Reinventing Security and Cooperation in Europe

After the Cold War, two European security institutions remained: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both organizations—robust tankers in size and complexity—shared the goal of enhancing security on the European continent and across the transatlantic space, despite their different roles and memberships. However, after 30 years, these organizations have charted different courses when adapting to contemporary challenges. Of the two, NATO has proved more adept at reinventing itself. It may be a tanker, but it has—when necessary—maneuvered like a yacht. The OSCE, with 57 participating states, including Russia, remains a tanker: essential but cumbersome, in need of an overhaul, vulnerable in a heavy storm. For the OSCE to thrive beyond next year’s 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act which created the organization, it will need to take a page out of NATO’s book of reinvention and embark on a new chapter.

Post-Cold War’s New Security Architecture for Europe

As the Cold War came to a close, security architecture in Europe was at a crossroads. NATO lost its express purpose as an anti-Soviet defense umbrella. Its counterpart, the Soviet-backed Warsaw Pact, was rapidly disintegrating. Many wondered about the necessity of NATO; leaders met in July 1990 and issued the London Declaration, a seminal moment for the Alliance that redefined its work for the years to come. NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner 

 a new focus for NATO: clearing away the legacy of the Cold War and helping define a new European security architecture, ensure the membership of a reunited Germany into the Alliance, and continue to prevent war on the European continent. The transformation of NATO was profound: revised defense and force planning, moving toward a reduced forward presence, and less reliance on nuclear weapons. A new Strategic Concept (the document defining the Alliance’s mandate) was introduced at the 1990 summit and approved in 1991. It also led to a restructuring of NATO member countries’ forces. This guiding document would last until a new Strategic Concept (introduced in 1999) would further refine NATO’s post-Cold War role and demonstrate the remarkable changes underway to ensure it continued to be fit for purpose. The decision to invite the new democracies of Europe into NATO, beginning in 1999 with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, transformed the Alliance and Europe itself. Russia was seen as a partner, as outlined in the NATO-Russia Founding Act. 

After 9/11, NATO’s key challenge changed dramatically. It shifted the Alliance focus beyond its core task of collective defense to emphasize its role in crisis management and cooperative security.

In the 1990s, the OSCE seemed like the ideal venue for strengthening ties with Russia and integrating the Russian Federation into the west. The Helsinki Principles (agreed to by the former Soviet Union after all) were the Organization’s foundation. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe, established in 1990, updated its mandate for the post-Soviet era, and the Helsinki Summit in 1992 gave the organization new capabilities, including on-the-ground missions and a human rights office, to ensure principles were implemented. The OSCE cemented the transition from an infrequent conference to an institution with staff, offices, and engagement. This was the golden era of the OSCE; while NATO focused on the macro level security matters, the OSCE focused on human rights, democracy, freedom of the press, the rights of national minorities, and arms control. Unlike NATO, the OSCE counted Russia as one of its key members and of equal standing with the United States or any other participating state. The immediacy of the OSCE’s work in Eastern Europe made this a zenith of the organization’s influence and efficacy.

The 1990s also tested NATO and OSCE with the collapse of Yugoslavia and war in the Balkans. For NATO, the debate was over whether to conduct “out of area” operations, eventually answered by actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The OSCE, which had deployed its first-ever monitoring missions to the former Yugoslavia in September 1992 (withdrawn in July 1993), found itself in a post-war democracy-building role in Bosnia by the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords. In Kosovo, the OSCE’s mission (established in 1999) runs its largest field operation, focused on human rights and governance.

After 9/11, NATO’s key challenge changed dramatically. In response to the terrorist attack on the United States, NATO members invoked 

 for the first time, shaped by years of Allied engagement in Afghanistan. NATO’s 2010 Strategic Concept underscored the threat of terrorism and transnational threats. It shifted the Alliance focus beyond its core task of collective defense to emphasize its role in crisis management and cooperative security and provided the foundation for NATO’s 2011 engagement in Libya. Even with military operations ongoing, NATO continued to expand its membership (adding seven members in 2004, two in 2009, and three more from 2017-2023).

Complicating the OSCE’s tenuous relationship with Russia is its breadth, not just of membership, but also of issues. It has expanded its areas of responsibility beyond its initial three pillars.

As NATO adapted itself to new security challenges, the OSCE found its tools were becoming dated, although its ability to put missions in the field remained useful: in Moldova, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia (until December 2008), and in Ukraine (from 2014 until 2022), among others. The OSCE’s Minsk Group, under joint leadership of France, Russia, and the US, engaged in years of negotiations with Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. But funding these missions and renewing their mandates became increasingly difficult as Russian opposition mounted. The OSCE’s security role also diminished. A focus on confidence building measures promoting verification and transparency has languished as major arms control agreements ended. Russia suspended and eventually withdrew from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE); the United States and Russia have withdrawn from the Treaty on Open Skies. The valuable safety rails the OSCE worked hard to install are slowly being dismantled and new measures are not being introduced.

OSCE and NATO in the Wake of Renewed Russia Aggression

Today, NATO remains a defensive alliance and is more relevant than ever. Bolstered by two new applicants, Finland and Sweden, NATO also boasts a new Strategic Concept 

 in 2022. This renewed force posture makes the Alliance better able to respond to threats. With an announced increase in military spending across Europe bolstering NATO’s capabilities, it is clear that NATO’s role will endure through 2030 and beyond. The reinvention and reinvigoration of NATO was externally motivated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, but the Alliance seized on the opportunity and ran with it. Although the Alliance is inherently a coalition of like-minded countries (while the OSCE has been described as a coalition of 

-like-minded countries), it still faced considerable internal and political hurdles to seize on this opportunity.

NATO stepped up to meet the strategic threat posed by Russia. It’s there in the 2022 Strategic Concept, and even clearer in the restructuring of its operational goals after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The OSCE, with Russia as a member, has found its capacity for action increasingly restricted. It is perhaps the most difficult chapter of the OSCE’s history, with everything coming to a head in the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Due to the consensus-based nature of the OSCE, Russia has blocked the formal adoption of a budget, forcing the organization to pursue extraordinary funding from individual members. Ahead of the 2023 ministerial in Skopje, Russia made it exceptionally difficult to choose a new country to chair and steer the work of the OSCE in 2024 (Malta took on the challenge).

Complicating the OSCE’s tenuous relationship with Russia is its breadth, not just of membership, but also of issues. It has expanded its areas of responsibility beyond its initial three pillars (politico-military, economic and environmental, and human) to now cover at least 24 sub-themes and focus areas. Although this is a reflection of the increasingly complex nature of current challenges that fall under the security umbrella, paring down its activities to be more targeted can only strengthen the organization.  

How can the OSCE reinvent itself and remain relevant in this increasingly complex and geopolitical world? Some have called for this tanker to return to its original conference format, harkening back to its early pre-institutional days. But doing so would lose expertise and capabilities, built up over many decades, including in the OSCE’s field missions monitoring not-so-frozen conflicts. As the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act looms large, can the OSCE tanker be retrofitted for the future? NATO has shown that a tanker can act like a yacht, given the right occasion and political will. The OSCE has a continued purpose, and with continued Russian aggression in Ukraine and consequential elections around the world, it is arguably more needed in 2024 than at any other point in the 21st century. But it needs to learn from NATO’s example if it is to endure effectively beyond 2025.

 is the director of the Wilson Center’s Global Europe Program. She spent more than 30 years as a US diplomat, having served primarily in Europe including postings to both NATO and the OSCE.

 is the chair of the Wilson Center's Global Europe Program and partner and lead of the Europe & Eurasia practice at Albright Stonebridge Group. Before joining the Wilson Center, Ambassador Reeker served as Chargé d'Affaires at the US Embassy in the United Kingdom (2021-22) and was Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasia (2019-21).

 is a program associate for the Wilson Center’s Global Europe Program. Previously, he worked at Johns Hopkin SAIS in the Foreign Policy Institute, the Dean's research institute, and for the Center for Transatlantic Relations, a transatlantic think tank within the university. He is also a Fellow for the Transatlantic Leadership Network. His current research focuses on the European Union, NATO, transatlantic security, the Arctic, the Nordic countries, and great power competition.

Cover photo: General view of the NATO Vilnius Summit, July, 11-12, 2023, Lithuania. Photo courtesy of NATO

General view of the NATO Vilnius Summit, July, 11-12, 2023. Photo courtesy of NATO. 

After the Cold War, two European security institutions remained: the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Both organizations—robust tankers in size and complexity—shared the goal of enhancing security on the European continent and across the transatlantic space, despite their different roles and memberships. However, after 30 years, these organizations have charted different courses when adapting to contemporary challenges. Coauthors Robin S. Quinville, Philip T. Reeker, Jason C. Moyer of the Wilson Center’s Global Europe Program examine what is working, and what needs strengthening. 

By taking lessons from NATO, the OSCE could be more effective in responding to today's complex challenges.

In this multimedia feature, Robin Quinville, director of the Global Europe Program at the Wilson Center, speaks with Baroness Catherine Ashton, who, among many other notable roles, served as the first woman commissioner for trade in the European Commission. Together, they examine the role that trade plays in helping Ukraine rebuild, in strengthening the US-UK relationship, and in helping to create a peaceful and stable Europe.

Cover photo: Ariel view of the Port of Odessa. Shutterstock/

Robin Quinville, Director of the Wilson Center’s Global Europe Program:

Hello from the Wilson Center, I'm Robin Quinville. I'm the director of the Global Europe Program here at the Wilson Center. And it's really a pleasure to welcome you to this 

Following on our discussion of strengthening supply chains and strategic competition, this issue of the 

 is reinvigorating a conversation on trade and investment to examine the unique role that European trade has in supporting Ukraine's postwar rebuilding.

We are happy to have the Right Honorable Baroness Catherine Ashton join us here at Wilson. She's a distinguished fellow with our program and it's a delight to have you here with us. Baroness Ashton served as the European Union's first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. So that's from 2009 to 2014. She earned wide praise as a negotiator leading the P5+1 talks on Iran's nuclear program and galvanizing agreement between Serbia and Kosovo on their future.

Before these impressive achievements, she served as the first woman commissioner for trade in the European Commission, and now she's written a new book titled, “

And Then What? Inside Stories of 21st Century Diplomacy

.” So, Cathy, thank you so much for being here with us today.

The Right Honorable Baroness Catherine Ashton, former European Trade Commissioner:

So as the EU's foreign minister in 2013, you know better than anyone the impact of Ukraine's decision to link its future to Europe's. The question of whether to sign the association agreement really galvanized events at that period, and it led to the change of government in Ukraine and it was all over this agreement to reduce trade barriers between Ukraine and Europe and Ukraine's European future. Tell us more about those negotiations and why they had this effect.

Well, as I say, it's great to be with you, Robin. So you have to imagine that for seven years by 2013, negotiations have been going on between Ukraine and the European Union. The purpose behind them was to offer opportunity for Ukraine in areas like their food production, the breadbasket of Europe. They were often described as [having] technology and the ability for some of their industries to rejuvenate, to recognize they needed to change, to grow and develop alongside that, because it was more than a trade agreement, you also had the opportunity to look at the judicial system, to look at anti-corruption measures, to do the kinds of things that we value so highly in terms of a democratic future and making sure the institutions are fit for purpose and provide for the citizens. So it was a broad agreement with trade at the real heart of it. Seven years of negotiation completed. It just needs a political signature to take it forward. And at that moment, as we all know, President 

 made the decision under pressure from Russia that he was not going to sign the agreement.

And events spiraled from there. That led us to where we are today.

You know, I think people have a bit forgotten that because at the beginning when Russia invaded Ukraine, people were saying, oh, it's about NATO. But it was about these early decisions on trade and on Ukraine's European future. Since Russia's invasion, Ukraine has shown this remarkable resilience. And Russia has deliberately targeted civilian infrastructure, obviously trying to cripple its economy as well as win a military victory. It's and it's striking at the economy, not only for the now, but for the for the future as well. How can the EU use trade policy positively in this instance to try and secure Europe, Ukraine's future with Europe?

It's going to be incredibly important when we help to rebuild Ukraine, that the infrastructure is not just seen as the buildings that are lying in twisted ruin right now, but also the infrastructure that makes it possible for people to live and work and thrive in an economy that's functioning. And that's going to depend a lot on the work done, of course, here in the US, but especially, I would argue, done in Europe.

And that's going to be opportunities to have no barriers to trade, the opportunities for Ukraine to get investment, foreign direct investment coming in from Europe, to get support from the European Commission, to redevelop its industries, its agriculture, and to be able to rebuild in that broadest sense, absolutely crucial, because also for the Ukrainian people, they want to have a thriving economy and not be dependent on us just giving them money and resources.

They want to be able to do this by having a strong economy.

Can the EU, as it negotiated this agreement and future agreements, actually put in some of the steps that need to be taken to meet the entry requirements into the EU eventually?

They certainly will. I mean, it's quite difficult getting into the EU as countries that have got here. And I will tell you it's something called the key. And the key is all of the legal requirements, the legislative changes you have to make. Your judicial system must be up to scratch. You have to show in each part of your system of government and in each part of your economy that you are meeting the standards and requirements of an EU member state.

And it can take a considerable amount of time to do it all. So one of the ways that the European Union helps is to put resources and people into that system and actually help develop the systems you need internally, the ways of doing things and so on. And that, I think from the experience of other countries, is incredibly important.

I remember years and years ago, of course, in the days when the UK was part of the EU, when Poland was coming in, and that we were working with the judicial system, our judges were talking to their judges, helping to support them, to develop the kind of work that was needed to make sure this system was appropriate and compatible. So there's lots and lots of things that will be done alongside side the giving of resources and, of course, support.

So it's more than just the suspension of import duties and things like that. It's practical assistance to make the system that is at work in Ukraine support of a fast or as fast as possible EU membership.

That's right. If you simply do like agriculture, there'll be lots of ways that the farming communities will be working together, ways in which you can provide machinery, ways in which you can provide opportunities to grow certain crops, support to do that, things that will be needed to kind of get the economy moving. All of those are available to Ukraine as a country that is moving closer and faster, of course, to Europe.

Right. How can US policymakers support EU efforts? And is there something that you could identify if you were talking to two US policymakers, as you sometimes do, that would you recommend?

I think it's important for the US to do what it does really very, very well, which is to offer a combination of financial support and also strategic support. You know, the US is good at bringing in expertise and knowledge, and especially when you're thinking about an economy like Ukraine's with a big reliance on agriculture, but also the potential of huge capacity in technology and beyond to make sure that there is a lot of work being done across the Atlantic to help support the growth and development of those technologies in those companies.

I also hope we'll see American investment, you know, companies coming into Ukraine and perhaps government can do some supportive work to help them do that in what will be initially quite challenging circumstances and business will do what business does best, but a bit of government support can go a long way.

I'm sure that Ukrainians are looking for that. If you pass their embassy here in Washington, it has a huge sign on it that says we are open for business, right? You were a European Union trade commissioner before you were a high representative for foreign and security policy. So can I ask you a little bit about where you see the US-EU trade discussions heading?

And where should they be heading, given all of your experience in this?

There's always this kind of dream of a free trade agreement across the Atlantic, and it's something the EU has long wanted, bearing in mind it's very complicated to achieve, and it's complicated because you're trying to do the best for your own country, or in the case of the EU group of countries, while also recognizing that getting a deal requires you to give a little, if not a lot in certain areas of your economy.

You know, trade deals are not 'everybody wins on everything.' They are a kind of a mixture. In some areas, perhaps your businesses will do less well, but they'll do very well in others. And the kind of combination helps to grow the economy, which means everybody does better. And those discussions, when you're talking with businesses who've got really strong interests in making sure either they can export as much as possible or that they can protect what they do as well as possible, are quite complicated.

And that was my experience. So when you're looking at, for example, we just mentioned agriculture in the context of Ukraine, think about it in the context of Europe. It's very complicated. Having said a lot, because we share the same values and ideals and we have markets that operate in very similar ways. There's a lot you can do on the way to getting to that magic moment of a free trade agreement, and I hope we'll continue to try and do that.

There's a lot of talk about whether both sides are becoming more protectionist in their attitude, and it's about protecting industries and communities while not falling into protectionism, which is about actually running industries that would be better off transforming into something else. And I think we're in the beginning of those discussions and debates. The pandemic, in a sense, brought them alive because of supply chains and so on.

But there's a lot more that we can do, and I hope we'll see the continuation of the ongoing dialog that's so valuable as a way of trying to address those issues.

Now, it occurs to me that it might be easier to do in a sort of sector by sector or a subject specific basis rather than an overall overarching trade agreement, at least to get there eventually.

What it can be. The only challenge with doing it sector by sector is that you always start with the easiest sectors and then you end up with the really tough ones and the really tough ones don't necessarily want to be thought of as just a sector. You know, if you're going to persuade an industry that actually it may have to put up with greater competition, you're only going to do it if it could see that there's a broader advantage.

And I remember negotiating trade deals where certain industries in Europe were going to have greater competition for sure. But what they could see was that if the other sectors worked well, they were going to have an advantage. Then the economy in Europe would grow anyway, and that means they would sell more of their goods at home as well as potentially abroad.

But it's the overview that that really pushes it and it also requires governments to be engaged with it so that they're talking to their industries and explaining what they're going to do, either to mitigate what they can see coming or at least to show the support to them and sometimes put a little bit of pressure on them to say, actually, this is good for the economy overall and the economy overall means the consumer.

The consumer should be the winner at the end of all this. And business should thrive because consumers are able to make good choices and have the goods that they want.

It's that balance which is so tricky to find. 

So the UK is negotiating its post Brexit trade agreements with countries, and I thought I'd ask you for you to look in your crystal ball and give us the prospects for a US-UK trade agreement.

Well, I think we've been talked about as being quite low down the list or even at the back of the queue, I think as I recall, and that's understandable for a number of reasons, most particularly because there are bigger fish to fry. As I say, from the US perspective, there are much bigger, more important deals to be done.

Having said that, there's a huge reliance from the UK's perspective on this amazing relationship. We call it the special relationship. It's not just a word that we use, we mean it. We think of the context of our relationship with the US as being extremely valuable and important. So trade is an expression of that. And even though I think getting to a trade deal with the huge nature of the US and its capacity versus the UK, that's going to be quite a challenging discussion to have for certain industries for sure.

But there's more we can do together, more investment, more capacity to be able to do things. More smaller moves, as you were saying, may be sectors, but maybe also just moving things a little bit, moving the dial toward a greater trade, sort of a appropriate relationship for the future that I hope we'll see, because it would be great if we could do that.

I have seen that they have been doing some discussions at the state level, so so maybe doing it at the subnational level and those are ongoing.

Well, if you take some of the states like California, I mean, they are huge economies. You could have fantastic arrangements for any country with even one of the states of that size. And that nature. So I think that would be good to do. But I guess in the end, the ultimate objective would be, you know, across the whole nation.

Well, you name checked my home state, so thank you for that. And thank you, Cathy, for this insightful conversation. I have really appreciated your insights into all of these things. And to our audience, I hope you learned as much as I have. I also hope that you will explore the rest of the Wilson Quarterly's spring issue available at Wilson Quarterly dot com.

In  this multimedia feature Robin Quinville of the Wilson Center's Global Europe Program and Baroness Catherine Ashton discuss the role of trade in helping Ukraine rebuild and creating a peaceful and stable Europe.

In this multimedia feature Robin Quinville of the Wilson Center's Global Europe Program and Baroness Catherine Ashton discuss the role of trade in helping Ukraine rebuild and creating a peaceful and stable Europe.

Trade the Future of Ukraine

Trade and the Future of Ukraine

The world has shifted dramatically since Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022. As we sit on the hinge of history, our summer 2022 issue examines the ever-widening impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war. With features covering a range of topics—from European security to world resources to mental health and more—we asked some of the nation's most experienced and respected foreign policy experts to share their thoughts on the biggest lessons and insights thus far. 

The warning signs of Russia’s malign actions have been present well over the last decade, from its 

 of Crimea and the war in the Donbas in 2014, to its brutal tactics in Syria.

What has surprised the world, however, are the war crimes committed by Putin and his Russian invaders.

We have seen images of corpses littering the streets of Bucha, with their hands tied behind their backs, and many of whom had been placed in shallow graves. Mothers and young girls have been brutally assaulted. And all the while, Russia brings in mobile crematoriums to hide the evidence of its crimes.

Ukrainian women and children are being rounded up and forcefully deported to internment camps in Russia. It is clear there is no limit to Putin’s cruelty.

The widespread destruction of nonmilitary targets—including 

apartment buildings, schools, and venues such as shopping malls—

remind us that no country can remain neutral in the face of this evil. For example, Russia deliberately targeted and bombed a theater in Mariupol that had the word “CHILDREN” written outside it in Russian, large enough for satellites to see.

These are Putin’s war crimes. And he, along with the Russian troops who have carried them out, must be held accountable.

, the Ukraine Invasion War Crimes Deterrence and Accountability Act. It passed the House—now it is time for the Senate to act and send it to the president for his signature.

This law will ensure that the United States helps Ukraine gather, analyze, and maintain evidence of war crimes. It will also put Russian troops and their leaders on notice that the world is watching.

We are taking the names of war criminals. And we will absolutely seek justice.

Congressman Michael T. McCaul is currently serving his ninth term representing Texas' 10th District in the United States Congress. He is the ranking member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 

Echoes of history are resonating from Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine. Once again, a European country has aggressively crossed sovereign lines, killing innocent civilians, committing war crimes and genocide.

Ukrainians have exceeded all estimates for success with their sheer bravery, leadership, and military ability. It is imperative that the US and its transatlantic allies sustain vital assistance to Ukraine in its heroic effort to defend itself from Russia’s illegal and immoral war.

Since this war’s threat extends far beyond the nations that are directly involved, the stakes could not be higher. Under the backdrop of a global clash between authoritarianism and democracy, a loss by Ukraine would incentivize those countries experiencing authoritarian influences to veer away from values of individual freedoms and the rule of law. And it would strengthen China’s hand as it seeks global dominance.

Addressing the efforts of this war will be daunting. With more than 5 million Ukrainians seeking refuge in neighboring countries, Europe faces its greatest wave of migration since World War II. The seizure and blockade of Ukrainian food exports will result in widespread famine, migration, and death. The ratcheting up of global oil and gas prices is creating inflation and political unrest in Europe and the US.

Yet our response to Putin’s aggression will have a far-reaching effect, which could mirror that of the post–World War II era. Transatlantic unity, witnessed by combined economic sanctions and a higher-funded NATO, which will include Finland and Sweden, have no doubt confounded Putin. Importantly, Europe is accelerating its historic energy transformation from a reliance on Russian oil and gas, while advancing to non-fossil-based energy.

The outcome of this war remains uncertain. In the final analysis, Ukraine’s sovereign decision must dictate the result. One thing is certain from a global perspective: Russia has already lost.

Bill Keating represents Massachusetts’ Ninth Congressional District. He is a senior member of the House of Representatives, sitting on both the Foreign Affairs and Armed Services committees. He currently serves as chair of the Europe, Eurasia, Energy, and Environment subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Ukraine and the Future of Democracies in the 21st Century

After months of bloody warfare in Ukraine, it is becoming clear that a difficult and prolonged war of attrition could result in dangerous or disappointing consequences or a successful defense of democracy—either way, it will have a pivotal impact on the course of history.

What path is taken will be decided by whether Ukrainian, US, and NATO leaders remain resolute, unified, and patient.

Growing frustration on both sides of this war could force greater risks that could escalate an already-dangerous war. That same frustration could also produce a less-than-satisfactory settlement of the conflict that would leave a neutral but divided Ukraine vulnerable to a weakened Putin.

Just as a long war of attrition and failed diplomacy defined World War I and the struggle for power in the 20th century, what ultimately happens in Ukraine could well define the struggle between autocracy and democracy for the rest of the 21st century.

For too long, autocratic adversaries have sensed weakness on the part of the United States and Western democracies. Putin took advantage of this weakness by invading Crimea, Syria, and Libya, and by conducting a bold cyberattack against US elections systems—and he never paid a price for his aggression. Finally, President Biden and our NATO allies said enough is enough. They came together in unprecedented unity to draw a line on Russian aggression: tough economic sanctions have crippled the Russian economy; crucial military assistance supported brave and courageous Ukrainian fighters; and NATO was strengthened by reinforcements, potential new members, and an Article 5 pledge to defend any NATO country from attack. The Russian invasion was stopped at Kyiv; and although the war, the killing, and destruction continue, it is clear that Putin failed to achieve his principal objectives.

Now is not the time for the US and our NATO allies to weaken our resolve to defend Ukraine. There is a larger strategic goal at stake that is served only by a strong message of unity in defense of democracy. This message must be sent not just to Russia but also to China, North Korea, Iran, and any other adversary that threatens the sovereignty of free nations.

If this war is to have a chance of ending successfully, Ukraine must continue to be supported by advanced weapon systems essential to pushing back Russian advances. President Zelenskyy needs negotiating leverage to achieve a just end to this war. This may require more time, blood, and patience, but it is the only effective way to defend Ukrainian sovereignty and give hope to future democracies in the 21st century.

Leon Panetta is former CIA director and secretary of defense.

It is time to forge a common understanding of what the free world should learn from the invasion of Ukraine. Four lessons should be foundational for new policies and strategies.

First, many had clung to the overly optimistic post–Cold War assumption that an arc of history had guaranteed the primacy of free societies over authoritarian systems. It is time to identify new ways to compete effectively against Russia and China. 

Second, “triangular diplomacy,” as practiced by President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the 1970s to separate China and the Soviet Union, is not feasible vis-à-vis today’s revanchist dictators Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin, who have announced that the friendship between them “has no limits.” Rather than try to separate Xi and Putin, it is time to glue the dictators together, because the advantages of their partnership derive mainly from their ability to cover for one another through obfuscation, obstruction, and coercion.   

Third, Russian aggression and Ukrainian courage have confirmed G. K. Chesterton’s observation that war is not the best way of settling differences, but it may be the only way to ensure that they are not settled for you. The free world must strengthen its collective defense to restore deterrence and prepare to respond to further aggression. 

Fourth, it is folly to rely on authoritarian regimes for critical supply chains or energy security. Governments and businesses must reduce the risk of supply chain disruption; new policies must integrate national security and energy security with efforts to reduce carbon emissions.   

H. R. McMaster is the Fouad and Michelle Ajami Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution of Stanford University. Upon graduation from the US Military Academy in 1984, he served as a commissioned officer in the US Army for 34 years, retiring as a lieutenant general in 2018. He was then the 26th assistant to the president for national security affairs.

War in Ukraine Is Changing Europe, Especially Germany

With reunification in 1990, Germany was no longer a potential battleground for opposing armies. Point Alpha—a critical observation post, where US soldiers warily watched the inner-German border for Warsaw Pact forces—became an out-of-the-way memorial. The end of the Cold War fundamentally altered Germany’s threat perception. For the first time in decades, Germany had potential partners, not adversaries, on its borders. 

NATO and EU expansion cemented this fact. Though Germans faced global challenges—managing migration, combating terrorism, ensuring nuclear nonproliferation—they did not see a fundamental threat to European security. Even Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine and Crimea in 2014 did not shake that view; rather, it was a problem for multilateral management through the Minsk Process, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe, and sanctions.  

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine changed all that. It shifted Germany’s threat perception profoundly. The invasion was a hard power action that recalled a too-familiar hard power past.

Germany’s chancellor, Olof Scholz, told parliamentarians on February 27, 2022, that they were in a “watershed era.” Shifting a long-held policy of promoting economic ties with Russia, Germany became a full-on participant in EU sanctions—and stopped the controversial Russia–Germany gas pipeline it had long defended. Germany also took a hard look at its own military readiness and capabilities. The result: a special €100 billion fund for defense investment, and a pledge to steadily invest more than 2 percent of GDP annually in defense—the NATO standard it had failed to reach. Implementation will take commitment and tenacity. It will take sustained public outreach to justify defense investment even as energy prices hit budgets hard. But Scholz’s government is at the beginning of its term. It has time to balance competing priorities effectively. If Germany can accomplish that, its actions will change Europe’s defense capabilities, strengthen NATO, and reinvigorate our transatlantic partnership. It will, in fact, mark a watershed.

Robin Quinville is the former Charge d’ Affaires to Germany and director of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Global Europe Program.

Cover photo: Dnipro, Ukraine Mar 11, 2022. Shutterstock/

As we sit on the hinge of history, our summer 2022 issue examines the ever-widening impacts of the Russia-Ukraine war. We asked some of the nation's most experienced and respected foreign policy experts to share their thoughts on the biggest lessons and insights thus far. Read more.