn’t an effective approach.

On terrorism, stop asking why and start asking how

For many Americans, the idea of an HIV/AIDS crisis conjures images of the 1980s, when sensationalized and ill-informed news reports stoked hysteria and stigma. In present-day America, updates on the virus are far more scarce, and what is reported often contributes to an increasingly optimistic outlook. The world has seen 

a global decrease in new HIV infections and AIDS-related deaths

, and new treatment possibilities appear abundant; just within the last few weeks, reports have excitedly relayed news of 

a chemical compound that can block the virus’s access to sugar and nutrients, effectively “starving HIV to death.”

In the Middle East and North Africa, HIV’s story is a very different one. 

 that the United Nations estimates that the region saw 25,000 new infections and 15,000 AIDS-related deaths in 2013, increases of 9 percent and 70 percent, respectively, over 2005 levels. An estimated 230,000 HIV-positive people live in the region.

The virus’s resurgence is only further aggravated by post-Arab Spring political turmoil. Bureaucracy, discrimination, the vulnerability of refugees, increased violence, and loss of funding have all made combatting the spread of HIV and caring for those already infected immensely challenging.

In Egypt, those living with HIV face the combination of a repressive political environment and stifling bureaucracy. After the 

ousting of President Hosni Mubarak in 2011

, Islamists saw overwhelming victories in parliamentary elections, culminating in the election of the Muslim Brotherhood’s 

Mohamed Morsi to the presidency in June 2012

. With this shift in power came an increase in public displays of religious devotion, which arrived arm-in-arm with cutbacks in public discourse on issues of sex, sexuality, and sexually transmitted infections. 

Morsi’s removal from power by the Egyptian military in the summer of 2013

 did little to curb this trend. In an attempt to prove its conservatism, the military regime has conducted numerous raids and arrests of 

 under Egypt’s debauchery laws. Reeve writes that possession of HIV medication has been used by the new government as “a pretext for arrest.”

While stigma and discrimination deter many HIV-positive people from seeking medical attention, those who do receive treatment face even further obstacles from Egypt’s Ministry of Health. Under Egypt’s National AIDS Program, the ministry is supposed to provide free medication to Egyptians living with HIV. Yet medicine is often unavailable at distribution centers, leaving many individuals without treatment for months at a time. Without consistent treatment, the virus develops a resistance to drugs; once again, the ministry is unprepared to help: its equipment for testing white blood cell count, viral load, and viral resistance to drugs is inoperative.

As relates to HIV/AIDS in the Middle East and North Africa, Egypt is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. In Syria, 

 have driven millions of refugees into neighboring countries, including Lebanon and Jordan. Such extreme numbers have placed serious burdens on both countries — particularly economically — as a huge influx of people without jobs or housing look for means to provide for their families. Among other pressures, these strains have driven some Syrian refugees to sex work and early marriages, while also increasing gender-based and sexual violence — all of which increase the risk of spreading HIV.

Both Lebanon and Jordan have faced problems securing funds to fight the virus, as the sheer scale of the refugee population has made it difficult to shake free the needed money. Frustratingly, despite an inbound stream of impoverished refugees, Jordan is technically ineligible to receive money from the 

Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria

the nation’s status as an “upper middle-income country.”

 Other efforts — such as the provision of rape kits with preventative HIV medication, and increased sexual and reproductive health education — are hindered by fear of stigma.

In Libya, those infected with HIV face paralyzing political instability and security concerns. Due to the closure of airfields and seaports, medications cannot be imported, leaving the country with precious little time before its current stock of medicine runs out. Political instability and conflict has disconnected Tripoli (in the west) from Benghazi (in the east), forcing Libyans there who want treatment to cross their war-torn country to receive it in the capital city. If, in the process, a militia with the wrong sympathies catches them carrying medications, their lives could be on the line.

Serious action must be taken if the region hopes to effectively control HIV/AIDS. Of course, with the affected countries facing such a broad array of other concerns, prioritizing anti-HIV/AIDS efforts in a region already fraught with violence, political uncertainty, and economic hardship would be no small feat. But to do nothing would be to give the virus the perfect environment to thrive, and potentially pile onto an Arab Spring death toll already in the hundreds of thousands.

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Countries in the Middle East and North Africa currently face major hardships — political unrest, extreme violence, and economic decline among them. From these has sprung a new threat: the heightened risk of HIV/AIDS infection.

After the Arab Spring, an HIV/AIDS crisis

a 23-year-old woman was beaten and gang-raped on a private bus in Delhi, India

. The incident sparked demonstrations across the country, with 

 descending on India’s Parliament House and official presidential residence to speak out against the government’s failure to provide security for women.

 by Kalpana Viswanath and Ashish Basu presents a response to these concerns through an online initiative called SafetiPin. Launched in November 2013, SafetiPin’s two key premises are “that large-scale data collection can lead to change, and that safety will ensue when more people become engaged in the issue.” Taking advantage of the rapid spread of mobile phone technology, the approach puts the collection and distribution of information in the hands of the public 

through the use of a smartphone application

. Rather than relying solely on police statistics, individuals can share their own experiences and assessments, which can then be shared with other users and outside stakeholders (including, for instance, researchers who want to compare these anecdotes with crime data).

The app functions as an adapted safety audit, a common method for determining if public spaces are unsafe, along with the characteristics that make them so. Users can evaluate an area by using a numerical system to rate parameters including lighting, visibility, openness of a space, the presence of other people, and the accessibility of public transit. Pins on a map mark locations where audits have been made — green pins indicate safer areas, while orange and red pins signal less safety.

The reliability of crowdsourced information is always a tricky business — one that, at least in this instance, comes with tangible risks (it’s not hard to imagine the app being used by a predator, in an extreme example). But for all the downsides, there are substantial benefits, accessibility and new insights into lived behavior chief among them. For better and worse, it allows information to spread much in the way it did before the age of apps; it’s word of mouth, just on a different medium.

One takeaway from SafetiPin’s audits is that the presence of security officers or a crowd had low correlation with a user’s sense of safety. By contrast, the presence of both men 

 women in a space, adequate lighting, and the ease of visibility to others had a high impact on whether or not users felt safe. Such information underlines a core feature of the app: accessibility. As the amount of data collected grows, key stakeholders gain a direct line to what people who are affected by safety issues are experiencing and suggest as solutions. SafetiPin’s discovery of a correlation between lighting and feelings of safety, for example, suggests a relatively straightforward safety measure: expanding (and maintaining) the number of streetlights.

At the same time, the app’s users are able to better inform their own safety-related choices, using the SafetiPin map to avoid dangerous areas, gaining awareness about points of concerns in their communities, and contributing information that can encourage meaningful action; users are simultaneously confronted with the reality of unsafe spaces and provided an opportunity to do something about them.

Ultimately, significant change with regards to overall safety for the women of India will be a collaborative effort; individuals, police, government officials, organizations, and many other stakeholders will need to share responsibility and contribute to safety efforts. Where SafetiPin can help is in getting these potential partners to start communicating with one another, and, in the process, bring violent crimes so often hidden under cover of darkness into the light.

SafetiPin: an innovative mobile app to collect data on women’s safety in Indian cities

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Since the high-profile gang-rape of a medical student in Delhi, violence against women in India has gained international attention. A new Indian initiative aims to put safety information in the palm of your hand (literally).

Isabel Larroca