The Korean War remains vital and relevant in the People’s Republic of China, even if it is often described as the “Forgotten War” in American popular culture. Although the war in China is today commonly referred to simply as the “Korean War” (朝鲜战争), in official Chinese publications and commemorations it retains the label it had in the 1950s, “The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea” (抗美援朝战争). Although the fighting between Chinese and UN forces stopped 70 years ago, the Korean War remains central to the national myth of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and continues to inform multiple policy debates across Beijing in ways that may surprise outsiders. 

The dynamics that drove Chairman Mao Zedong’s decision to support China’s intervention in the Korean war, and lingering memories of the War itself, have driven significant differences in how the war is generally understood in the United States and China. 

In the United States, the Korean War is remembered as a costly and ultimately indecisive defense of an ally against Communist aggression, as well as the first battle of the Cold War. Yet for China, the war is viewed as both necessary to protect the nascent People’s Republic of China (PRC) from a direct threat, and as a dramatic victory for the CCP against hostile Western imperialism. For Beijing, the war has been subsequently used to justify the delay in unification with Taiwan, to reinforce distrust of the United States, and to buttress the legitimacy of the CCP as the only force that can protect China from hostile foreign powers after the so-called “Century of Humiliation.” 

The Korean War remains central to the national myth of the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and continues to inform multiple policy debates across Beijing in ways that may surprise outsiders. 

This divergence between how the war is understood in the West and in Beijing – both its causes and its effects – betrays broader divergences in worldviews that inflame mutual suspicion amidst great power competition.

When discussing official Chinese views on history, it is impossible to completely separate fact from politics. Historiography is often a particular challenge for Marxist regimes, because histories must reflect not only what 

 called the “materialist conception of history,” but also the regime’s 

contemporary ideological, political, and factional requirements

. Major swaths of the CCP’s history – such as the role of the CCP and Kuomintang (KMT) in the Second Sino-Japanese War, the Great Leap Forward, the 

, and the Tiananmen Square incident – have been 

. As one Chinese scholar explained to an author of this article: “In the West, history never changes and the future is uncertain. But in Marxism, the future is certain and history is always changing.”

Official Chinese histories of the Korean War have been largely unchanged since the 1950s. Although scholarship on the war has certainly evolved in China, its primary conclusions have been largely unquestioned and unchanged – especially in official publications. Chinese histories still portray the Korean War as a stunning defensive victory by Chinese forces against a powerful, hostile force whose primary goal was to invade China and undermine the CCP. 

From the onset of tensions on the Korean peninsula, U.S. officials viewed actions taken by both DPRK leader Kim Il Sung and Chairman Mao primarily through the lens of the Cold War. Just two months before the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula in April 1950, President Truman received

, which called for the use of military force to contain communist expansionism anywhere. Washington initially believed that Chairman Mao was 

focused on consolidating the CCP’s control over China

 – the People’s Republic was still less than one year old – and on wresting Taiwan away from the Kuomintang.  On October 12, 1950, 

 concluded that “while full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that, barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950.” 

Yet contrary to these assured predictions, the CCP Politburo decided to intervene in Korea on the following day. Limited access to Chinese archives 

 of the intentions of China’s leaders surrounding the decision, but the opening of Soviet archives has provided a far more detailed understanding of Mao’s thinking. In early 1950, North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had 

 to discuss his plans to invade the South with Stalin, and requested Soviet assistance. Stalin advised him to discuss the invasion plan with Mao Zedong, which he did when visiting China in mid-May. After discussions, 

Mao and Stalin both approved the invasion

 and offered some limited material support, but neither leader initially agreed to directly intervene on behalf of the DPRK.

Transforming China with draconian domestic land reform projects and consolidating the CCP’s control over the country were Mao’s primary tasks in this moment. Dealing with the remnant KMT forces on Taiwan, which Mao believed were supported by the United States and threatened to overthrow the nascent regime 

, were a particular concern.  The implications of American intervention in Korea were 

exacerbated by the deployment of the U.S. Seventh Fleet 

Facing what he believed to be a burgeoning strategy to envelop and undermine the young nation he had founded less than a year ago, Mao acted. The following month, elements of the elite 4th Field Army had 

, primarily as an insurance policy against the possibility of a collapse by North Korean forces. The 

: “We think it correct to concentrate nine Chinese divisions on the Chinese-Korean border for volunteer operations in North Korea in the event the enemy crosses the 38th parallel.”

Mao’s concerns deepened significantly in early August with the hardening of UN defenses at Pusan. He declared at a CCP Politburo meeting that a U.S. military victory in Korea would 

. After the successful amphibious landings at Inchon by UN forces in September 1950, Mao’s fears of advancing American forces intensified. The 

 in Northeast China and Taiwan risked the CCP losing control entirely. 

Facing what he believed to be a burgeoning strategy to envelop and undermine the young nation he had founded less than a year ago, Mao acted.

Ultimately, Mao saw a UN victory in Korea as the first step in an American plan to topple his regime, so he decided to pick, as scholar Donggil Kim 

,  “the most favorable time and battlefield for China – namely Korea – due to its proximity to the Soviet Union and Northeast China, China’s industrial center.” In mid-October 1950, despite Stalin’s refusal of Mao’s previous request for air support over Manchuria, and his directive to Mao to not engage in a large-scale offensive against the U.S., Mao decided to ignore Stalin and 

Chinese propaganda in this period echoed these calculations. Beijing called the conflict “The War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea,” and labeled its troops as “Volunteers,” depicting the war as an opportunity to challenge American power in Asia and to project China’s rise as a regional power. More crucially, Beijing 

 to strengthen domestic support and legitimacy for the CCP in the aftermath of a devastating civil war, mobilize the Chinese people around the Party and the “new” China, and propel a vision of China as the 

driver of perpetual revolution across Asia

Thus, a powerful confluence of the CCP’s interpretation of China’s history, assumptions of U.S. hostility, a lack of confidence in the regime’s ability to maintain power at home, and Mao’s regional ambitions combined to influence China’s decision to intervene in Korea. For Mao, Stalin’s preferences or a sense of Communist solidarity were not nearly as important as his calculation of the PRC’s security interests and his own aspirations for regional leadership – two forces he conceived of as closely related.

Decades later, China’s understanding of the war’s causes still differs from that of the West. The Chinese leadership remains eager to portray the war as a successful conclusion to a so-called “Century of Humiliation” and a moment of triumph for the nascent regime. This consistency can probably be attributed to the consistent utility of this narrative to CCP leadership, despite the radical ideological and policy shifts China has experienced over the decades. As shown in scholar 

, policymakers invoke “lessons of history” to argue for certain policies, and these analogies in turn shape leaders’ decision-making processes by affecting their interpretation of information.  Although some recent Chinese scholarship has adopted a more critical view of Mao’s decision-making and the course of the war, the overall interpretation remains altogether positive. 

Chairman Mao set the tone for China’s official memory of the War by declaring it a victory. In a speech at the Central People’s Government Council in September of 1953 entitled “Our Great Victory in the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea and Our Future Tasks,” he declared, “we fought U.S. imperialism, an enemy wielding weapons many times superior to ours, and yet we were able to win and compelled it to agree to a truce.” Mao also argued that “a new imperialist war of aggression against China and a third world war have been put off,” and he warned imperialist aggressors to bear in mind that “the Chinese people are now organized, they are not to be trifled with.” He concluded with a warning that foreign powers may resume the war and were sure to try to subvert the CCP.

China’s official interpretation of the Korean War’s significance has remained generally consistent with Mao’s position in 1953. In the initial years after the war,  Steven M. Goldstein 

 that the Chinese government even blamed the severity of the war and China’s intervention on Washington, arguing that “the  United  States  had  intervened  in  [an intra-Korean]  civil  war  and  by  doing  so  had  changed  the  nature of the conflict [i.e. internationalizing it].” Writing in the 1990s in 

, Chinese scholars Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai 

: “[The war] was the natural result of gradually developed animosity between the [CCP] and what it regarded as the foreign imperialist powers, especially the United States, and of the fear of a threat from the latter.”

“We fought U.S. imperialism, an enemy wielding weapons many times superior to ours, and yet we were able to win and compelled it to agree to a truce.” 

Yet by the 1990s and the end of the Cold War, some Chinese scholarship began to incorporate more nuanced and diverse perspectives. Goldstein

 that while more traditionalist, “neo-orthodox” views blaming the war on the United States remain relatively prominent, “dominant approaches to the origins of the Korean War…dispers[ed] blame by emphasizing the impact of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States as the causal factor in the division that created the conditions for the conflict.” 

Largely driven by the work of prominent academics Shen Zhihua and Yang Kuisong, and undertaken at a time when Chinese academics had greater leeway than they have today, this perspective argues that the Soviet Union and Stalin in particular can be blamed for instigating the conflict. Both scholars argue that the Soviet Union encouraged Kim Il Sung’s invasion due to traditional Russian geopolitical interest in Northeast China and Stalin’s overly aggressive opportunism towards advancing the communist cause.

This turn towards a more context-oriented interpretation 

largely coincided with the warming of China-South Korea relations in this era

. It also reflected the increasingly negative view some Chinese policymakers and scholars adopted towards North Korea and its nuclear program. Of course, China’s own agency and culpability in the conflict remains routinely justified.

Other Chinese analysts have gone so far as to criticize some of Mao’s wartime decisions as detrimental to the unification of Taiwan and the overall Chinese revolution. While the Korean War is still seen as a Chinese victory, Mao himself 

 for falling prey to mission creep and squandering strategic advantages that could have enabled a more favorable peace. Yet even these critiques remain aligned with the view that Chinese intervention was moral, largely successful militarily and politically, and intended to produce a lasting peace.

As we have seen, the Korean War remains deeply salient in China today. 

China did not officially announce the number of soldiers killed in Korea

 (180,000) until 2010. Yet today the Korean War is portrayed as a glorious and successful struggle against Western imperialism and a key aspect of China’s identity as a great power.

The CCP’s founding myth is of particular significance, with the Korean War playing a central role the end of the “Century of Humiliation.” This narrative posits that China had been the dominant power in the world and the center of civilization for centuries until the Qing dynasty’s corruption and ineptitude rendered China vulnerable to hostile foreigners (read, the West and Japan). These powers used their superior technology to defeat China in a series of wars, forced its leaders to sign unequal and exploitive treaties, and occupied Chinese territory. 

This history presents Chairman Mao as the leader who brought the humiliation to an end on October 1, 1949, when he established of the People’s Republic of China and declared that the Chinese people had “stood up.” To this day, Chinese propaganda argues that only Chairman Mao and the CCP could unify China and give it the strength to resist the hostile foreign powers dedicated to splitting China and containing its rise. The Korean War is presented as an example of the CCP’s role in ending the “Century of Humiliation.”

The CCP continues to deploy the Korean War to g

highlighting the return of “martyrs” remains

 to China from Korea. Although not as prominent as the Sino-Japanese Wars in popular memory, such narratives demonstrate the CCP’s commitment to the memory of the Korean War as an exemplar of national sacrifice and struggle. 

Other publications use the conflict to project China’s identity as a moral defender of peace, a benevolent “older brother” to North Korea, and an anti-imperialist power with a record of victory against the West. A 2

 argued that “the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army’s going abroad to fight was a righteous deed to protect peace and resist aggression.” Other articles in state media directly depict China as 

 by the United States and the Soviet Union.

China did not officially announce the number of soldiers killed in the Korean War (180,000) until 2010. 

The Korean War also provides contemporary Chinese policymakers with ready historical analogies, and informs China’s approach towards the Korean peninsula today. Recent articles in Chinese state media 

the importance of dialogue for international peace

 (perhaps an implicit reference to the contemporary North Korean nuclear crisis), and call for the implementation of 

the Korean War’s model of national defense modernization

. Memories of the Korean War, and especially the tremendous losses endured by Chinese forces in the conflict, may also inform Beijing’s decisions to support North Korea in contemporary crises.

Even top leaders in China rely heavily on Korean War narratives. In 2010, 

then-Vice President Xi Jinping gave a speech

 that presented the conflict as the natural culmination of China’s triumphant retaliation against the imperialists who held the nation down during the Century of Humiliation. He also offered a compelling underdog narrative of a still impoverished country overcoming the wealthiest power on earth:  

Loving peace is an excellent tradition of the Chinese people. Since modern times, the Chinese people, who have had their fill of the hardships caused by the imperialist great powers’ aggression and devastation, understand even more deeply the barbarity of aggressive wars and the preciousness of safeguarding peace.

Xi’s speech also lays out the continued importance of the Korean peninsula to Chinese security, drawing a straight line from China’s intervention in 1950 to its present policy: 

The Korean peninsula is linked to China’s mountains and rivers, and safeguarding peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, and in Northeast Asia generally, relates to world peace and stability. China’s basic position and policy stance on this issue is consistent. 

Regardless of what some revisionist Chinese academics argue, and despite internal frustration with the Kim regime over its nuclear weapons policy, Xi’s speech articulates a continuity between contemporary national interest in North Korea and the intervention of October 1950. Although Chinese policymakers, netizens, and scholars increasingly view North Korea as a troublesome liability, and see South Korea in a more positive light, the fundamental necessity of maintaining the Kim regime to provide a strategic buffer for China from the United States remains the guiding principle of China’s Korean policy. 

Such calculations suggest that the Korean War experience will drive China’s leadership to c

 and shy away from applying truly detrimental pressure. As scholar Wang Fei-ling 

 in 1999: “Beijing clearly prefers the current political stability and the existing balance of power on the peninsula in the near future.” Within CCP policy-making circles, “traditionalist and conservative forces” still hold sway on Korean policy. China’s leaders remember the threat that justified its original intervention into the Korean Peninsula, and likely view it similarly today.

The Korean War narrative also shapes Beijing’s approach to U.S.-China relations, and illustrates its increasingly competitive characteristics. 

Anger towards the United States over the original Korean conflict

 remains present in Chinese politics, and history is used to reinforce Chinese assumptions of U.S. efforts to split and contain China, with Taiwan policy firmly in the foreground.

“Beijing clearly prefers the current political stability and the existing balance of power on the peninsula in the near future.” 

Zhou Enlai’s initial five conditions to peacefully resolve the Korean War –  issued prior to Chinese intervention in 1950 – clearly identify a perceived link between the American Seventh Fleet’s involvement in the Taiwan Strait. Contemporary Chinese narratives still connect the two issues directly. The author of a 2010 article in 

 for the 60th anniversary of the Korean War l

aid the blame for Taiwan’s continued separation

 at America’s feet, writing that “[China] had no choice but to indefinitely postpone its plans to liberate Taiwan.” These narratives frame America’s continued support for Taiwan as evidence of ongoing hostility, and justify the CCP’s inability to achieve unification.

Korea continues to contribute to a deepening U.S.-China competition. As analyst 

, “China often looks at the Korean peninsula through the lens of Sino-U.S. strategic relations.” A planned THAAD missile deployment to South Korea in 2013, for instance, triggered widespread Chinese fears of 

an emerging American “containment” policy

. This strong Chinese reaction to the deployment of missile defense systems on the peninsula provides a stark reminder of 

the ability of Korean tensions to impact wider U.S.-China relations

. Given China’s views of the Korean War, instability in North Korea or a U.S.-led attempt to overthrow the Kim regime could 

. Under this paradigm, the Korean peninsula will likely continue to constitute a hindrance to positive U.S.-China relations rather than a means for cooperation.

In this vein, China’s official discussions and remembrances of the Korean War may become a proxy for commentary about the state of contemporary U.S.-China relations. An intensification of official references to the Korean War in speeches and propaganda may therefore indicate Beijing’s recognition that relationship with Washington will be fundamentally hostile going forward. While China’s wars with Japan are highlighted much more strongly and consistently in its discourse, the elevation of Korean War narratives to a similar level of prominence will likely suggest efforts by Beijing to prepare the Chinese people for a long and painful period of confrontation with the United States.

The Korean War plays a far greater role in shaping and informing contemporary Chinese perceptions and strategies than it does in the West. The conflict contributes greatly to the CCP’s projection of China as a peace-loving nation, willing to directly confront foreign attempts to split and contain it, and powerful enough to succeed. By casting outgunned Chinese martyrs as patriots defending their country and sticking up for their Korean brethren against imperialist Americans, China’s leaders have constructed a myth that remains potent in sustaining the People’s Republic and the CCP.

Although some Chinese scholars have adopted more nuanced takes on the Korean War, or demonstrated increased annoyance with North Korea, Beijing’s definition of its fundamental national interests – ensuring stability in China’s Northeast and preventing the rise of a unified and American-supported Korea that might undermine the CCP – remains unchanged. China’s views on the Korean War may also explain its continued support for North Korea, and why it seems willing to risk so much over a country for which it has very little affinity.

Going forward, American policymakers should learn from past mistakes and understand how the conflict continues to animate the PRC’s approach to the Korean Peninsula. If the U.S. again fails to understand the goals and motivations of its adversary and rival, it is far more likely to repeat the same mistakes made in 1950.

 is the Director of the Wilson Center’s Asia Program and a Senior Fellow in the Wilson Center’s Kissinger Institute on China and the United States.

is a Program Associate with the Wilson Center’s Asia Program.

The views expressed are those of the authors alone, and are not those of the Wilson Center or of the U.S. Government.

(Cover photograph: Statue of People’s Volunteer Army Commander Peng Dehuai in Dandong, Liaoning. Ferox Seneca / Wikimedia Commons 

Peng_Statue_1.jpg

China’s view of the Korean War has not changed much since 1953. What ripples does this cause in Asia and across the globe?

Eternal Victory

Indonesia Should Be at the Heart of US Indo-Pacific Policy

When the Trump administration rolled out the 

 in 2020, it soon looked to Indonesia as the next logical addition. The agreements aimed to normalize Israeli relations with Arab-Muslim majority countries in the Middle East after decades of political conflict, while expanding trade, investment, and people-to-people ties. Considering Indonesia’s growing economic importance and status as the world’s largest Muslim-majority country, and following 

 that the time had come for Jakarta to engage in the Abraham Accords process. The United States 

 in Indonesia to sweeten the deal, and Secretary of State Antony Blinken 

 raised the issue in Jakarta during a high-profile visit in December 2021.

the move publicly and continue to make strong statements 

. In private, regional and Indonesian experts pour cold water on the possibility. With an upcoming Indonesian election in 2024, and Israel-Palestine a volatile domestic issue, lower-level contacts in trade and investment are far more likely than Jakarta to sign on formally to the Abraham Accords. Demonstrating the intractability of this issue, 

FIFA recently barred Indonesia from hosting

 the 2023 U-20 World Cup after the governor of Bali lodged protests about Israel’s participation in the event.

The episode is a microcosm of key challenges in the US relationship with Indonesia: as both countries work to strengthen economic and diplomatic ties with each other and in the region, ambiguity persists as to how close the partnership can be. Although its growing relationship with Washington builds on a solid foundation, Jakarta prioritizes an independent foreign policy, refusing to reduce ties with China or to follow American preferences without critique. Moreover, the dearth of US economic engagement undermines America’s attractiveness for the growth-hungry developing nation. The ceiling may be lower than many hope.

The United States will have to understand that Indonesia will always hedge between Washington and Beijing, which sets the ceiling in the relationship lower than that with other allies and partners, such as Japan and India.

If the United States wishes to shore up a 

, Washington cannot overlook Indonesia. Maximizing ties with Jakarta within this context will require patient, deft policy to incentivize relations with Washington instead of Beijing on key issues, a greater willingness to engage economically, and an awareness of Indonesia’s reluctance to pick sides.

Indonesia at the heart of the Indo-Pacific

Strategically critical, the world’s fourth-most populous country, largest Muslim-majority nation, and third-largest democracy, Indonesia too often goes under-recognized. It is indisputable that the nation of more than 18,000 islands (6,000 of which are inhabited) plays an 

 among Indo-Pacific and developing nations. Washington recognizes this and naturally jockeys for 

. US Indo-Pacific policy makes little sense without strong relations with the country lying at the geographic heart of the region.

Indonesia has slowly but steadily embraced a newfound role on the international stage. Jakarta led the G20 in 2022, and chaired the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or ASEAN, in 2023. Two-term President Joko Widodo (often referred to as 

 prior to the G20 Summit in November 2022. By virtue of its large size, Indonesia is often viewed as a de facto leader within ASEAN, which Jokowi wants to see become an “

However, Indonesia is often characterized as “

punching below its weight in global affairs

.” In many ways, this remains the case, with Jokowi 

 growth over foreign policy. For example, in 2014 Jokowi promised to make Indonesia a “Global Maritime Fulcrum” linking the Indo-Pacific, but 

. Moreover, Indonesia’s reliance upon diplomacy (both high-level and backdoor) to address ASEAN’s two crises in the 

 is unlikely to achieve success, further contributing to the perception that Indonesia isn’t as active diplomatically as it could be.

In the realm of great power politics, Indonesia resists choices. Jakarta values its 

, which sometimes leads to seemingly contradictory policies. Although 

 to condemn Russia’s aggression against Ukraine in the UN, Jakarta was equally focused on the war’s 

ed to broker peace between the warring nations. And despite its public condemnations of Israel to assuage domestic political opinion favoring solidarity with Palestine, Jakarta 

 criticism of China’s repression against its Muslim population in Xinjiang.

The floor and ceiling in US-Indonesia ties

At the same time, US-Indonesia ties have grown closer over the past decade, particularly concerning defense. US Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin 

. Indonesian Defense Minister (and presidential contender in 2024) Probowo Subianto has also 

 due to his human rights record. This has resulted in increased arms sales and 

. Beyond security, Indonesia and the United States collaborated to launch 

 during Jakarta’s tenure as head of the G20 last year.

It is no coincidence that US Secretary of State Antony Blinken chose to lay out the Biden administration’s 

 from a stage in Jakarta. During meetings with Jokowi 

 as a “vibrant, critical…partner” and both countries as “two of the largest democracies in the world…working together to preserve the rules-based system and international order.” In many ways, the floor in US-Indonesia relations is fairly high, and Indonesia is not in China’s camp.

 in ways that can frustrate Washington. It also works to maintain a balance, such as in its continued 

, the trilateral security pact between Australia, the UK, and the US that, among other forced posture changes, is bringing nuclear-powered submarines to Australia. The United States will have to understand that Indonesia will always hedge between Washington and Beijing, which sets the ceiling in the relationship lower than that with other allies and partners, such as Japan and India.

Fundamentally, Jakarta approaches China from a realistic perspective grounded in the living memory of the Cold War’s devastating impact and Beijing’s role in Indonesia’s development. Contrary to some fears in Washington, there is little love lost between Jakarta and Beijing, particularly within the Indonesian military. But, although Beijing poses a real security threat recognized in Indonesian defense and strategic circles, it also looms far closer geographically than Washington, and its economic promise is attractive and swifter.

 against its first president, Sukarno, and Washington’s role in supporting the brutal 

 under the next president, Suharto. During the Cold War, Jakarta first attempted to remain nonaligned with either the Soviets or the US but was dragged in anyway, at great cost, when Washington grew concerned at Indonesia’s

tilt toward the communists. This is living memory for many Indonesians, and Jakarta fears the fallout of a looming second cold war. Indonesia does not want to make an enemy of Beijing, nor can it afford to shut off the tap.

Luckily, Indonesian hedging also means that Jakarta remains committed to a US role in counterbalancing China. Even if the ceiling may not be as high as Washington would like, Washington can be confident the floor is fairly high and there is further room to grow. Maximizing US relations with Indonesia requires deft policy, and awareness of what Indonesia wants: economic growth and to avoid being dragged into another cold war.

Vis-à-vis China, the United States faces an 

 in Indonesia, preventing maximization of—or reaching the ceiling in—US-Indonesia relations. The United States may lead in foreign direct investment into ASEAN as a whole with 

 compared to China’s $14 billion, but Indonesia’s 

 are larger than America’s. China is the 

 in Indonesia (behind Singapore), and it increasingly focuses on Indonesia’s strategic resources, 

 support for Jokowi’s economic priorities that may be less attractive to Western private firms, notably his planned new capital city, 

Reaching the ceiling in US-Indonesia ties requires economic engagement, while not crashing into it calls for subtlety, patience, and understanding. 

Although Indonesia recognizes the clear risks China poses, it approaches Beijing from the perspective of development and economic growth. Jokowi banked his reputation and electoral appeal on promises of continued growth, including his goal of becoming the world’s 

two decades of challenging democratization

, the country’s economy has grown tremendously, 

, but Beijing’s economy remains more attractive for Indonesia’s core interests. Simply put, Indonesia remains a developing country, one that naturally prioritizes economic growth over other issues. When speaking with Indonesian interlocutors, it is clear that the lack of US economic offerings is the biggest hurdle in the relationship.

Without participation in regional trade agreements or increased material incentives, Washington will find it hard to counteract Beijing’s pull or to set standards that achieve its goal of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Despite a chorus from both allies and partners calling for the United States to join in the region’s expanding trade opportunities—such as 

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership

—increased market access to the United States is 

 from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, no majority in Congress or the White House exists for new regional free trade agreements.

Executive branch policy has limited impact on this perception. The 

 attempts to facilitate rule-setting and expanded opportunities across a number of pillars. Negotiations are continuing—including last month in 

—but they are viewed in the region as hollow, regardless of how Washington frames it. As with the Biden administration’s 

Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment

, follow-through is easier said than done. While the 

 may have netted a US-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, it promised new initiatives in the millions, not billions, spread across ASEAN. Moreover, as a market economy, the United States has a harder time than China leveraging private business for strategic gain.

If it wants to maximize relations, Washington will need to provide more material incentive. The 

 for infrastructure under the Millennium Challenge Corporation’s Indonesia Compact is a good start, but greater volumes will be needed. The United States must leverage its private sector more effectively; work with allies and partners, such as Japan, to rule-set and invest together; and follow through on its promised economic initiatives, many of which need sustained commitment. There is tremendous opportunity in Southeast Asia as global supply chains shift and the region continues to grow at a remarkable clip. The challenge is taking advantage of it.

Reaching the ceiling in US-Indonesia ties requires economic engagement, while not crashing into it calls for subtlety, patience, and understanding. For one, appearances matter. If Jakarta signs an agreement with the United States, it may feel the need to pursue something else with China to avoid appearing to favor one or the other. Washington may also need to understand that things move slowly in many cases due in part to Indonesia’s quest for “balance” vis-à-vis China. Expecting Indonesia to publicly condemn China in the South China Sea or not chafe at new minilateral security arrangements—such as the Quad between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States or AUKUS—is unrealistic. That doesn’t exclude the United States from pursuing policies that unsettle Southeast Asian partners when necessary, instead suggesting that it will have to live with an Indonesia that prefers nonalignment, even in the face of a threatening Beijing. Relatedly, we should not solely engage Indonesia through the lens of competition with China, but rather on Jakarta’s own merits. Too much focus on China will only elevate Indonesian concerns and obscure opportunities for cooperation on issues unrelated to great power competition.

—or accommodate itself to—the realities of great power competition. AUKUS provides the best example. Jakarta 

about nuclear proliferation and an arms race in the region. But, following the larger rollout in March 2023, 

 proved much tamer. Instead of deep concerns, it “has been closely following” the pact and “expects Australia to remain consistent in fulfilling its [nuclear non-proliferation] obligations.” Its misgivings remain, but Indonesia accommodated itself to the new security arrangement, even signing a 

new defense cooperation agreement with Canberra

As the United States continues to shift its attention toward the Indo-Pacific, it cannot ignore Indonesia, which resides at the region’s geographic center. Deft policy work is necessary to maximize Indonesia’s value and role in a free and open Indo-Pacific. In particular, expanded economic engagement and an understanding that Indonesia will go to Beijing in the absence of US attention are paramount. Recognizing the ceiling also necessitates understanding Jakarta’s hedging, and Washington should not expect it to act in the manner of more closely aligned US allies and partners. That said, on issues like AUKUS where a strong case can be made to proceed regardless of concerns within Southeast Asia, Washington can be confident that the floor in US-Indonesia relations remains high enough to survive these temporary challenges. If the United States can calibrate its approach to Indonesia to ensure that America becomes more attractive as an economic partner than China over the long term, it is a good bet that Indonesia will play an indispensable role in wider efforts to ensure a free and open Indo-Pacific.

is the program coordinator and associate for Southeast Asia at the Wilson Center’s Asia Program, where he administers the 

. Professionally proficient in Mandarin Chinese, his research interests include Southeast Asia, Chinese foreign policy, and Indo-Pacific geopolitics. He maintains a particular focus on security issues such as the ongoing conflict in Myanmar and the changing balance of power in the wider region. Before joining the Asia Program team, Myers worked on democracy and human rights issues and as a researcher of terrorism and violent extremism. He is also a member of the Emerging Quad Think Tank Leaders program. Myers’ writing and commentary have appeared in The Diplomat

Foreign Policy, War on the Rocks, and other outlets. He received his MA from Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and his BA in Political Science and Chinese Language & Culture from Macalester College.

Cover photo: President Joe Biden walks with Indonesian President Joko Widodo as he departs the Apurva Kempinski in Bali, Indonesia Monday, November 14, 2022. Official White House Photo by Adam Schultz.

American success in great power competition with China and the future of a free and open Indo-Pacific runs through enhanced engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—in particular, its largest member state, Indonesia. Lucas Myers provides historical context and analysis.