More than two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, war crimes are mounting. To update its readers on the most recent developments and provide a deeper understanding into the process of holding offenders accountable, the Wilson Quarterly turns to 

 who currently serves as the lead coordinator of the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group for Ukraine, a joint initiative of the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom. Here, a conversation with Williamson and Kennan Institute Director William Pomeranz, who brings his own legal background to the discussion.

 Nearly every family in Ukraine has been touched in some way by Russia’s full-scale invasion. In the areas of the country which has been held or occupied, there have been widespread reports of war crimes and atrocities by Russian soldiers. Efforts are underway to hold perpetrators accountable. Can you provide a brief update on the war crimes being investigated against Russia and Vladimir Putin’s regime?

 From the very earliest days of Russia’s invasion in February 2022, we saw evidence of war crimes as the Russian military engaged in indiscriminate attacks on civilians, disproportionate use of force, and mistreatment and even killings of prisoners of war. When towns like Bucha and Irpin were liberated from Russian occupation in spring 2022, we already began seeing compelling evidence of crimes against humanity in the form of widespread murders, illegal detentions, torture, and sexual violence. Since then, we have seen abductions and forced deportations of children, persecution of anyone not willing to embrace Russian primacy, and forced disappearances of civilians. Charges have been filed in hundreds of cases—but unless those charged were already detained as prisoners of war, they remain out of reach for the Ukrainian authorities and international tribunals. Some may be tried in absentia (which is permitted under Ukrainian law), and for others, the arrest warrants will remain in effect should they ever travel to third countries—or in the unlikely event that a more rule of law-oriented government in Russia takes hold. In the meantime, investigations will progress, and cases will continue to be indicted.

There are concerns that crime of aggression prosecutions relative to Ukraine, might open the door for cases to be brought in other situations where countries intervene militarily for humanitarian reasons or in response to a terrorist threat. 

 In the early months after the invasion, there was much talk about resorting to international tribunals to hold perpetrators of war crimes accountable. What has come of that effort?

 Ukraine is somewhat unique in that we have in place both a viable international mechanism for accountability through the International Criminal Court (ICC), and a domestic process through the Ukrainian national system. The more common scenario, seen in places like Syria and Myanmar, is where we have neither. Unlike those countries, Ukraine is a democratic country with a functioning justice system rooted in rule of law. So it can, and should, deal domestically with the vast majority of crimes committed on its own territory. The ICC, because it has a global mandate, will only be able to deal with a small number of very high-level cases, but we have already seen the ICC exercise its jurisdiction with arrest warrants (indictments) issued against Vladimir Putin and other senior Russian political and military figures—with more cases likely to follow. Beyond the ICC and the national courts, there has also been a concerted effort to establish a special tribunal for the crime of aggression since the ICC is precluded from prosecuting this crime and there are strict limitations on doing so in the Ukrainian domestic system.

 Approximately how long will it take to have a tribunal empaneled?  What are the lessons from Nuremberg? What are the differences in today’s circumstances? 

 It is not a given that this special tribunal will get off the ground. Ukraine’s rationale for creating such a court is that all other crimes committed during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine flowed from this illegal act of aggression, which is the same theory that was used at Nuremberg to prosecute Nazi leaders for crimes of aggression. So, this is a compelling argument and one with a strong historical foundation. Nevertheless, the practical challenges in creating any international tribunal can be daunting—and they have been here, particularly when it is impossible to act through the UN Security Council where Russia holds veto power. Thus, a number of alternative approaches have been suggested, such as creating a court under the auspices of the Council of Europe, or some sort of internationalized Ukrainian national court.

The ICC’s reach will be limited, and even if a new special tribunal is created, it will likely only deal with dozens of perpetrators. So, 99% of the cases will still fall to the Ukrainians to handle.

As this process is playing out, an interim prosecutor’s office has been set up to collect and preserve evidence pertaining to crime of aggression cases, with the idea that this evidence can be used if a special tribunal is established. In terms of how this differs from Nuremberg, that court was set up in the aftermath of World War II with a strong consensus between the victorious Allied powers. Even with the creation of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda tribunals in the 1990s, there was unanimity in the UN Security Council. Obviously, that international cohesion has now broken down, so we have to explore other options for accountability that depart from historical precedents.

 Will other countries join in an international tribunal to investigate Russian war crimes? What countries may object to such a tribunal?  Why?

 So far, this initiative to create a special tribunal has largely been a North American and European exercise, with support from a few other states such as Australia and Japan. Beyond those countries though, the idea has not gotten much traction for a variety of reasons such as tacit support for Russia, perceived double standards by Western powers in treating Israel/Palestine and the US invasion of Iraq differently from Ukraine—and views that Ukraine gets undue attention while conflicts elsewhere are ignored. Even among states that are generally supportive, including within certain quarters of the US Government, there are concerns that crime of aggression prosecutions relative to Ukraine, might open the door for cases to be brought in other situations where countries (such as the US) intervene militarily for humanitarian reasons or in response to a terrorist threat. All these sensitivities have historically factored into the difficulty in achieving a political consensus on how crimes of aggression should be addressed. It’s no different with Ukraine—even when there’s widespread recognition that Russia has engaged in a blatant act of aggression.

 Does holding Russia and Putin accountable require new laws to be enacted and enforced? Why? 

 The existing ICC (Rome) Statute provides a strong legal foundation for prosecuting Putin and other senior Russian officials for genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Ukrainian domestic law allows for prosecutions of war crimes but does not include provisions allowing for prosecutions of crimes against humanity. It would be helpful if Ukraine would pass legislation to include crimes against humanity and, more broadly, to incorporate the entirety of the Rome Statute in its domestic law. While prosecutions may be more challenging without these statutory reforms, they can nevertheless be pursued utilizing existing domestic laws.

 Ukraine has investigated and documented more than 100,000 war crimes committed by Russians on Ukrainian territory. How can Ukraine individually pursue such crimes?

 The official number now is well over 125,000. Even with a reduction in numbers that will come as duplicate reports are screened out, related incidents are consolidated into single cases, and certain acts are reclassified as common crimes rather than war crimes, Ukraine will still be dealing with tens of thousands of cases. The ICC’s reach, as mentioned, will be limited—and even if a new special tribunal is created, it will likely only deal with dozens of perpetrators. So, 99% of the cases will still fall to the Ukrainians to handle.

Because of the difficulty in connecting direct perpetrators with an individual crime, cases have to be built against those at command levels who bear responsibility for crimes committed throughout their area of control. This is done through military analysis.

To address this overwhelming caseload, they will have to institute a more effective system for prioritization that focuses resources on particularly heinous crimes—those involving death or serious injury, targeted sexual violence, crimes directed at children, and those having a significant impact in a particular community. Other crimes—such as an incident where a single artillery shell causes property damage to an apartment or a squad of Russian soldiers loots a grocery store in an occupied town—while perhaps qualifying as war crimes, would need to be deferred to a later date when resources allow them to be addressed, if ever. Ultimately, the Ukrainian authorities will have to make hard decisions about which cases to pursue and which ones to defer or drop. That is the only possible way they can deal with this overwhelming caseload.

 How does your investigation into the Russia-Ukraine war compare with some of the other, large-scale war crimes you’ve investigated?

 Just to clarify, we are not directly conducting investigations in Ukraine, but rather providing expertise and support to the Ukrainian authorities who are doing the actual investigations and prosecutions. That said, we certainly have broad visibility into the nature of crimes and the evidence that is there. Sadly, it is very similar to what we saw in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia over the 1990s—but on an even larger scale. There are also some truly horrific variations on criminality, such as the abduction and forced Russification of Ukrainian children, that distinguish this conflict from those in the Balkans. As the conflict is ongoing, and as we still don’t have a full picture of what has happened in the occupied territories, there may even be worse to come.

 Is there something that is generally misunderstood about the war crimes process? Is it hard to convict?

 Common crime cases (such as murder, rape, robbery) that are dealt with regularly in our own judicial system and that of other peacetime countries, are generally straightforward prosecutions with a known single perpetrator and single victim, easily accessible witnesses, are of limited scale and involve a finite amount of evidence. War crimes, on the other hand, are often connected events that take place over wide swaths of territory, involve multiple victims that are otherwise unrelated, frequently require tracking down witnesses that have been displaced and dispersed to any number of third countries, and involve direct perpetrators that are impossible to identify.

So even gathering the crime base evidence (that which pertains to the event itself) is more complicated. Then, because of the difficulty in connecting direct perpetrators (what we often refer to as “trigger pullers”) with an individual crime, cases have to be built against those at command levels who bear responsibility for crimes committed throughout their area of control. This is done through military analysis that determines which unit was in a given place at a given time, the command structure, how orders were issued, and so on. Assembling the evidence for both the crime base and linkage elements of a war crimes case tends to be more complex and lengthier than for common crime cases. When you factor in other requirements, particularly for trials in an international court—such as translations, logistics of bringing witnesses to a far-away location, and so on—even more delays ensue. While the process is longer though, I’m not sure that it has been more difficult to secure convictions in war crimes cases. I understand where that perception comes from due to some prominent trials going awry, but generally speaking, the conviction rates in war crimes cases over the last 30 years are probably pretty consistent with those in common crime prosecutions. 

 (Retired), currently serves as the Lead Coordinator of the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group for Ukraine, a joint initiative of the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom. He is the Senior Director for International Justice at Georgetown University.  Williamson is also the Presiding Arbiter of the Brčko Arbitration Tribunal in Bosnia and Herzegovina, an appointment by the International Court of Justice.

 is the Director of the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute and an expert on the complexities of political and economic developments in Russia, particularly through a legal lens. He leverages his extensive hands-on experience in international and Russian jurisprudence to address a wide range of legal issues—from the development of Russia’s Constitution to human rights law to foreign investment and sanctions. He is also the author of 

Law and the Russian State: Russia's Legal Evolution from Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin 

Cover photo: Exhumation of 450 bodies from a mass grave. Most of the victims were tortured and killed during Russian occupation. There were children among them. Izyum, Kharkiv Oblast, Ukraine. September 17, 2022.

More than two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, war crimes are mounting. To update its readers on the most recent developments and provide a deeper understanding into the process of holding offenders accountable, the WQ turns to Ambassador Clint Williamson who currently serves as the lead coordinator of the Atrocity Crimes Advisory Group for Ukraine, a joint initiative of the United States, European Union, and United Kingdom. Here, a conversation with Williamson and Kennan Institute Director William Pomeranz, who brings his own legal background to the discussion. 

With tens of thousands of war crimes already documented, efforts to hold Russia and Vladimir Putin accountable are well underway.

War Crimes and Punishment

The Kennan Institute has reached its 50th anniversary—a landmark for any organization. Looking back on those five decades, the region it covers (first the Soviet, then post-Soviet era) has experienced incredible changes and turmoil, only for us to return to a dangerous confrontation with Moscow. Through it all, the Kennan Institute has served to educate American policymakers and public audiences about the challenges and opportunities presented by this dynamic and culturally diverse region.

The first half of the Kennan Institute coincided with the Cold War, perestroika’s arrival, and glasnost reforms under Mikhail Gorbachev. It grew alongside the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and the chaotic transition from the Soviet system. In 1991, it helped make sense of 15 new nations that emerged from the Soviet Union’s collapse, as well as violent uprisings in Russia that soon followed. Kennan Institute staff and scholars studied Boris Yeltsin’s attempt to transition to democracy and a market economy, and the roadblocks that impeded that transition.

In a very real way, the Kennan Institute now exists in an environment similar to that of its founding in 1974, as the United States confronts a Russian state hostile to America’s post-WWII global leadership. 

From its founding, the Institute led the way in engaging with Soviet academies under its first director, S. Frederick Starr. His successors built on his record by bringing scholars and experts from the region to the Institute, leading to important international collaborations and exchange. Through it all, the Kennan Institute served as a crucial nexus for policymakers in Washington who were working on the region and engaged with academics performing groundbreaking research.

During the transition from the Soviet era, “post-Soviet” quickly became a term to reference developments in the newly independent states. However, it did not adequately capture the region’s rapid evolution. In 1990, Ukraine approved a national referendum that called for its historic independence from the Russian Federation; its development was shaped by the Orange Revolution in 2004, and the Maidan uprising in 2014, confirming its popular drive for a pathway to Europe. “Post-Soviet” also failed to capture the complexities of social, political, religious, cultural, and economic transitions underway in the Central Asia and Caucasus nations.

Indeed, what used to be the most unifying idea of this region—the Soviet victory in World War II—no longer binds the region. Russia sought to forge and lead new regional groupings (the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization) to extend its influence. But just as the relevance of the Moscow-led Soviet victory ebbed outside of Russia, these disparate organizations experienced various setbacks and disagreements.

After three decades of the Soviet collapse, the “newly independent states” were ready to drop the word “newly” and establish their own identities and destinies. In recognition, Western academia has started to examine these nations outside of Russian control. Supporting research on and engagement with these diverse states continues to be a vital part of the Kennan Institute mandate.

Yet for Russia, three decades of reform and global integration were not sufficient to break the country from its long history of imperialism. With Vladimir Putin’s rise to power at the turn of the century, Russia has gradually but inexorably moved from a policy of pursuing influence with its neighbors to one of reclaiming lands once held by the Russian empire. In 2008, Russia invaded Georgia to detach two enclaves on the border, enhancing its control over the region, and derailing any Georgian aspirations to join the NATO alliance. In 2014, it annexed Ukrainian land and sparked separatist conflicts on Ukrainian territory, then launched a massive military invasion in 2022. Russia and Ukraine are still locked in a brutal war with no end in sight.

The Kennan Institute’s 50th year and Russia’s renewed pursuit of empire are occurring alongside growing confrontation with the Western-led political and economic global order, making it an appropriate moment to dedicate this edition of the 

 to the issues we cover, drawing upon many of the Kennan Institute’s staff and scholars past and present.

Our greatest strength continues to be our deep bench of scholars, collectively covering a vast array of pressing issues and academic disciplines. We are always able to turn to them to find vital voices on most any topic.

For more than a decade, Russia has increasingly used 

, and military contractors to support its friends and disrupt its 

. It engages in nuclear threats while also complaining of unfair 

. Instead of exchange and dialogue, US-Russia relations now revolve around accusations of 

 reminiscent of the Cold War. In pursuing his singular vision of Russian interests grounded in empire, Putin has led Russia to unprecedented isolation, broken only by relationships of convenience with states also suspicious of the West.

In a very real way, the Kennan Institute now exists in an environment similar to that of its founding in 1974, as the United States confronts a Russian state hostile to America’s post-WWII global leadership. Russia is once again closed to American scholars, and our national focus and attention on Russia is understandably limited to 

 and political concerns. All of this serves to renew the importance of the Kennan Institute’s mission of promoting 

 of this region in all its complexity and iterations.

The only constant for this region’s foreseeable future is change. In turn, as all the former directors have elaborated in their 

, the constant for the Kennan Institute remains our work to improve American understanding of the region by engaging in public debates in new ways.

My brief tenure as director coincided not only with Putin’s turn to aggression, but also the COVID pandemic and banishment to remote work. Instead of reducing our impact, our audience has vastly expanded. We now broadcast to multiple countries and hundreds of viewers at a time—as opposed to our more DC-centric audiences of the pre-pandemic era.

This new capacity could not have come at a more opportune moment. The Putin system is creating an ever-expanding network of banned Russian individuals and organizations, with increasing numbers forced to 

 abroad. In response, the Kennan Institute launched a Russian language blog (“

”) written primarily by independent Russian journalists and experts forced into exile. Within 18 months, the blog reached around 1 million views, more than half of whom came from Russia. The best messenger to reach Russians behind the Kremlin’s information blockade are other Russians who share a language and culture.

Our greatest strength continues to be our deep bench of scholars, collectively covering a vast array of pressing issues and academic disciplines. We are always able to turn to them to find vital voices on most any topic. We are not immune from setbacks resulting from unfolding events. Our ability to hold alumni conferences abroad has been disrupted by travel restrictions—and by the natural tensions resulting from war and conflict. We also must walk a fine line as we transition from the handy framework of “post-Soviet” to a far more divisive and fragmented reality.

Optimism for those who study Eurasia remains in short supply. The end of the Cold War has given way to confrontation and competing notions of history. But the intellectual pillars of the Kennan Institute, which bears the name of the still relevant 

 and as set down by my predecessors and all the scholars that have come through our doors, remain as germane today as when the Kennan Institute was founded in 1974.

William E. Pomeranz is the Director of the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute and an expert on the complexities of political and economic developments in Russia— particularly through a legal lens. He leverages his extensive hands-on experience in international and Russian jurisprudence to address a wide range of legal issues—from the development of Russia’s Constitution to human rights law to foreign investment and sanctions. He is also the author of 

Cover photo: View of St. Basil's Cathedral in Moscow's Red Square. Shutterstock/

In this piece, the current director of the Kennan Institute provides critical context to situate readers in the Kennan Institute’s scholarship on Russia and the region, and why it is so important in this moment in time to help the US and other global leaders navigate the choppy waters ahead. One way that the Kennan Institute is meeting today’s challenges is through its work with the Russian diaspora and journalists in exile. By helping to connect them in a language they can understand through the highly popular In Other Words blog series, the Kennan Institute has a fundamental role in preparing Russians for a post-Putin reengagement with the world. 

Moscow's last years of empire, the rise of democracy, and return to dictatorship. Insights from the Kennan Institute's remarkable first 50 years, and for the road ahead. 

Introduction: Understanding Russia

The Russian attack on Ukraine took most experts and citizens by surprise. In retrospect, however, 

Putin telegraphed his ambitions in his 2020 constitutional amendments

, which, among other things, emphasized the Russian Federation’s right to defend ethnic Russians abroad and further stated that Russia could not give up any land once it had been incorporated into the country.

These two new constitutional principles, combined with the rewriting and reduction of Russia’s legal obligations under international law, 

 for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The ripples of Putin’s war, however, go far beyond the battlefield and have touched Russia’s most sacred memory of them all: The Great Patriotic War.  Indeed, as Putin pursues his 21st century imperial designs in Ukraine, he must define what unites his now expanding, multinational country.

Putin launched his attack on Ukraine under the pretext of protecting Russians in the Donbas from imminent violence—a blatantly false charge—and to expand Russian territory. Putin has designs on incorporating Donetsk, Luhansk, the newly captured region of Kherson, and maybe other regions, into the Russian Federation. With this expected annexation of territory, Putin would have succeeded in creating a strategic land bridge that links mainland Russia to Crimea.

In starting this brutal and unprovoked war on Ukraine, however, Putin has forever tarnished the one historical event that binds the Russian Federation together, namely the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II. The search for national unity has become a growing fixation for Putin, but Russian history provides few satisfactory role models who have achieved this objective. Peter the Great still serves as the obvious default choice. 

, saying the Russian state remains almost unchanged since the 18th century, adding that Peter did not take away any territory from Sweden in the Great Northern War, so much as return what was Russia’s. 

In reality, Putin is left with one unifying event to rally the Russian people: the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II.

Putin is much more loath to turn to Lenin and the Bolshevik Party for positive historical symbols. On several occasions, Putin has accused Lenin of planting a time bomb in the heart of the Soviet Union by basing its internal construction on the nationality principle. He further 

 for surrendering territory to Germany just before Germany surrendered. “We lost to the losing party, a unique case in history,” Putin declared in years past.   

Putin skipped any discussion of the centenary of the 1917 Russian Revolution as being too divisive. Four years later, however, he dedicated a monument in Crimea commemorating the end of the Russian Civil War. The ceremony was particularly revealing about Putin’s efforts to create a usable past. He opened the memorial on 

, formerly the holiday marking the 1917 Revolution, stating that “in Crimea one gets the keenest sense of this live, unending bond.” Putin also declared, “Sevastopol and Crimea are now with Russia and will stay with it forever, because this was the expression of the sovereign, free, and uncompromising will of our entire people.” The inscription on the monument further read, “We are a single people, and have only one Russia.”

At this 2021 ceremony devoted to reconciliation and historical remembrance, Putin nevertheless managed to misrepresent the facts. According to him, one reason for placing this monument in Crimea was because the so-called philosopher’s ship—the boat that carried some of Russia’s leading intellectuals into exile—sailed past Crimea. Putin said that the ship carried those “who left their motherland and emigrated.” In fact, Lenin banished these freethinkers from the Soviet Union under threat of execution if they ever returned.

 30 years after the end of the Cold War, Russia is once again on the outside looking in. The irony is that Ukraine finds itself in a similar position, but with radically different objectives.

Putin is also on shaky ground when lamenting the exodus of Russia’s most talented citizens. His invasion of Ukraine sparked the largest migration and 

In reality, Putin is left with one unifying event to rally the Russian people: the Soviet Union’s victory in World War II. Putin has extended the natural lifetime of this victory to another generation by creating the immortal regiment, where the relatives of veterans march to commemorate the sacrifice of their ancestors. Putin invariably leads this procession, proudly displaying a photograph of his father, a World War II veteran. 

Putin returned to this message of unity on May 9, 2022, the 77th anniversary of Victory in Europe Day. He 

 by saying that this anniversary “has been enshrined in world history as a triumph of the unified Soviet people, its cohesion and spiritual power, an unparalleled feat on the front lines and on the home front.”   

Yet in the aftermath of Putin’s bloody and criminal war, it is doubtful whether World War II still plays this singularly unifying role. Clearly, Ukraine no longer feels attached to this history, since Putin has falsely and maliciously transferred Nazi crimes to Ukraine to justify this war. Russia further stands accused of the same criminal actions as the Nazis—crimes against humanity, the crime of waging an aggressive war, and genocide—along with the massacre of innocent civilians and the deportation, or filtration, of Ukrainian citizens. The historian Francine Hirsch has identified the underappreciated role that the Soviet Union played at Nuremberg and the establishment of the post–World War II human rights architecture. Russia’s leaders now face similar charges—and potential legal consequences—for the invasion of Ukraine.

The unifying symbol of World War II remains problematic for other reasons. Russia always had difficulty explaining the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact—the 1939 agreement between Hitler and Stalin that divvied up Poland and gave the Soviet Union free reign in the Baltics. Putin and the Duma have dealt with this inconvenient episode by introducing administrative 

 for equating Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, and any public statement denying the decisive role of the USSR in defeating the Nazis. Russia’s preeminent human rights group, Memorial, was recently declared a foreign agent and dissolved because, in the eyes of Russian law enforcement, it had created a false image of the Soviet Union as a “terrorist state.”    

The post–Cold War security architecture—and attempts to integrate Russia into Western and global institutions—has reached a dead end.

Putin’s call for unity has been accompanied by a host of repressive laws—the 

—and the doubling-down on the principle of national sovereignty. On the latter front, Putin has been almost too successful. Russia has essentially pulled out—or been expelled—from the global institutions that serve as the backbone of the post–Cold War global order. 

Russia is no longer a member of the Council of Europe

 and, consequently, it is no longer subject to the European Court of Human of Rights. The United States revoked Russia’s permanent most-favored-nation status, which was the primary reason for Russia joining the World Trade Organization in the first place. Russia has also backed away from global trade by allowing parallel imports, which is in violation of international copyright regulations, and threatening to nationalize foreign-owned industries.

The European Union expelled Russian banks from the bank messaging system (SWIFT), and therefore from the global payment system. Russia spent more than a decade trying to integrate global education standards through the Bologna process so that domestic degrees would be recognized as the equivalent of European degrees. No problem. Russia has now unilaterally withdrawn from the Bologna process. Russia has also been suspended from the 

Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

So, 30 years after the end of the Cold War, Russia is once again on the outside looking in. The irony is that Ukraine finds itself in a similar position, but with radically different objectives. The war has revitalized NATO and the Western alliance, but 

it appears that Sweden and Finland will join NATO

 before Ukraine. Ukraine’s other main geopolitical goal is to join the European Union. On this front, Ukraine has now achieved 

 to the EU, but this recognition only starts the clock for what most likely will be years of negotiations to obtain full EU membership.

Much depends on the military situation on the ground. The current consensus among analysts suggests that the two countries may be engaged in a war of attrition, with both sides suffering from shortages of supplies, weapons, and manpower. Since neither country appears willing to admit defeat—political suicide for both Putin and Zelenskyy—a protracted conflict seems the most likely result. 

Although the ultimate endgame is still in doubt, new facts on the ground must be considered. To begin with, the theoretical unity between Russia and Ukraine—left over from World War II—has been permanently broken, and only time will tell whether Putin can rely on this increasingly distant memory to preserve domestic solidarity and stability. The post–Cold War security architecture—and attempts to integrate Russia into Western and global institutions—has reached a dead end, as has the terminology used to describe the former Soviet Union. Indeed, the term “post-Soviet” is no longer relevant since Ukrainians heroically have now fought—and died—to secure their country’s European future. One thing is certain: as long as the war continues, there will be no innocent bystanders. The rest of the world—whether it be in food supplies, energy prices, human migration, or global financial markets—will continue to feel its aftershocks.  

William Pomeranz, the director of the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute, is an expert guide to the complexities of political and economic developments in Russia, particularly through the lens of law. He leverages extensive, hands-on experience in international and Russian jurisprudence to address a wide range of legal issues, from the development of Russia’s Constitution to human rights law to foreign investment and sanctions. He is also the author of 

Law and the Russian State: Russia’s Legal Evolution from Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin

Cover photo: Victory Day celebration on Red Square on May 9, 2022 in Moscow, Russia. Shutterstock/Igor Dolgov.

Kennan Institute Director William Pomeranz examines the challenges Putin faces in unifying Russia while increasingly ostracized by regional and global governing bodies. 