Building Resilience Amid Growing Humanitarian Needs

As I write this, Hurricane Milton is hurtling towards Tampa, Florida. With no time to catch their breath after Hurricane Helene, those in the path of the storm find themselves in a trap laid by climate change—unable to recover from one extreme weather event before the next one hits. Despite massive mobilization of US military and federal personnel, extensive relief efforts, and significant resource distribution by FEMA and other agencies, the US—the world's richest country—is struggling to keep pace with the escalating frequency and intensity of these extreme weather events. 

But the storm clouds over Florida are just the tip of the iceberg. Across the globe, climate change is not only intensifying weather patterns but is also fueling conflicts in vulnerable countries. Through a vicious cycle, armed conflict erodes communities' ability to withstand climate stressors like drought and flooding, while climate-induced resource scarcity and economic instability fuels tensions and creates fertile ground for armed groups to recruit desperate individuals. The 

International Rescue Committee's Emergency Watchlist

 paints a grim picture: 14 out of 20 countries on their radar are battling both climate disasters and armed conflicts. These nations, which house a mere 9% of the world's population, shoulder a staggering 69% of global humanitarian needs. 

What do these mounting pressures mean for the future of humanitarian assistance? I asked Dr. Syed Imran Ali, an experienced aid worker and engineering researcher who leads the 

 at York University’s Dahdaleh Institute for Global Health Research. With a blend of systems thinking and real-world experience, Dr. Ali tackles the tough questions head-on: How can aid systems adapt to this new reality? What role can innovation and technology play? How can we bridge the gap between immediate relief and long-term development in protracted crises?

As climate change reshapes our world, Dr. Ali's interview serves as a clarion call for policymakers, aid workers, and donors, reminding us that in the face of unprecedented challenges, our greatest assets may be human ingenuity, collaboration, and the untapped potential of local communities. 

Lauren Herzer Risi: How can humanitarian assistance adapt to meet today’s needs and those challenges we see on the horizon—particularly in the context of climate change and protracted conflict?

 Today, climate chaos and conflict are driving an unprecedented global humanitarian crisis. More than 310 million people today need 

 and more than 120 million people (over 1.5% of the world’s population) are 

—the highest levels ever recorded. In the face of such overwhelming numbers, it becomes easy to lose sight of the human reality. We need to remember that each one of these numbers is a person with stories of loss, struggle, and resilience. We need to remember that people only leave their homes when there is no other choice, when to stay means they may not survive.

In the face of the scale and widening reach of this crisis, the standard centralized model of humanitarian response is increasingly unfit for purpose.

The places that people flee to then are, necessarily, on the edges of survivability—a unit of geographic distance between living and not living. Today, the margins of survivability are being pushed into ever greater swathes of the global population as more and more people are forced into precarious situations by mounting pressures of climate change, conflict, and social and economic dislocation.

In the face of the scale and widening reach of this crisis, the standard centralized model of humanitarian response—driven by international institutions, donors, and organizations based in the minority world—is increasingly unfit for purpose. To address the growing frequency and distribution of emergencies, we need a humanitarian system that is equally well distributed with strong local standing capacities.

Localization has been on the agenda since the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, yet entrenched structures continue to prevent local humanitarians from building the readiness and capacity needed to lead responses in their own communities. A fundamental 

 is the reluctance of traditional donors and institutions to decentralize funding and decision-making, which ultimately undermines local partners’ autonomy and ability to respond effectively to crises. An 

 of national Red Cross/Red Crescent development efforts in five countries revealed a persistent pattern of fragmented, short-term support that prioritizes the short-term goals of donors and existing institutions over the long-term organizational development and sustainability of local responders.

The future of humanitarian assistance amidst accelerating climate change and growing conflict lies in cultivating a highly distributed and ready humanitarian network—one that empowers local actors and fosters mutual support among neighboring countries to face the widening progression and reach of the contemporary global humanitarian crisis.

Lauren Herzer Risi: How can we balance the need to reform traditional systems and approaches to humanitarian assistance with innovation and the deployment of new tools/technologies?

 I don’t think there necessarily has to be a tension between humanitarian reform and investing in innovation. In fact, innovation in tools, technologies, and approaches can enhance local capacities if it is guided by the principles of localization and integrated thoughtfully into broader reforms.

Technology cannot solve the structural challenges facing the humanitarian sector, so it must complement broader reforms—not replace them.

One way this can happen is by empowering local responders to develop solutions to the challenges they face daily. Local responders are closest to the issues, with deep knowledge of the context and what potential solutions could look like. By providing them with the necessary support—financial, technical, and otherwise—for research and development and response planning, their capabilities can be enhanced while generating solutions that are tailored to local conditions and highly fit for purpose.

Technology can also play a transformative role in generating operational insights from existing monitoring and reporting processes. Anyone who has worked in the humanitarian sector knows how much data is collected for reporting to headquarters or donors. This data contains potentially life-saving information—on how well things are working, where the problems lie, and how operations could be improved—much of which remains hidden and underutilized.

If we can figure out how to unlock this life-saving information from the data, we can close the loop between monitoring and operations—helping both international and local humanitarian responders get the maximum value out of the programs and the monitoring data they already spend considerable time and resources implementing and collecting.

Technology cannot solve the structural challenges facing the humanitarian sector, so it must complement broader reforms—not replace them. Investing in new technologies is only effective when combined with efforts to decentralize decision-making, secure long-term resources for local organizations, and strengthen local capacities, including on R&D and response planning.

Lauren Herzer Risi: Share an example that illustrates where you see a need/opportunity for innovative approaches—what is working and where?

 There are some outstanding initiatives empowering local responders to develop solutions to the challenges they face. One example is 

, a funding platform that has supported more than 70 life-saving innovations aimed at reaching the most vulnerable populations in conflict settings—many of them developed by local organizations. Many large international humanitarian organizations have also launched innovation labs (such as Doctors Without Borders' 

 aimed at enabling local communities and field staff to develop solutions that address immediate, context-specific challenges. These initiatives all aim to unlock the creativity of those closest to crises.

One of the harder things to do in humanitarian response is meaningfully engage and center crisis-affected communities in the design and implementation of responses to health crises.

One significant unmet need in the humanitarian sector is the effective use of data for decision-making. While tools like 

have revolutionized quantitative data collection; qualitative data, which captures richer, contextual insights, remains underutilized due to the time-intensive nature of its collection and analysis. Innovations in natural language processing, such as Kobo’s 

 to incorporate speech-to-text transcription, machine translation, and large language models are beginning to address this gap, making qualitative data more accessible and actionable at scale.

In humanitarian crises, access to clean water is one of the most critical public health needs. The 

, developed by my research lab, addresses this by using machine learning to optimize water chlorination and ensure that water remains safe to drink at the household level—where it matters most for public health. This tool transforms routine water quality data into actionable insights, helping humanitarian responders maintain safe water supplies for vulnerable populations.

One of the harder things to do in humanitarian response is meaningfully engage and center crisis-affected communities in the design and implementation of responses to health crises. An organization doing remarkably innovative work in this domain is 

, whose CommunityFirst Framework enables the co-design of humanitarian response strategies to health crises by affected communities and humanitarian organizations. SeeChange has worked with Doctors Without Borders to demonstrate their community co-design approach in Peru, Sierra Leone, and Venezuela. It is through this kind of innovative path-breaking work that progress on the localization agenda can be accelerated.

Ultimately, innovations like these—whether through data-driven insights, surfacing local solutions, or community-based co-design frameworks—demonstrate the critical role that affected communities and frontline responders have in advancing humanitarian response. By continuing to invest in locally-driven solutions that can reach everyone in need, the humanitarian sector can become more fit for purpose and respond more effectively to contemporary crises.

Lauren Herzer Risi: How can cooperation be strengthened among humanitarian, development, and peace and security actors, recognizing the protracted nature of many of today’s disasters, weather or conflict-related?

 Protracted crises, whether driven by conflict or increasingly, climate-related disasters, pose a significant threat to the long-term resilience of both built infrastructure and human systems. A good example of this is the gradual degradation of urban water supply systems in protracted conflicts. Over time, repeated shocks erode system resilience, turning once-functioning water infrastructure into potential sources of public health risks. This 

 can extend beyond physical systems to human systems—degrading social cohesion and community stability, further undermining the functioning of socio-technical systems.

Humanitarian responders need to actively engage with development and peace-building professionals to mitigate these cumulative effects and ensure essential services—such as water and sanitation infrastructure and healthcare systems—can withstand future shocks. This is well understood in the humanitarian sector, and there are considerable efforts underway to ensure that disasters are 

. But the ability of the humanitarian sector to quickly respond to acute crises should not be deprioritized in favor of long-term developmental thinking—a 

 that has been borne out in several emergencies in the past decade. Focusing on building long-term resilience is important to do at the right moment, when the acute needs have been met, excess loss of life and disease have been brought under control, and the situation has been stabilized enough.

Lauren Herzer Risi is the director of the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program. Syed Imran Ali, PhD, is a global health and humanitarianism research fellow at the Dahdaleh Institute for Global Health Research at York University in Toronto, Canada, where he directs the Humanitarian Water Engineering Lab.

Cover photo: A woman with a child on her back walks past a house which had collapsed due to flooding in the Nakhu river caused by heavy rains in Lalitpur, Nepal, on Tuesday, October 1, 2024. AP Photo/Niranjan Shrestha.

In this Q&A, Lauren Herzer-Risi talks with humanitarian water specialist Syed Imran Ali about building resilience in the face of increasingly volatile natural disasters, and the fact that climate change isn’t just increasing the number and intensity of humanitarian crises but is complicating the delivery of assistance. 

In the face of climate change and protracted conflict, humanitarian crises are growing in number and frequency—and complicating the delivery of assistance.

Introduction: The Great Population Shakeup

A country’s demographic trends are often cited among the risks or opportunities that it faces. Youth bulges could bring political instability; a robust working age population promises a “demographic dividend” of economic prosperity and strengthened democracy. As one generation ages out of the labor force, another slips into place, taking on the responsibility for economic growth (while paying into social security, caring for parents, and often raising a family). So, it has been and so it will always be... right? Not necessarily.

Immediate and growing effects of changing global demographics may drastically shift longstanding economic and political patterns and perhaps, help to shift long-held assumptions.

 titled “The Great Population Shakeup” and assesses how the immediate and growing effects of changing global demographics may drastically shift longstanding economic and political patterns and perhaps, help to shift long-held assumptions. Simple statistics of rising and falling population numbers do not capture the more intricate interplay of challenges and opportunities presented by the coexistence of powerful economies that are shrinking as they age, and fast-developing regions characterized by rising youthful populations striving for political empowerment and economic advancement. The stakes are high for our planet’s security and sustainability. Many of the risks are obvious, but opportunities to shape shakeups and use them as a springboard to a better planet for its people also abound.

Key fundamentals in demography, including population growth, remain intact. Global population has been on the rise for centuries at varying rates of growth. In a span of just 100 years, from the early 19th century to the early 20th century, the global population doubled from 1 billion to 2 billion, spurred by the Industrial Revolution’s advancements in technology, medicine, and agriculture. The momentum of growth accelerated even further in the following decades, with the next 2 billion added in just 50 years. By the autumn of 2023, the world's population had surged to 8 billion. Yet that growth is slowing, and the latest United Nations projections indicate that globally, population will peak at 10.3 billion in the mid-2080s. Decades of improvements in healthcare and education, increased employment opportunities for women, changing social norms, and—in the case of China’s one-child policy—coercive approaches have led to declining fertility rates. In fact, fertility rates in more than half of all countries globally fall below the replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman.

Young people are at the center of any shakeup. Simply put, they will inherit the planet and live on it longer. 

However, these statistics do not capture the immense fluidity and potential collision of powerful trends in other areas of human existence, including shrinking and booming economies, the increasing intensity of climate impacts felt among rising populations, and growing risks of global conflict. The 

 assembled a distinguished array of writers to dig deeper into the larger currents that will shape the “Great Population Shakeup,” and their expert analysis provides readers with the information they need to make better decisions in foreign policy and national security. 

Young people are at the center of any shakeup. Simply put, they will inherit the planet and live on it longer. Today's generation of youth is the largest in history, equal to the 

 world population in 1950. By 2080, those youth will be the largest generation of individuals aged 65 and above, surpassing (for the first time) the number of those younger than 18. For some, that transition will come even sooner; 28% of the world’s population lives in countries where the population has peaked, including China, Germany, Japan, and Russia. In 48 other countries, the population will likely peak between 2025 and 2054.

When it comes to demography, the future will 

look like the past. If country leaders do not account for changing population dynamics in their decision-making, they raise the risk of economic and political instability at home and abroad—while also missing vital opportunities for leadership and growth.

Richard Cincotta’s interactive feature gives readers a readily digestible primer on how a country’s age structure affects overall development and shows how these issues play out broadly across the globe. Other writers in this issue look deeper into the regional impacts of these trends on economic and political security. As noted, global populations will peak and then decline, yet population projections aren’t devoid of growth. The UN projects that 126 countries will continue to grow through 2054. This includes some of the world’s most populous countries, like Indonesia, Pakistan, and Nigeria.

Africa is a continent demonstrating how youth population booms will dominate future discussions of opportunity and challenge. By 2050, Nigeria’s population is expected to double to 400 million, with women of childbearing age and young people far outweighing the older population. This significant demographic shift has the potential to propel Nigeria toward a period of substantial economic growth, writes Amarachi Nwosu, who curated a collection of photography from Taiwo Aina, Ifebusola Shotunde, and Ugochukwu Emebiriodo that show the process is already underway. The creativity driving Nollywood and Afrobeats makes Nigeria a force whose cultural activity shapes global trends and drives more than $600 million annually to Nigeria’s GDP. Yet realizing the country's potential will mean grappling with the threat of climate change to livelihoods and health, unequal access to education (especially for girls), and high unemployment.

Nigeria’s boom is just one story. A simultaneous aging and shrinking population in today’s powerhouse economies poses unique threats and challenges. Clément Gibon examines what rising youth populations in the Middle East/North Africa region might mean in this key geographic region. In Latin America, writes Helder Marinho, the corresponding declines in the labor force could spell trouble for a region whose window to invest in infrastructure, education, and markets is closing. Asia also poses questions and Wang Feng examines China’s population dynamic and its immense potential impact on global economics, while Leela Visara assesses what’s happening with population and gender in the world’s largest democracy, India.

The “Great Population Shakeup” we are currently experiencing has other ramifications for issues at the forefront of national security and political discussions. The diversity of today's demographic trends is unprecedented, and is playing out amidst a changing climate, political upheaval, and increased conflict. Demography is not destiny—but it is not divorced from it either. From military readiness to economic prosperity, population trends (fertility, mortality, and migration) are deeply entwined with the options that countries have to advance their interests.

In the United States, low fertility rates and aging populations mean that immigration is all that stands between the country and population decline. 

In the United States, low fertility rates and aging populations mean that immigration is all that stands between the country and population decline. Jack Goldstone observes that more people are on the move than ever before and delves into the complex realm of immigration and its pivotal role in shaping economic prosperity for affluent nations. He cautions that in order to reap the benefits of immigration it is critical not to inflame the populist backlash to immigration.

Mark Maslin offers a stark and sobering assessment of how population trends intersect with climate goals, scrutinizing the dynamics of consumption in the creation of internal and external security risks for nation-states.

 also reminds us that there are stories of opportunity and human striving and suffering associated with any shakeup. 

 editor Stephanie Bowen and Tyler Marshall explore how developing a workforce ready for the future can prepare low-and-middle income nations to fill the gaps created by demographic tumult and bring leadership opportunities to the world’s largest economies. Sarah Barnes and Jay Gribble acknowledge the struggles and resilience of populations particularly affected by these shifts: women, immigrants, and aging populations. 

As the global population continues its uneven climb, the stakes feel higher than ever. Climate change is changing the livability of the planet, and the renewable energy transition is disrupting our complex and politically fraught energy systems in unpredictable ways. Russian President Vladimir Putin continues to sacrifice Russia’s declining population to its brutal campaign in Ukraine. In countries around the world, the very rights that have enabled women to enter the workforce and strengthen the countries’ economic competitiveness are being threatened and, in some cases, rolled back.

So, the short answer is no. When it comes to demography, the future will 

Environmental Change and Security Program

 which covers demography as an essential part of its portfolio.

Lauren Herzer-Risi, director of the Environmental Change and Security Program at the Wilson Center, sets the stage for the issue and explains how global demographic shifts affect many US foreign policy issues. 

Country leaders must account for changing population dynamics in decision-making, or risk economic and political instability at home and abroad. 

Energy security—including access to critical minerals which are vital for the green energy transition—are being impacted by the Russia-Ukraine war and growing tensions between Russia and the West. In this interview, we bring together two leaders to discuss the current state of energy as it relates to the conflict. Theresa Sabonis-Helf is Chair of the Science, Technology, and International Affairs concentration at Georgetown University. Prior to joining Georgetown, she was a professor of national security strategy at the National War College in Washington, DC for 18 years. She has lived and worked in seven countries of the former USSR, assisted two nations with the development of their first National Security Strategies, wrote a textbook on Caucasus regional energy issues, and co-edited two volumes on Central Asia's political and economic transition. As a short-term scholar in summer 1997, she is part of the deep bench of experts the Kennan Institute has welcomed over the years.

Lauren Herzer Risi is the director of the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program. She works with policymakers, practitioners, donors, and researchers to generate innovative, transdisciplinary solutions to development and security challenges related to environmental change, climate change, and natural resource management.

 Can you provide a brief overview of where Russia fits in the overall energy security of Europe, the US, and other parts of the world—both before and after Russia invaded Ukraine two years ago?

 At the time of the full-scale invasion, the United States was a total net exporter of energy and depended minimally on Russia for fossil fuels. Russia was, however, the world’s largest exporter of oil and gas and the European Union was its largest customer. The EU 

 more than 60% of Russian gas exports and about 50% of Russian oil exports in 2021. The EU seemed to be a critical customer—one that Russia would not want to lose—but its dependence proved to be a vulnerability for the EU. Before the invasion, Russia supplied about 45% of all of Europe’s natural gas imports, was one of the lead exporters of crude oil to Europe and was Europe’s largest supplier of petroleum products. Russia even supplied 50% of Europe’s 

The plans made by the EU and its members to reduce imports from Russia and overall consumption of fossil fuels were arguably more important than the sanctions themselves.

 estimates that the EU’s Russian fossil fuels imports have fallen from a high of $16 billion per month (pre-2022 invasion) to $1 billion per month (by December 2023). Russia is still a major exporter, and although it has found new markets for all its oil, it is struggling to reach new markets with some of its natural gas. China is now the largest importer of Russian fossil fuels, followed by Turkey, and India.

The exception to this strong trend away from Russian imports is nuclear fuel. In this sector, reliance is relatively high and with little change—although efforts to decrease this dependence are underway. The Russian nuclear corporation, 

, has an especially strong global presence in uranium conversion and enrichment, controlling 38% and 46% of global capacity. Europe remains highly dependent on Russia for nuclear materials, which is why Rosatom has been left out of the 13 packages of EU 

 still accounted for 16.9% of Europe’s natural uranium, 22.35% of the EU’s conversion services, and 30% of its enrichment services. Eighteen EU nuclear power plants also rely on Russian-supplied fuel rods. US dependence is less acute, but Rosatom continues to supply 20% of the low-enriched uranium used in 

. Additionally, Russia has been the sole supplier of 

(high-assay low-enriched uranium), the fuel required for next-generation small modular reactors now under development to help provide clean and cost-efficient energy. Both the US and the EU have enacted policies to reduce these many dependencies, but it will take several years to realize.

 before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee in Europe about nuclear security, energy security, and energy policy implications of Russia’s Rosatom corporation. What were you hoping lawmakers came away with from your testimony?

My testimony focused on how deeply embedded Russia is in the global nuclear fuel supply chain, and the reasons why we should be very cautious about sanctioning Rosatom. We must better develop our own sector and compete with Russia, but we also need to keep Rosatom deeply engaged in the international nuclear energy safety and security community. In the Soviet era, the USSR pursued a very isolationist approach to nuclear energy—one that had a lot of flaws, including very little respect for a culture of safety in the industry. I consider the integration of Russia in the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the fundamental shift in Russia’s standards, to be an important accomplishment. I am concerned that some moves we might take to marginalize Russia could also deteriorate that important cooperation. I am also deeply concerned about the nuclear power plant at Zaporizhzhia. It has remained under Russian control since October 2022, but the situation could become significantly worse than it currently is.

The relationship between energy and water comes through in sometimes terrifying ways. The Russian attack on the massive Kakhovka Dam impacted electricity, availability of potable water, irrigation capacity, and the nuclear reactors at Zaporizhzhia.

 A number of energy-related sanctions have been instituted by European countries and the US since Russia’s invasion. Are they having the intended effects? Have there been any unintended consequences?

Russia’s revenues from fossil fuels have declined and Europe’s dependence on Russia changed radically. Bruegel estimates that excluding uranium products, EU-Russian energy trade has 

 since the war’s onset, and Europe currently purchases very little Russian pipeline gas. But that is only partially due to sanctions. The destruction of the Nord Stream system and Russia’s refusal of sales that aren’t paid in rubles are major factors. The oil-related sanctions have been effective in reducing the EU’s dependence on Russian oil, but most Russian oil has been redirected to new markets. China, India, and Turkey are now lead buyers of Russian seaborne oil (pipeline oil was not sanctioned). There were no efforts to prevent Russia from exporting to new markets in the hopes of keeping oil prices stable. A cap was placed on how much Russia could receive per barrel; however this has been 

 over time, as Russia has found ships and routes that are not subject to the cap.

The plans made by the EU and its members to reduce imports from Russia and overall consumption of fossil fuels were arguably more important than the sanctions themselves. EU 

 declined 12% in 2022 and an additional 19% in 2023 compared to 2021 levels. Meanwhile, the EU shift toward LNG imports over pipeline gas was similarly impressive: the LNG share of the gas supply 

 from 20% in 2018-2019 to 40% in 2022-2023.

Since the onset of the war, the EU has prioritized reducing Russian dependencies, and has done so more rapidly than anticipated. It is important to note, however, that there were unintended consequences. India, China, and Turkey now have closer trade relations with Russia. European states also saw an estimated $350 billion in 

 to shield their citizens (somewhat) from the unprecedented 

 that occurred in winter 2022. They also spent more than 50 billion Euros—10 times the historical average price—to fill their gas storage facilities ahead of the 2022-23 winter months. Such extra spending was particularly frustrating for the EU nations that preferred to channel energy finance to non-fossil fuels.

 Russia has targeted Ukraine’s water infrastructure as well as its energy infrastructure. What does this war tell us about the intersections between water and energy in the region?

The relationship between energy and water comes through in sometimes terrifying ways. The Russian attack on the massive Kakhovka Dam impacted electricity, availability of potable water, irrigation capacity, and the nuclear reactors at Zaporizhzhia. Water to cool the reactors was secured before it became a high-risk, but substantial damage to farmland resulted, as well as to the human and agriculture water supply. The destruction of 

 only minimally decreased Ukraine’s available electricity, but it damaged an estimated 620 square kilometers of land, and according to 

, accrued $6.4 billion in damages. Loss of the dam also brought water insecurity for southern oblasts, rendering an estimated one million hectares 

 for agriculture for three to five years.

Prior to this conflict, supply security had not been prioritized by much of Europe. It is likely that energy security—and in many instances the use of green energy to reinforce it—will be a much higher priority globally.

Both Russia and Ukraine have targeted water and energy infrastructure. The damage inflicted by Russia is much greater, but both sides recognized the critical vulnerabilities of water and energy. Ukraine cut most of the flow of the North Crimea Canal to Crimea in 2014. Crimea’s access to electricity was also cut off, by Kyiv loyalists in November 2015. Although the government of Ukraine did not claim credit for the power line attacks, they declined to restore energy ties. The role of energy and water infrastructure as tools of war have been unfolding ever since.

 What has the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict been on the global renewable energy transition?

On the negative side, it drove prices up for European states so dramatically that crisis response and new gas infrastructure took priority over development of green energy for a time. It also compelled many nations to reconsider coal as a fuel source during a crisis. On the positive side, Europe has seen a dramatic reduction in energy demand; efficiency was elevated in a climate of crisis and high prices. Historically, the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 dramatically transformed how nations thought about oil. Each of those crises lasted only a few months in duration, but resulted in fundamental changes in institutions, consumption, and how nations thought about supply security. The current situation will have dramatic effects on how the world thinks about energy security during transition. Prior to this conflict, supply security had not been prioritized by much of Europe. It is likely that energy security—and in many instances the use of green energy to reinforce it—will be a much higher priority globally.

 A country’s energy supply and its security are interconnected. Is there an element of that connection that is often overlooked by those helping to shape energy-security policy?

We tend to forget how closely energy security is connected to regime security. This is why water and energy are being weaponized in the war. Energy, particularly electricity, is part of the modern social contract. If a nation is urbanized and its people are accustomed to light and heat and that is taken away, it becomes very difficult for the political powers to remain in office. Control of cities is a particular problem if electricity services cannot be rapidly restored. Use of tall buildings, urban traffic flow, emergency medical services, functioning cell towers, and so on—all become compromised or impossible if electricity is disrupted for an extended period. The ability to provide reliable electricity to a country is one of the criteria of being a developed state. As societies move more and more toward electrification, the electricity grid becomes an increasingly attractive target to adversaries. In its effort to survive, Ukraine is leading the way toward more resilient electricity. One example is that they have converted thousands of cell towers to use battery back-ups so that attacks on electricity will not destroy communication capabilities.

 Is there anything else you’d like to add?

Once Ukraine makes it to the other side of this terrible war, its energy future is rather bright. Ukraine is now integrated into the all-European electricity grid (ENTSO-E) and is poised to be a net exporter of electricity to the largest, most sophisticated electricity grid in the world. This is due to work done by Ukraine and the Europeans since 2011. Ukraine shifted its laws, regulations, and standards to be compliant with EU rules prior to the invasion. It was fully included in ENTSO-E in March 2022, and was a net exporter of electricity even during the first six months of the war. Although Ukraine has endured catastrophic damage to their electricity sector, it has the right rules, investors, and capabilities to become an important part of the greening of Europe.

Theresa Sabonis-Helf is Chair of the Science, Technology, and International Affairs concentration at Georgetown University. Lauren Herzer Risi is the Director of the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program.

Cover photo: Cooling towers of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station near city Enerhodar, Ukraine. Shutterstock/

In this piece Theresa Sabonis-Helf and Lauren Herzer Risi explore how energy security, including access to critical minerals which are vital for the green energy transition, have been impacted by the Russia-Ukraine war and growing tensions between Russia and the west. 

With wide-reaching implications for regional and global energy supplies, the Russia-Ukraine war is also testing the world’s efforts to go green.