Energy security—including access to critical minerals which are vital for the green energy transition—are being impacted by the Russia-Ukraine war and growing tensions between Russia and the West. In this interview, we bring together two leaders to discuss the current state of energy as it relates to the conflict. Theresa Sabonis-Helf is Chair of the Science, Technology, and International Affairs concentration at Georgetown University. Prior to joining Georgetown, she was a professor of national security strategy at the National War College in Washington, DC for 18 years. She has lived and worked in seven countries of the former USSR, assisted two nations with the development of their first National Security Strategies, wrote a textbook on Caucasus regional energy issues, and co-edited two volumes on Central Asia's political and economic transition. As a short-term scholar in summer 1997, she is part of the deep bench of experts the Kennan Institute has welcomed over the years.

Lauren Herzer Risi is the director of the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program. She works with policymakers, practitioners, donors, and researchers to generate innovative, transdisciplinary solutions to development and security challenges related to environmental change, climate change, and natural resource management.

 Can you provide a brief overview of where Russia fits in the overall energy security of Europe, the US, and other parts of the world—both before and after Russia invaded Ukraine two years ago?

 At the time of the full-scale invasion, the United States was a total net exporter of energy and depended minimally on Russia for fossil fuels. Russia was, however, the world’s largest exporter of oil and gas and the European Union was its largest customer. The EU 

 more than 60% of Russian gas exports and about 50% of Russian oil exports in 2021. The EU seemed to be a critical customer—one that Russia would not want to lose—but its dependence proved to be a vulnerability for the EU. Before the invasion, Russia supplied about 45% of all of Europe’s natural gas imports, was one of the lead exporters of crude oil to Europe and was Europe’s largest supplier of petroleum products. Russia even supplied 50% of Europe’s 

The plans made by the EU and its members to reduce imports from Russia and overall consumption of fossil fuels were arguably more important than the sanctions themselves.

 estimates that the EU’s Russian fossil fuels imports have fallen from a high of $16 billion per month (pre-2022 invasion) to $1 billion per month (by December 2023). Russia is still a major exporter, and although it has found new markets for all its oil, it is struggling to reach new markets with some of its natural gas. China is now the largest importer of Russian fossil fuels, followed by Turkey, and India.

The exception to this strong trend away from Russian imports is nuclear fuel. In this sector, reliance is relatively high and with little change—although efforts to decrease this dependence are underway. The Russian nuclear corporation, 

, has an especially strong global presence in uranium conversion and enrichment, controlling 38% and 46% of global capacity. Europe remains highly dependent on Russia for nuclear materials, which is why Rosatom has been left out of the 13 packages of EU 

 still accounted for 16.9% of Europe’s natural uranium, 22.35% of the EU’s conversion services, and 30% of its enrichment services. Eighteen EU nuclear power plants also rely on Russian-supplied fuel rods. US dependence is less acute, but Rosatom continues to supply 20% of the low-enriched uranium used in 

. Additionally, Russia has been the sole supplier of 

(high-assay low-enriched uranium), the fuel required for next-generation small modular reactors now under development to help provide clean and cost-efficient energy. Both the US and the EU have enacted policies to reduce these many dependencies, but it will take several years to realize.

 before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee in Europe about nuclear security, energy security, and energy policy implications of Russia’s Rosatom corporation. What were you hoping lawmakers came away with from your testimony?

My testimony focused on how deeply embedded Russia is in the global nuclear fuel supply chain, and the reasons why we should be very cautious about sanctioning Rosatom. We must better develop our own sector and compete with Russia, but we also need to keep Rosatom deeply engaged in the international nuclear energy safety and security community. In the Soviet era, the USSR pursued a very isolationist approach to nuclear energy—one that had a lot of flaws, including very little respect for a culture of safety in the industry. I consider the integration of Russia in the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the fundamental shift in Russia’s standards, to be an important accomplishment. I am concerned that some moves we might take to marginalize Russia could also deteriorate that important cooperation. I am also deeply concerned about the nuclear power plant at Zaporizhzhia. It has remained under Russian control since October 2022, but the situation could become significantly worse than it currently is.

The relationship between energy and water comes through in sometimes terrifying ways. The Russian attack on the massive Kakhovka Dam impacted electricity, availability of potable water, irrigation capacity, and the nuclear reactors at Zaporizhzhia.

 A number of energy-related sanctions have been instituted by European countries and the US since Russia’s invasion. Are they having the intended effects? Have there been any unintended consequences?

Russia’s revenues from fossil fuels have declined and Europe’s dependence on Russia changed radically. Bruegel estimates that excluding uranium products, EU-Russian energy trade has 

 since the war’s onset, and Europe currently purchases very little Russian pipeline gas. But that is only partially due to sanctions. The destruction of the Nord Stream system and Russia’s refusal of sales that aren’t paid in rubles are major factors. The oil-related sanctions have been effective in reducing the EU’s dependence on Russian oil, but most Russian oil has been redirected to new markets. China, India, and Turkey are now lead buyers of Russian seaborne oil (pipeline oil was not sanctioned). There were no efforts to prevent Russia from exporting to new markets in the hopes of keeping oil prices stable. A cap was placed on how much Russia could receive per barrel; however this has been 

 over time, as Russia has found ships and routes that are not subject to the cap.

The plans made by the EU and its members to reduce imports from Russia and overall consumption of fossil fuels were arguably more important than the sanctions themselves. EU 

 declined 12% in 2022 and an additional 19% in 2023 compared to 2021 levels. Meanwhile, the EU shift toward LNG imports over pipeline gas was similarly impressive: the LNG share of the gas supply 

 from 20% in 2018-2019 to 40% in 2022-2023.

Since the onset of the war, the EU has prioritized reducing Russian dependencies, and has done so more rapidly than anticipated. It is important to note, however, that there were unintended consequences. India, China, and Turkey now have closer trade relations with Russia. European states also saw an estimated $350 billion in 

 to shield their citizens (somewhat) from the unprecedented 

 that occurred in winter 2022. They also spent more than 50 billion Euros—10 times the historical average price—to fill their gas storage facilities ahead of the 2022-23 winter months. Such extra spending was particularly frustrating for the EU nations that preferred to channel energy finance to non-fossil fuels.

 Russia has targeted Ukraine’s water infrastructure as well as its energy infrastructure. What does this war tell us about the intersections between water and energy in the region?

The relationship between energy and water comes through in sometimes terrifying ways. The Russian attack on the massive Kakhovka Dam impacted electricity, availability of potable water, irrigation capacity, and the nuclear reactors at Zaporizhzhia. Water to cool the reactors was secured before it became a high-risk, but substantial damage to farmland resulted, as well as to the human and agriculture water supply. The destruction of 

 only minimally decreased Ukraine’s available electricity, but it damaged an estimated 620 square kilometers of land, and according to 

, accrued $6.4 billion in damages. Loss of the dam also brought water insecurity for southern oblasts, rendering an estimated one million hectares 

 for agriculture for three to five years.

Prior to this conflict, supply security had not been prioritized by much of Europe. It is likely that energy security—and in many instances the use of green energy to reinforce it—will be a much higher priority globally.

Both Russia and Ukraine have targeted water and energy infrastructure. The damage inflicted by Russia is much greater, but both sides recognized the critical vulnerabilities of water and energy. Ukraine cut most of the flow of the North Crimea Canal to Crimea in 2014. Crimea’s access to electricity was also cut off, by Kyiv loyalists in November 2015. Although the government of Ukraine did not claim credit for the power line attacks, they declined to restore energy ties. The role of energy and water infrastructure as tools of war have been unfolding ever since.

 What has the impact of the Russia-Ukraine conflict been on the global renewable energy transition?

On the negative side, it drove prices up for European states so dramatically that crisis response and new gas infrastructure took priority over development of green energy for a time. It also compelled many nations to reconsider coal as a fuel source during a crisis. On the positive side, Europe has seen a dramatic reduction in energy demand; efficiency was elevated in a climate of crisis and high prices. Historically, the oil crises of 1973 and 1979 dramatically transformed how nations thought about oil. Each of those crises lasted only a few months in duration, but resulted in fundamental changes in institutions, consumption, and how nations thought about supply security. The current situation will have dramatic effects on how the world thinks about energy security during transition. Prior to this conflict, supply security had not been prioritized by much of Europe. It is likely that energy security—and in many instances the use of green energy to reinforce it—will be a much higher priority globally.

 A country’s energy supply and its security are interconnected. Is there an element of that connection that is often overlooked by those helping to shape energy-security policy?

We tend to forget how closely energy security is connected to regime security. This is why water and energy are being weaponized in the war. Energy, particularly electricity, is part of the modern social contract. If a nation is urbanized and its people are accustomed to light and heat and that is taken away, it becomes very difficult for the political powers to remain in office. Control of cities is a particular problem if electricity services cannot be rapidly restored. Use of tall buildings, urban traffic flow, emergency medical services, functioning cell towers, and so on—all become compromised or impossible if electricity is disrupted for an extended period. The ability to provide reliable electricity to a country is one of the criteria of being a developed state. As societies move more and more toward electrification, the electricity grid becomes an increasingly attractive target to adversaries. In its effort to survive, Ukraine is leading the way toward more resilient electricity. One example is that they have converted thousands of cell towers to use battery back-ups so that attacks on electricity will not destroy communication capabilities.

 Is there anything else you’d like to add?

Once Ukraine makes it to the other side of this terrible war, its energy future is rather bright. Ukraine is now integrated into the all-European electricity grid (ENTSO-E) and is poised to be a net exporter of electricity to the largest, most sophisticated electricity grid in the world. This is due to work done by Ukraine and the Europeans since 2011. Ukraine shifted its laws, regulations, and standards to be compliant with EU rules prior to the invasion. It was fully included in ENTSO-E in March 2022, and was a net exporter of electricity even during the first six months of the war. Although Ukraine has endured catastrophic damage to their electricity sector, it has the right rules, investors, and capabilities to become an important part of the greening of Europe.

Theresa Sabonis-Helf is Chair of the Science, Technology, and International Affairs concentration at Georgetown University. Lauren Herzer Risi is the Director of the Wilson Center’s Environmental Change and Security Program.

Cover photo: Cooling towers of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station near city Enerhodar, Ukraine. Shutterstock/

In this piece Theresa Sabonis-Helf and Lauren Herzer Risi explore how energy security, including access to critical minerals which are vital for the green energy transition, have been impacted by the Russia-Ukraine war and growing tensions between Russia and the west. 

With wide-reaching implications for regional and global energy supplies, the Russia-Ukraine war is also testing the world’s efforts to go green.