Trans-Pacific Partnership [TPP] free trade agreement

 in 2017 has been described as one of the biggest U.S. foreign policy blunders in recent years. The commercial losses for U.S. businesses are obvious. The TPP would have been the world’s most ambitious trade deal, encompassing 40 percent of the world’s economy, and U.S. trade with member countries totals around $1.5 billion a year. 

Yet the loss in withdrawing from the TPP was even greater from a geostrategic perspective. 

 cost the United States the opportunity to strengthen its position as a Pacific power at a time when China has emerged as the regional hegemon. And as the new Biden administration turns to many former officials from the Obama White House to fill key posts, expectations are high for policies that are more stable, predictable, and focused on restoring U.S. leadership in the global order, especially in Asia. 

Key Asian allies (including Japan and South Korea) welcomed the Obama presidency’s focus on the world’s most populous and dynamic region. And the TPP was a much-touted example of reinvigorated U.S. commitment to promote free trade rules. Above all, the pact exemplified U.S. determination to enhance economic and political partnerships, in line with its military dominance in the region. Thus, the U.S. rejection of the TPP was seen as much as a political retreat from Asia as it was a refutation of the multilateral trade deal itself. 

Under a new leadership, the White House will no doubt recognize the geostrategic need for the United States to return to the TPP, now known as the 

Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership [CPTPP]

. But if a key Biden administration objective in doing so is to secure U.S. economic leadership in Asia, there may actually be far more effective and less politically contentious ways to do so, especially in the near term. 

The TPP had already been the victim of a politics of reticence. The agreement had languished under the Obama administration, and both 2016 presidential nominees Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump opposed the U.S. joining the trade deal as negotiated. Nearly a decade after the global financial crisis, the divide between those able to navigate a more interlinked economic network and those who were sidelined from it became even more marked. Free trade became synonymous with job loss in the United States, and supporting policies that encouraged further globalization became toxic on the campaign trail.  

Rebuilding the U.S. economy, restoring confidence in U.S. competitiveness, and enhancing its resilience will be President-elect Biden’s first focus. That will mean addressing immediate challenges facing domestic growth, while promoting further global economic integration and increasing trade flows will be put on the backburner.

But the world won’t wait forever. Over the past four years, the divide between those who have benefitted from a more globalized economy and those who have not has increased. What’s more, the devastating impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has heightened awareness of prevailing economic and racial injustices. A broader rethink of the so-called Washington Consensus and the unshakeable faith in market forces and limited state intervention may be in the offing.

The question of how the U.S. can reengage usefully with Asia may depend on whether or not Biden’s economic and foreign policy advisors can deliver the message that it is in the nation’s interest to be an integral part of the global economy – and a driving force in establishing new rules of economic engagement. 

There is growing concern, even among the United States’ staunchest allies, that Biden’s rallying cries to “Build Back Better” and “Buy American” will give little room for Washington to address challenges beyond its own borders. 

Trade is foundational to these sentiments. There is clearly a lack of interest in the United States in negotiating new trade deals as a way to boost economic growth. Anti-trade sentiment in the U.S. was strong before Donald Trump won the presidency, and the past four years has seen a strengthening in aversion to trade and globalization from both the right and the left. New trade deals are perceived to hollow out local economies and destroy jobs, with precious little trickling down to address the vacuum created by industrial exodus.

Nowhere has the case against trade been made more strongly than against China. Most trade analysts argued against a singular focus on the U.S. trade deficit of goods with China. Yet Trump’s hawkish stance towards Beijing – and calling out of China’s unfair trade practices – have been largely welcomed on both sides of the aisle. Continuing bipartisan support means that a strong stance against China will continue under the Biden administration.

Biden’s commitment to enhance domestic self-reliance means expanding geopolitical influence will take a backseat to concerns at home, at least initially. And though foreign policy experts aspire for Washington’s speedy return to the trade agreements such as  the CPTPP, the President-elect has made clear that he is in no rush. “I want to make sure we’re going to fight like hell by investing in America first.... I’m not going to enter any new trade agreement with anybody until we have made major investments here at home and in our workers,” he told the New York Times in early December. 

Even if the incoming administration did want to prioritize new trade deals, there is little political appetite on Capitol Hill for reducing tariffs or lifting trade barriers. Democrats and Republicans alike seem more concerned with the tasks of job creation and incentivizing innovation that resonate more deeply with their constituents. 

On top of it all, the July 2021 expiration of 

, which gives presidential authority to negotiate trade deals which Congress can vote for or against but cannot amend or filibuster, may also play a role in a new administration’s thinking. Extending this authority will be a high priority, and may be more difficult if a new trade deal is already under negotiation. 

Politics and logistics may mitigate against new trade deals in the immediate future. But the close link between national security and economic security means that as a new White House seeks to reset and reestablish frayed relations overseas, it must also recalibrate the belief that foreign policy and trade issues are separate from domestic concerns.

Biden has repeatedly stated both on the campaign trail and in his presidential transition that China is not merely an economic rival. To his mind, Beijing represents a greater systemic challenge which requires the U. S. to work together with like-minded countries in Asia, in particular, to push back against Chinese encroachment. 

“On any issue that matters to the U.S. and China relationship, from pursuing a foreign policy for the middle class, including a trade and economic agenda that produces and protects American workers, our intellectual prosperity and the environment, to ensuring security of prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region, to championing human rights, we are stronger and more effective when we are flanked by nations that share our vision and the future of our world,” observed Biden in a national security speech given in late December “That is how we multiply the impact of our efforts and make those efforts more sustainable. That is the power of smart, effective American leadership. But right now, there is an enormous vacuum. We are going to have to regain the trust and confidence of a world that has begun to find ways to work around us or work without us.” 

The world has certainly begun to work closer together to create new rules of trade engagement, albeit without the United States. In the four years that Washington turned its back on numerous multilateral deals, including the TPP, the Paris climate accords, and World Health Organization membership, Asia too has been in flux. Most vexing for Asian countries has been the balancing act required to contend with China’s consolidation as their single biggest trading partner and its growing role as a security challenge. 

The uncertain role of the United States as the Indo-Pacific deals with shifts in the regional balance of power and challenges to economic development has had consequences. Rather than simply wait for U.S. leaders who are more amenable to multilateralism, the TPP process moved ahead without the United States, as the remaining 11 countries pushed through CPTPP in 2018.

Representing nearly 15 percent of the global economy, the CPTPP is one of the most ambitious trade deals in the world to date, boasting geographic breadth and attention to non-tariff barriers including intellectual property rights and digital commerce which is where the real commercial as well as security competition will lie. The agreement also succeeded in bringing a disparate group of countries from Vietnam to Japan together to pursue free trade under a common set of rules of engagement.  The allure of CPTPP has been made clear by the fact that a number of countries have already expressed interest in joining the group, including Great Britain as well as China, even without the United States as part of the deal. 

Yet CPTPP is not the only recent mega-trade deal of the Indo-Pacific. A second major multilateral trade agreement, the 

Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)

, took shape in November 2019. This pact was agreed upon by the ten ASEAN member countries of Southeast Asia, as well as Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, and China.

While less focused on addressing issues related to non-tariff barriers, RCEP is unifying a diverse group of nations with varied governance systems – ranging from constitutional democracies to authoritarian rule – to commit to greater trade efficiencies and compatibility. RCEP is also still a work-in-progress, and still must be ratified by at least six ASEAN countries and three of the five partner nations. It is expected to come into force by the end of 2021.

Neither the United States nor India, Asia’s biggest democracy, is party to the CPTPP or the RCEP. Yet contrary to how it is portrayed in the U.S. media or ballyhooed by the Chinese leadership, RCEP is not a Beijing-led trade deal. The initiative was pushed forward by the 10 Southeast Asian nations of Singapore, Brunei, Malaysia, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam, and Cambodia at a time when a political divide has grown larger among ASEAN countries along a U.S.-China line. 

Biden has repeatedly stated both on the campaign trail and in his presidential transition that China is not merely an economic rival. 

The benefits of rules for economic engagement that allow for greater efficiency, and shared expectations that globalization is a driving force for economic growth are the glue to keep RCEP and CPTPP member countries together. Indeed, too much focus on governance and democratic values as ideals to unite the region against Beijing can actually backfire, especially when essential nations such as Vietnam still eschew democracy. In fact, as Biden concentrates on uniting “like-minded” countries for a common goal, there will need to be a rethink on what the shared values are, and what is expected from leadership. Effectiveness as a Pacific power and leader of the international order will require the United States to put its own economy back on firm footing. Yet the U.S. must also demonstrate a renewed commitment to listen and not simply work together with allies and partners. 

There is certainly a credibility void to be filled. The Obama administration sought a so-called rebalance to Asia in 2011, with the TPP anchoring a more comprehensive approach of engagement in the region. It was a strategy largely welcomed by Washington’s closest allies amidst growing concerns about China’s rise and a perceived need for U.S. leadership to offset Beijing’s regional hegemony. 

The U.S. abandonment of the TPP shattered the rebalancing strategy. And any attempt by a  Biden administration to go back to that future must back up the rhetoric of commitment to Asian allies with a targeted action plan soon after taking office, lest his promises are perceived merely as empty words.  

Picking up from where the Trump administration left off and pushing back against China’s unfair trade practices will be a low-hanging fruit. Though President Trump adopted a unilateral approach to trade to reduce the U.S. trade deficit, and imposed tariffs on long-standing allies as well as China, his administration worked with the European Union and Japan to form a trilateral coalition within the World Trade Organization aimed at pushing back against China and other non-market economies. 

These endeavors continued into this year, as Washington joined forces with Japan and the EU again to declare current WTO rules inadequate to address market distortions caused by subsidies. The triumvirate proposed new subsidy rules instead, namely against providing unlimited guarantees; offering subsidies to ailing companies without a restructuring plan; providing subsidies to companies that are unable to secure long-term financing; and calling for the ban of certain debt forgiveness. 

President-elect Biden will be in no rush to lift tariffs imposed by his predecessor. But his administration should make a concerted effort to continue working together with the EU and Japan within the WTO framework to reinforce rules that ensure fair trade, if only to prove U.S. commitment to multilateralism. 

Pushing back against China’s economic coercion offers another opportunity for a U.S. leadership role. Ongoing tensions between China and Australia have escalated to the point where it is no longer simply a tit-for-tat trade dispute. Rather, Beijing’s punitive actions against Canberra for its decision to ban Huawei from its 5G network and its public demand that China investigate the origins of the coronavirus are authoritarianism in action. 

Escalating Chinese reprisals, including harsh tariffs on key exports including wine and barley and the detention of Australian journalists, are hardly unique to Australia. China acted swiftly and aggressively against South Korea in 2017 when Seoul agreed to install the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system, which it deemed a threat to its own national security. China boycotted Korean goods. Group travel by Chinese tourists to Korea was banned. The cost to the Korean economy was at least $6.8 billion that year. 

Pushing back against China’s economic coercion offers another opportunity for a U.S. leadership role.

China also took punitive economic action against Japan in 2010, after a Chinese fisherman was detained for fishing in Japanese territorial waters without permission. In response to the conflict, Beijing imposed an export ban of all rare earth elements to Japan, which are critical materials for the production of strategic products including hybrid cars and missiles. 

This pattern of retaliatory action against countries that have been critical of China or challenged Beijing’s rule is not new, but it has grown and intensified in recent years. Ironically, these measures have coincided with President Xi Jinping’s international public relations campaign to promote China as a guarantor of the rule of law in the 21st century.  

The opening for the Biden administration is clear. It can step up efforts not only to call out China’s violations of global trade rules, but to push back against worldwide Chinese economic coercion. Washington could rally like-minded nations to work together to counterbalance China’s violation of global trading rules without having to deal with the domestic political minefield of trying to negotiate new trade deals. 

Dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic within the Unites States, and the resulting domestic economic fallout, is a given for the Biden Administration. And the necessity for the world’s largest economy to recover robustly and provide social stability within its own borders is also in the interest of U.S. partners and allies. 

So perhaps negotiating new trade deals may be pushed back for a while. But Washington must seize the many other options to engage multilaterally across the globe, and address issues of mutual economic concern, especially regarding China’s violation of international trade rules. The Biden administration must embrace a commitment to work together with its partners and allies to address distorting non-market practices in the global economy from day one, and resist being blinded solely by the needs of the domestic economy.

is the Deputy Director for Geoeconomics and the Senior Northeast Asia Associate at the Wilson Center’s Asia Program. A seasoned journalist and analyst, she spent ten years reporting from Tokyo and Washington for Dow Jones and UPI on the global economy, international trade, and Asian markets and politics. Goto previously worked for the World Bank and has been awarded fellowships from the East-West Center and the Knight Foundation.

Cover Photograph: President Donald J. Trump, seated next to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, listens as China’s President Xi Jinping,  delivers remarks at the G20 Japan Summit in Osaka, Japan on June 28, 2019. (Official White House Photo by Shealah Craighead)

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Asian nations need a return to U.S. multilateralism, even in the absence of new trade agreements.

Beyond Deals 

Sleeping next to a corpse, even that of a loved one, was a ritual I had long been dreading. Instead of bringing closure, it seemed a particularly cruel and gothic way to bring even more sorrow to a grieving family.

Yet Buddhist tradition in Japan dictates that a body lies in rest at home with the family for several days until a monk prays for the deceased's spirit to depart safely for its next life at the funeral, after which the body is cremated. And so my father’s body was brought back to my parents’ house in suburban Tokyo, the site which had been bought by my grandfather nearly a half-century earlier, and to which I had flown back to from Washington.

Having been in a steady decline from a debilitating lung disease until he was no longer able to breathe even for a minute without an oxygen tank, my father's last several months had been especially painful to watch. Given his struggle just to stay alive, his death was not unexpected, and in some ways, it was a relief that he no longer had to fight as he slowly ceased being the brilliant investment banker that he once was.

But I had failed to be there when he took his final breath. While I  managed to fly in to Japan to see him every few weeks at his hospital bed since late last year, it just wasn’t enough.

But I had failed to be there when he took his final breath. While I managed to fly in to Japan to see him every few weeks at his hospital bed since late last year, it just wasn’t enough. Just when I was about to board the plane from Dulles on standby on May 8 after my mother called that the end should be coming soon, she called again to say it was all over.

Long haul flights are never for the faint of heart, but that flight was the loneliest journey I had ever taken. Having no one to talk to about my loss just minutes earlier, I had over 12 hours to myself to replay my final visit with my father the previous month, and to grapple with the guilt for not being there when it really mattered, in his final hours.

When I finally arrived at my parents' house, my father was laid out in a white futon on the tatami floor wearing a pure white kimono, a dagger placed upon his chest to ward off evil spirits. A long white candle burned and incense was lit, but the smell of lilies overpowered everything else.

It was the least likely setting my father would have been comfortable in, yet his face was calmer than it had been in a long time. In fact, he not only looked more serene, but he actually looked slightly more youthful than he had when I had last seen him in hospital six weeks earlier.

And without worrying about his oxygen supply, and not panicking every time he coughed, I was finally able to focus on who he really was, and what he meant to me, rather than seeing him as the sickly, frail patient.

Born two years before Japan surrendered to the United States, my father Shigenobu was born to a well-to-do family of landowners in Saitama, which back then "might as well have been rural Vietnam," according to him. His thirst for knowledge of the wider world, and his drive to learn English in his teens in particular were key for him to pursue a career in international finance, which allowed my mother and me to spend several years in Los Angeles and Brussels. His passion and life decisions, in short, ultimately came to define my own life, and eventually, my children’s as well.

His passion and life decisions, in short, ultimately came to define my own life, and eventually, my children’s as well.

As relatives, friends, and former colleagues came over to pay their respects during the day as final arrangements for the funeral were made, I was able to spend time with my father each night, simply sharing time with him and talking to him about what had been, what could have been. It wasn’t a dead body that I was with. It was my father that I have always loved, who was sensible, proud, and always unafraid to be a bit irreverent, and who was also no longer suffering. This was the father that I wanted to remember, and when the time came for the undertaker to carry his body away to the temple, the pain of separation was overwhelming.

My father's body was cremated after the funeral, and his ashes now rest at my parent's house, in accordance to Buddhist tradition. His remains will finally be buried by our local temple on the 49th day of his death, a week after Father's Day.

is the senior Northeast Asia associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center's Asia Program.

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Learning to Say Goodbye to My Father: The Ritual of Letting Go

Until the end of World War II, Emperor Hirohito was a living god in the minds of many Japanese. By the time of his death in 1989, he was more of a phoenix: the personification of a Japan that was able to rise from the ashes of war. His 64-year reign, the Showa era, was a story of resilience and triumph that weathered military defeat and ultimately conquered the world as an economic powerhouse.

Only four decades after Tokyo was reduced to rubble, Japan rebuilt itself into the second-largest economy in the world. So ascendent was Japan that many in the West began to fear that Japan might simply buy out some of the hottest (and not so hot) assets from across the globe — 

, the Pebble Beach golf course, and even Van Gogh’s sunflower paintings. Such international worries, however, soon dissipated as Japan fell into an economic abyss shortly after Hirohito’s reign, from which it is only now showing signs of re-emergence.

Over the past 25 years since the emperor was laid to rest, Japan has grappled with its own narrative of exceptionalism. It’s easy to fall into the trap of nostalgia—longing for the Showa era days gone by when Japan was clearly the biggest power in Asia and its people were confident of economic superiority underpinned by a diligent workforce, unique business practices, and traditional values.

Change has been painfully slow for Japanese women, and nothing short of a social revolution will propel Japan’s economy even close to what it once was. Yet, the descendants of Emperor Hirohito remain committed to preserving a Japanese value system that is in dire need of sweeping social reform.

The descendants of Emperor Hirohito remain committed to preserving a value system in dire need of sweeping reform

Take, for instance, none other than Hirohito’s own granddaughter-in-law, Princess Masako. When the Harvard- and Oxford-educated career diplomat married Crown Prince Naruhito 21 years ago, hopes were high that she would take on an active role in modernizing the often staid imperial household — she could encourage greater diplomatic exchange between royalty worldwide, even if she couldn’t reach the global celebrity status of a Princess Diana or Queen Noor. Instead, as Princess Masako struggled to conceive a child over the years, she made fewer and fewer public appearances, and almost never traveled overseas.

When she did succeed in giving birth to Princess Aiko 12 years ago, national joy was muted: a woman still cannot succeed to the Chrysanthemum Throne. Granted, parliament began debating the possibility of reforming the constitution so that women could inherit the crown, 

but that conversation was quickly quashed when Princess Kiko, the wife of Naruhito’s younger brother, had a baby boy in 2006

. This means that once Crown Prince Naruhito ascends to the throne, his successor will be neither his daughter nor his two female nieces, but his nephew, Hisahito — who will leapfrog over all of them to take the emperorship. Princess Kiko is the mother of the emperor-to-be, and has overtaken Princess Masako in stature.

Although the stakes and public exposure are unrelatable, the troubles are. The imperial household is plagued with the same challenges of modern families everywhere: grappling with infertility, suffering awkward dynamics between relatives, trying to support high-powered women who want to carve out a new path for growth while juggling family and work commitments. Yet instead of championing any of the hurdles they face, the imperial family has essentially tried to bury the fact that they struggle. Far from speaking out on the difficulties of conceiving, or discussing women’s rights, they remain silent and abide solely to follow their official duties of attending politically correct public events.

The imperial household faces the same challenges as all modern families. Rather than champion those issues, they try to hide their struggles.

As one of the most rapidly aging societies in the world — and the home to a generous welfare system — Japan has no choice but to encourage more women to remain in the workforce, even once they have children.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has made empowering women one of his biggest rallying cries — and to his credit, he has elevated public acknowledgement of the issue to unprecedented levels. But his words have yet to lead to concrete results, as Japan ranks in 105th place on the World Economic Forum’s latest global annual gender gap report. Even more worrisome is the fact that one in three young, well-educated Japanese women still just want to get married and become full-time housewives, 

according the Japanese Health Ministry’s survey of women and their aspirations last September

Emperor Hirohito may approve that such traditional values still remain strong under his son Akihito’s reign. But if Japan is serious about even getting closer to its glory days, it needs to accept the fact that the winning formulas that worked in the past simply won’t work in the future.

Hirohito’s successors can and must contribute to spur the much-needed social change.

 is an Associate with the Wilson Center’s Asia Program, specializing in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. She was formerly a correspondent for Dow Jones News Service and UPI in Tokyo and Washington. Follow her on Twitter at 

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Hirohito's descendants remain committed to Japan's traditional values, which desperately need reform.

Hirohito's Long Shadow

The 20th century was America’s century. From recovering from the devastation of war to promoting prosperity and the rule of law worldwide, it was the United States’ capital and values that came to define much of the world’s military, political, social, and economic road map, even into the 21st century. Since 1945, it became clear that it was in Washington’s interest to ensure that the global economy recovered steadily, and that it should stimulate demand worldwide. Boosting global growth was not simply an altruistic goal, nor was it guided solely by the fear of communism’s rise—it was also a means to further US corporate interests. Access to global markets, operating under clear rules driven by US standards, also became part of the US national interest. Global trade enjoyed clear prioritization across US public and private sectors.

Clarity about the United States’ commitment to global trade no longer holds.

Even the staunchest US allies have come to question Washington’s commitment to free trade in Asia.

To be sure, grinding poverty persists in much of the world. Currently, 46 nations are deemed the least developed countries, representing 12 percent of the world’s population. Of these, 33 are in Africa and 9 are located in Asia, including Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, and Afghanistan. But from Japan and the earlier 

 of South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, to rapidly rising India, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and beyond, the Indo-Pacific region is home to the world’s most dynamic, populous, and ambitious countries, which have emerged as economic rivals to the United States. In short, Washington’s 20th-century goal of lifting all boats to greater prosperity out of the ruins of war has largely been achieved—not only in Europe but also in most of Asia. As a result, market access to the Indo-Pacific has become more lucrative, and more competitive, with Washington’s voice no longer dominating the field as countries look to redefine and enhance the rules of trade that better meet the needs of the 21st century.

The fact that China has emerged as the single biggest trading partner for all countries in the Indo-Pacific, with the exception of Afghanistan, has also caused US economic influence in the region to falter. At the same time, Beijing is steadily investing in matching its military might to its economic influence, both within and well beyond Asia—not simply by building up its arms but also by making strategic use of advanced technology to enhance its military capabilities. With Washington increasingly aware of the multifaceted threat posed by Beijing’s economic and technological advancements, the 

 is going on the offense and developing its own economic strategy that resets US trade ambitions and prioritizes national security in defining economic relations with like-minded countries. The question, however, is whether the United States can succeed in bringing its allies and partners in line with its own reassessment of the international economic challenges that lie ahead. 

Coupled with Washington’s own decision to 

 of the Indo-Pacific’s most ambitious trade deal in 2017, and with no US plans to join the subsequent Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement, even the staunchest US allies have come to question Washington’s commitment to free trade in Asia. What the Biden administration has instead decided is to develop a two-pronged strategy. First, it is focusing on dealing with the economic threat posed by China’s 

. And second, the administration has drawn a clear line in 

 on Beijing’s access to advanced technology by choking off China’s ability to acquire the most sophisticated semiconductor capabilities and chip manufacturing technology, which in turn would curtail Chinese development of artificial intelligence and supercomputing. Together, these new approaches to trade and technology acquisition are key to enhance US economic competitiveness and boost US security. But they can only be effective if the United States works in conjunction with other countries. After all, along with the United States’ success in lifting economic standards worldwide, its solo ability to tip the global scale in its favor and induce adherence to its standards has also diminished.

Yet the Biden administration’s vision for a new trade framework focusing on four key areas—digital trade, supply chain resilience, environmental sustainability, and good governance—has been lackluster. While 13 countries—including Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia—have agreed to start negotiations on the key issues, 

 has already declined to join in talks regarding trade under the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, due to domestic political considerations. India’s walkout highlights just how difficult it can be for countries on divergent paths of development to reach a consensus, even on critical issues such as supply chain resiliency, given that national leaders must reckon with their domestic constraints as much as their economic needs. The true value of the framework’s road map, however, is to clearly show that Washington needs to work with its partners to address the region’s biggest challenges. And nowhere is the need to form partnerships more apparent than in the effort to push back against China’s aggression and its abuse of its economic might.

Victory will necessitate humility on the part of Washington, and recognition that it can no longer alone meet the challenges that lie ahead. 

The Biden administration’s success in pressing ahead with three key proposed laws over the past 12 months despite a deeply divided Congress speaks volumes about the emerging national consensus to push for growth and industrialization policy. The United States is hardly alone in increasing spending on securing critical infrastructure, investing in cybersecurity, and boosting commitments to innovate in advanced technologies. From 

 to speed up economic recovery, key US allies in the Indo-Pacific region have boosted spending to enable them to rebound from the disruptions caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic, and to stave off risks of China weaponizing its global economic dominance. Enhancing resilience no longer means simply preparing for the unexpected, such as natural disasters; it also means being able to withstand pressures that China could place on accessing goods that could make countries vulnerable. Nevertheless, there is a growing wariness across the board that efforts to become more resilient are also leading to a path of less global interdependence and the rise of unilateralism, especially in the United States. Far from advancing globalization, as Washington sought to do in the 20th century, its de facto new industrialization policy is seen as a potential driver of economic nationalism. 

Meanwhile, Washington’s trade policy has focused more on encouraging overseas investments into the United States, with no clear, immediate gain for countries that are actively committing to strengthening crucial US industries such as semiconductors and large-capacity batteries. This has been especially disconcerting for South Korea, which is 

 the US will take away its global chip lead.  In the longer term, however, the Biden administration’s measures to safeguard US technological advancement and to stop the transfer of advanced technologies to China could lead to a potential schism between the United States and its key allies.

Through the United States’ October 7, 2022, 

 to stop China from acquiring advanced semiconductor technology, including manufacturing equipment and the talent to support chip development, it has made clear where it draws the line when it comes to engaging in a technology competition with China. The goal is not simply to stop Chinese access to the world’s most advanced chips and prevent their use in Chinese missiles and other military uses but also to stop China from furthering its goal of becoming the world leader in advanced technologies, including the development of artificial intelligence.

The strategic objective of stifling Beijing’s technology innovation has secured widespread congressional support. But for the Biden administration to succeed in keeping the United States’ most vital technology from being abused by the Chinese—and for the US to remain a global economic leader in a new era of competition—it must have the cooperation and support of the other advanced economies in Asia and Europe. A true victory for Washington requires protecting its own semiconductor technologies through export controls. But victory will also necessitate humility on the part of Washington, and recognition that it can no longer alone meet the challenges that lie ahead. Working together with like-minded partners is no longer simply a mantra—it must be at the core of Washington’s effort to win the strategic competition with Beijing.

 is the director for Geoeconomics and Indo-Pacific Enterprise, and deputy director for the Asia Program, at the 

Cover photo: Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, left, President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi pose for photos as they arrive at the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity launch event at the Izumi Garden Gallery, Monday, May 23, 2022, in Tokyo. AP Photo/Evan Vucci.

The strategic objective of stifling Beijing’s technology innovation has secured widespread Congressional support. But in order for the Biden administration to succeed in keeping its most vital technology from being abused by the Chinese—and to remain an economic world leader in a new era of competition—it must have the cooperation and support of the other advanced economies of Asia and Europe.

Friends, Allies, and the Trade Dilemma

Even with all the political, economic, social, and cultural differences that divide Asia, an unshaken belief in trade as a pathway for growth still prevails across the Indo-Pacific. Although faith in trade has traditionally been a force unifier in an otherwise disparate region, disruptions in supply chains and the rise of new values for economic engagement are increasingly becoming yet another factor driving a schism across Asia. 

The 2020 outbreak of COVID-19 turned many long-held supply chain beliefs on their head, and Asia’s leading trading nations are now scrambling to find their footing in the newly emerging economic order. Once the gold standard in promoting trade efficiency, the 

just-in-time supply chain management system

 that had been championed by Japanese automobile group Toyota has come to exemplify the fragilities of a hyperconnected global production network. Keeping inventories to a minimum proved to be a particular source of vulnerability during the pandemic, leading to border closures, hoarding, and other disruptions. 

While the worst of the shocks caused by COVID-19 may now be over, the world is far more attuned to the possibility of future crises that could strike without notice. What’s more, there is greater awareness that the global economy is disproportionately dependent on Asia for some of the most vital goods—from pharmaceuticals to advanced technology components to basic consumer goods—and that the Indo-Pacific is especially vulnerable to natural disasters, energy supply disruptions, and geopolitical tensions. Northeast Asia has always been vulnerable to earthquakes and typhoons, and is energy-poor. Geopolitical risks in the region, however, have begun to emerge as the greatest threats to economic stability and security as tensions with China escalate. Meanwhile, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has increased risks to the regional order, and Moscow’s vision for the Russian Far East could further destabilize Asia. 

The good news amid the increasing risks to growth and stability is that Washington’s key allies in the region—namely, Tokyo, Seoul, and Taipei—have inherently remained protrade, and there has been no notable movement to retrench from the global economy. They largely share the economic values of the United States in their commitment to fair markets and the international order. They share a commitment to trade as a means for economic expansion, the need for global markets, and an inherent understanding of interdependence. Not only do they face challenges of limited natural resources, including their energy supply, but the smaller sizes of their domestic economies also push them to look outward for growth. At the same time, the pandemic has made clear that their diverse industries and technological capabilities make them drivers of global growth and economic security for the world. 

The ability for governments to trust one another will also play an ever-larger role in establishing networks.

But the rules of economic engagement and supply chain resilience are evolving rapidly as countries race to prepare for external shocks and ever-growing geopolitical risks. As they race, we’re witnessing an inherently different approach to tackling the supply chain conundrum between the United States and its Asian partners, which could drive a wedge between the two sides at a time when Washington needs to work even more closely with like-minded governments in one of the world’s most vibrant regions. 

Boosting domestic capabilities to produce goods has been a key Washington response to the pandemic, especially concerning critical technologies. Nowhere has this been more apparent than in the semiconductor industry, with the Biden administration

 in late August to provide more than $52 billion in subsidies for US chip production. The legislation directly responded to the dire shortage of semiconductors faced by the United States as it relied on chip imports from Asia. To be sure, the United States was hardly unique in needing to deal with chip shortages. In 2021, the 

global automobile sector alone lost more than $200 billion in profit

 when corporations were forced to limit production due to a lack of semiconductors. Companies including Ford Motor suspended production temporarily, and 11 million fewer cars were manufactured worldwide due to the lack of chips. 

At the same time, the foreign policy drive to boost domestic capabilities of essential industries and develop cutting-edge technologies looms large. The White House made clear that the CHIPS Act is a key part of the US strategy to directly confront China in the longer-term technology cold war, and to ensure that 

the United States invests in its technology development capabilities.

 Yet there is growing unease among US Asian allies that Washington’s efforts to both reshore and near-shore production will make it increasingly challenging for countries to cooperate with and invest in the United States. 

For a government like that of Taiwan, the impact of the United States’ decision to focus on domestic production of semiconductors and make headway in the technology war with China is especially acute. More than 

three-quarters of all chips are made in Asia, and over 90 percent of the most advanced semiconductors are produced in Taiwan

, giving the island outsized influence in the global economy. In fact, Taiwan’s largest chipmaker—TSMC—has become critical to the United States’ strategy to ramp up its own semiconductor research and production capabilities. TSMC has already made headway in its plans to construct a 

, and a number of other Taiwanese chip suppliers are expected to invest in US production. It is a delicate balancing act for Taipei as it looks to maintain its competitive edge in the chip sector, while working with Washington to boost US self-sufficiency in the critical sector.

As governments scramble to develop new rules to share technologies and establish frameworks for digital cooperation and governance, efforts to reconcile competition with cooperation will be crucial.

Taiwan’s central role in the global semiconductor supply chain network has played no small part in mounting US interest in demonstrating public support for Taipei, even as it increases tensions between Washington and Beijing. For Taipei, however, Washington’s demonstration of interest and recognition of its position in the global economy is both a blessing and a curse. On one hand, there is greater awareness of the critical role that Taiwan plays in the technology-centered global economy, the challenges it faces in confronting the China threat, and its unique status in the international order. On the other hand, heightened US interest and highly visible political support have not only intensified cross-Strait military tensions, but the Taiwanese economy is facing greater risks of blockades from China in retaliation to US interests. The United States’ partnership with Taiwan must go beyond simply encouraging technology transfer from the island to US shores and offering it rhetorical support.  

As events unfold, the United States will need to work with like-minded governments and reassess what makes a strong partnership to develop supply chains that are resilient to external shocks—including geopolitical tensions. Working with partners and allies in building supply chain resilience undoubtedly makes economic sense. In the semiconductor industry, for instance, not only does it 

cost about $4 billion to build an advanced chip factory

, but continual investments will needed to sustain and update the facility. To reshore chip manufacturing capabilities, a comprehensive ecosystem for semiconductor production will need to be developed, ranging from research and development to testing and packaging. Given the high labor and energy costs in the United States, the prospect of complete US self-sufficiency in developing, producing, and disseminating chips within US borders will be far too costly. Cooperating with like-minded countries will be essential to keep costs down, which remains a critical factor for supply chain sustainability. 

But as security concerns take on greater importance in the development of new supply chains, the ability for governments to trust one another will also play an ever-larger role in establishing networks. The fact that TSMC produces advanced chips for US F-35 fighter jets and also supplies semiconductors for China’s Huawei Technologies means that there will need to be 

closer coordination between Taipei and Washington

 that goes beyond simply sharing chip development strategies and extends to establishing rules to protect competitive technologies. 

The desire to establish supply chain partnerships that can be less dependent from China—if not entirely independent—has focused on ways to secure critical technologies that have been carefully developed through sizable investments by the United States and others. At the same time, one of the basic tenets of supply chains remains unchanged: their ability to boost business competitiveness and cost-effectiveness. The drastic disruptions to supply chains in recent years may have led to a greater push to reshore, near-shore, or “friendshore” vital supplies, but the need to keep costs down and for businesses to remain competitive is an enduring core value of supply chains. In short, governments may be on the same page when it comes to restructuring supply chains to bolster resilience, but the competitive nature of industries will—and should—persist. 

As governments scramble to develop new rules to share technologies and establish frameworks for digital cooperation and governance, efforts to reconcile competition with cooperation will be crucial. It is imperative to develop relationships based on trust, which requires a traditional, analogue approach to growth. Clearly, Washington and its traditional allies in the region agree that supply chains based solely on cost effectiveness no longer meet the needs of a global economy confronting greater geopolitical risks. 

Given all these factors, there is wariness about the United States’ commitment to working together with its allies and partners when it comes to developing new supply chain networks. One of the biggest questions is the extent to which the United States wants to be self-sufficient and limit cooperation with like-minded countries. As the Biden administration seeks to enhance the nation’s ability to withstand economic coercion and external shocks, there is growing guardedness outside the United States that Washington is pursuing an industrial policy that will focus more on foreign technology transfer than on international technology cooperation. The CHIPS act and subsequent export restrictions on semiconductors aims to cut China’s development of advanced chips development at its knees through stringent limitations and control of technologies being available in China. There may be numerous unintended consequences of the strategy, not least the prospect of alienating US allies and partners in joining Washington’s efforts to take similar action and abide by the export restriction rules.

Certainly, Tokyo, Taipei, and Seoul do not always see eye to eye when it comes to threat perceptions regarding Beijing’s aggressions or Moscow’s ambitions.

Shihoko Goto is the director of geoeconomics and Indo-Pacific enterprise and deputy director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center. Her research focuses on the economics and politics of Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, as well as US policy in Northeast Asia. A seasoned journalist and analyst, she has reported from Tokyo and Washington for Dow Jones and UPI on the global economy, international trade, and Asian markets. She is a columnist for 

, and she was previously a donor country relations officer for the World Bank. She has been awarded fellowships from the East-West Center and the Knight Foundation, among others.

Cover photo: US Vice President Kamala Harris hosts a roundtable discussion with Japanese business executives from companies in the semiconductor industry, at the Chief Mission Residence in Tokyo. September 28, 2022. Leah Millis/Pool Photo via AP.

In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, the Russia-Ukraine war, and anti-Beijing sentiments, there are louder calls against globalization. As vulnerabilities become increasingly clear, business and policy leaders are making the case for building economic security and to follow the “grow-your-own” model of McDonalds. But as Shihoko will make clear as she fleshes out the importance of friendshoring over nearshoring, the global supply challenges most at issue now are having the right technology and partners you can trust.