How past events are recollected and represented is known as “historical memory.” It is the glue that helps hold civilizations and nation-states together.

Historical memory is particularly powerful in China. Not only does it hold the nation together, but it provides the key to understanding Chinese nationalism and China’s intentions. 

At the center of China’s historical consciousness is the so-called “century of humiliation.” The Chinese see the period beginning with the First Opium War (1839–1842) and ending with the Sino-Japanese War of 1945 as a period when their nation was attacked, bullied, and torn asunder by imperialists. 

This period has been cemented into Chinese life with a single phrase: 

 (“Never Forget National Humiliation”).  It is a slogan whose four Chinese characters are engraved on many monuments and painted on walls across the entire nation.

When I decided to write a book about how historical memory provides essential raw material to construct China’s national identity and shape the projection of Chinese power, this phrase seemed apt for the title. 

Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations

My book posed two main questions: How did the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) not only survive, but thrive, after the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown? And why did the young Chinese who protested dictatorship and demanded democracy in the 1980s shift so quickly to protesting Western hostility towards China in the 1990s? 

Historical memory provides essential raw material to construct China’s national identity and shape the projection of Chinese power.

Historical memory offers important explanations for these unusual events. Following its ideological bankruptcy in 1989, the CCP launched a vast social project – the “Patriotic Education Campaign” – that pushed the period of national humiliation to the center of China’s history education and domestic discourse. The aim was to glorify the Party, reestablish its legitimacy, and justify one-party CCP rule in the post-Tiananmen and post-Cold War era.

It worked. Indeed, it worked so well that the events of the past eight years since I published my book have come as a surprise, even to me. 

Upon completing the book, I thought that today’s young people who grew up in a prosperous and powerful China might not be influenced easily by long-ago traumas. But the political usage of historical memory has reached new levels that are probably unparalleled in human history. China has been transformed into a different country. And Chinese nationalism has evolved as well.

And once historical memory is embedded in political institutions and social discourse, it becomes more powerful than a mere narrative. It transforms ideas to beliefs, and creates roadmaps that define groups and national objectives. 

One needs only to look at a Chinese foreign policy that is increasingly being described as “assertive” and “aggressive” in the South China Sea, Belt and Road Initiatives, and in its bilateral relations with the U.S. – and redoubled efforts to suppress internal and peripheral crises in Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Xinjiang – to see these effects.

China’s Patriotic Education Campaign began in 1991, shortly after the Tiananmen Square crisis. After Xi Jinping became China’s leader in November 2012, his administration made tremendous efforts towards further institutionalizing patriotic education. 

One key effort towards this end was the nationwide unification of textbooks. This project aimed to homogenize textbook use for each grade in the primary, middle and high schools across the country. 

In 2012, the Ministry of Education maintained a unified curriculum for all public schools in China, but allowed different provinces to choose textbooks from a small number of permitted selections. But five years later, the whole country began to use the same textbooks for three subjects: History, Chinese Language and Moral Education. 

Since the reform was focused initially on ideology and identity education, the textbooks for these three subjects were prioritized. By Fall 2020, however, uniform textbooks for all subjects were available in all Chinese high schools across the country. 

Following the reform, students found that their history books had become very different. In the previous official eighth-grade Chinese history textbook, four pages focused on the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) – and labeled it as a mistake made by Chairman Mao. But new history textbooks dramatically reduced and modified this content. In today’s version, the Cultural Revolution is only mentioned on one page. And the reference to Chairman Mao’s mistake? Removed. 

History textbooks published in 2019 saw a significant increase in content related to patriotic education, and especially territorial issues. According to 

, there was a substantial increase in content related to the South China Sea, Taiwan, Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Hong Kong and Macau. The South China Sea Islands were mentioned 31 times, Taiwan and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 30 times, and Hong Kong and Macau ten times. The textbook also included a special column on these territorial issues to discuss how they belonged to China, and had been its rightful possessions since ancient times. 

Yet the CCP believes that modifying school education alone is insufficient, and Chinese leaders have extended the campaign more deeply into popular culture, entertainment, and other aspects of daily life. 

Previously, regular visits to selected memory sites, museums, and monuments for patriotic education were undertaken only by students and government employees. But over the last eight years, visits to so-called “red” (CCP color) memory sites have become essential for all citizens – including China’s new class of entrepreneurs and self-employed business owners. 

Visits made by Chinese business tycoons create some interesting juxtapositions. Tencent President 

Pony Ma wore the Red Army’s earliest regalia

, including a cap with a red star in its center, when he visited Yan’an in Shaanxi province – the site of the CCP’s headquarters during the Sino-Japan War. Pictures of Ma leading his company’s executives in a uniform worn by troops in the 1920s and 1930s were widely shared across Chinese social media. 

An even more uncomfortably comic scene was created when Leong On-kei, the wife of Macau’s gambling kingpin Stanley Ho, led a group of over 60 of her casino executives, to Jinggangshan in East China’s Jiangxi Province, which is the birthplace of the Red Army. 

 for a week of patriotic education courses, which is interesting in part because  gambling remains illegal in mainland China. Many of China’s newly rich and business corporations seem eager to showcase their loyalty and patriotism to the CCP publicly, no matter what business they pursue. 

Patriotic education has penetrated to unthinkable depths within popular culture over the past eight years, including the production of numerous patriotic soap operas and television series. Mocked by many viewers as “Resisting-Japan Bizarre Dramas,” these movie and television productions often portray the Communist-led anti-Japanese forces during the Sino-Japan war (1931-1945) in the most hagiographic and self-glorifying light. The storylines also traffic in unrealistic and ridiculous plots, such as a CCP soldier tearing a Japanese soldier into half using only his bare hands. 

The ubiquity of these programs raises an important point.  Visitors to China who turn on television cannot avoid such fare. These dramas are telecast throughout the day. One critic of my book pointed out that official patriotic education is like a radio program that youngsters can switch off if they do not like it. But the institutionalization of patriotic education at so many levels of Chinese life argues against this view. These programs are available anytime and everywhere. There are a part of Chinese daily life that can never be switched off.

China’s ruling apparatus is pursuing every opportunity to extend patriotic education. Even in a time of pandemic. 

In July 2020, after China effectively controlled the spread of the coronavirus, the Party immediately informed all schools to use the anti-coronavirus campaign as 

“a vivid lesson” for patriotic education

. In September, China organized a huge ceremony to celebrate the success of its campaign against the COVID-19 pandemic. The propaganda activities included comparisons  of Chinese efforts with those of the U.S. and other countries, which highlighted the incompetence of foreign governments, and depicted China’s governance system and leadership as more advanced.  

The creation of new national memorial days is also a key element in the campaign. In 2014, Xi Jinping decreed the creation of two new public anniversaries: December 13 became the annual national “Memorial Day for the Nanjing Massacre,” and September 3 became the national anniversary of “Victory Day of the Chinese People’s War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression.” 

New commemorative activities are conducted across China to underscore the importance of these days. On December 13, at 10 A.M., for instance, bells and sirens begin ringing in Nanjing and many Chinese cities. People are expected to stop whatever they are doing when this happens, irrespective of whether they are driving or walking on the road. In recent years, these events have become highly institutionalized and formalized. 

The definition of national objectives by China’s government has been one of the most important steps taken to institutionalize historical memory. Immediately after becoming China’s top leader, Xi Jinping used public speeches to present a new national goal – 

 – as his administration’s main policy platform. The CCP promotes the China Dream narrative as the new leadership’s mission statement and as its guide to the country’s future.

President Xi places a great “rejuvenation” of the Chinese nation at the center of the program. This language is important. The term “rejuvenation” is closely tied with the century of  humiliation narrative.  Xi’s program aims to end China’s national humiliation, bring the nation to the center of the world stage, and make it a prosperous, powerful nation that enjoys global respect and great power status. And while this dream includes many diverse elements, Taiwan’s return to China is on the top of the list. 

The CCP promotes the China Dream narrative as the new leadership’s mission statement and as its guide to the country’s future.

The historical memory of national humiliation was the primary content in both the initial patriotic education campaign of the 1990s and 2000s, and the new education initiatives imparted since 2012. So what has changed in the last eight years? 

This humiliation narrative now has been systematically connected with China’s future objectives. The emphasis has shifted from a passive, traumatized representation to an active future role for China. Xi upgraded the narrative from a propaganda tool to the signature ideology of the CCP,  signaling how integral it is to the “China Dream” narrative. The new approach focuses on further strengthening the nation, and making China stronger, wealthier and assertive. The past eight years have demonstrated a very clear correlation between shifts in the use of historical memory and the changes in China’s foreign policy behavior. 

Historical memory in China is a very complicated process. It is crucial to avoid oversimplifications. 

China’s history as a nation-state is very short. But its civilization is a story that spans over 3,500 years. Prior to 1911, when the Republic of China was formally established, Chinese people believed in universalism. They had no conception of a nation-state. With a firm belief in the concept of “All under Heaven,” China viewed other states and their people as barbarians. 

This faith in universalism was destroyed by imperialist gunboats, sparking that century of humiliation. China’s journey as a nation-state commenced with the sharp trauma of foreign invasions and national survival crises. The Chinese people turned from universalism to radical nationalism for survival. 

It is easy for outside observers to conclude that the Chinese government instrumentally uses national trauma of the century of humiliation for propaganda purposes, and that Chinese citizens are easily influenced or brainwashed by it. And the patriotic education campaigns which I have described are, without a doubt, government propaganda.

But the actual historical events of the “century of humiliation” contained in Chinese history textbooks, and the items displayed in museums, are not made up or manufactured. The full picture of Chinese history may not be presented, but the violence and war crimes were real – as was the trauma inflicted on millions of Chinese families.

Modern China faces two fundamental historic tasks: The first is to build an independent, strong, and prosperous state to end the century of humiliation. The second is to build a democratic constitutional republic to complete China’s transformation from a backward feudal system to a modern, well-respected nation. 

Patriotic education’s powerful impact isn’t derived only from the CCP’s exceptional propaganda campaigns. The history of humiliation is the starting point as well as the destination for both tasks. Past humiliation is used to define the nation’s future objectives. President Xi has connected passive memories with a new and active mission statement and policy. 

The Chinese people turned from universalism to radical nationalism for survival.

The effectiveness of historical memory about the century of humiliation in unifying China is why  various generations of Chinese leaders have chosen it as a policy platform and a mobilization tool. Yet it has also created two crucial paradoxes with which China must contend:

1.  A paradox between one-Party rule and democracy:

 A strong state and a democratic society are not contradictory. Democracy is an essential element of nation building. Yet China’s rise as an independent, unified, and strong state in recent decades has been achieved through an authoritarian one-party leadership structure. Many Chinese still remember old China as “a pan of loose sand” that didn’t stick together. China’s recent success provides the CCP with a justification to continue one-party rule. Those desiring the national rejuvenation of the “China Dream” see a centralized strong leadership as necessary for a strong and well-coordinated state, and something that might not be possible in a democracy. 

The CCP has often used other countries as examples to drive this point home. India provides a picture of how a democratic system might not be suitable for a large and ethnically-diverse population. The pandemic response in the United States is used as evidence that China’s current political and governance system make it superior to the U.S. in navigating public health – and in other ways. 

2. A paradox between nationalism and democracy:

 In most democratic societies, nationalism is considered to be a negative force. Yet the Chinese revolution of the past century has been driven by strong nationalism, and China’s independence and unification were achieved under the leadership of a strongly nationalistic political party. This historic background provides a justification that nationalism is a positive force. Many Chinese, including some senior intellectuals, consider nationalism as an essential ideology to hold the nation together. 

This helps explains why the CCP’s patriotic education campaign has met little resistance in Chinese society. Many Chinese are unhappy with various CCP actions and policies, and they believe that a democratic system is good. But they also believe that China has important national interests, and that safeguarding them in the international arena should be China’s top priority. 

This is especially true when China faces serious challenges and hostility from certain countries, including the United States. This paradox presents a contradiction for many Chinese citizens, including some liberal scholars. They yearn for China to democratize, but also believe that the country needs a strong government to defend its national interests, especially those concerning territory and sovereignty. 

The historical memory of national humiliation plays an essential role in creating both paradoxes. China’s collective aspiration for national rejuvenation somehow justifies one-party rule, nationalism and hawkish foreign policy. And the CCP has skillfully used these justifications to serve its interests. For the party, the educational campaign’s most important messages are that only the CCP can make China an independent, united, powerful and wealthy state, and only the CCP can defend China’s national interests and meet foreign competition

Historical memory will certainly continue to play a very important role in China’s nation building, and because of this, the two paradoxes it helps create will persist as China charts its future path. 

Chinese citizens yearn for China to democratize, but also believe that the country needs a strong government to defend its national interests, especially those concerning territory and sovereignty. 

One cannot simply expect that time will heal all wounds and the shadows of history will eventually fade away. And when a powerful narrative of historical memory is institutionalized and embedded in both the educational system and social discourse, it transforms into the nation’s “national ideas”– collective beliefs on how society ought to act. 

National ideas are difficult to change because, like all traditions that are institutionally entrenched, they become ingrained in public rhetoric and bureaucratic procedures. These ideas also profoundly influence people’s perceptions and actions – in conscious and subconscious ways. 

A thorough comprehension of Chinese historical memory is essential to understanding today’s Chinese politics and foreign policy analysis. But the stakes are even higher. It is also necessary   to understand the thinking of a new generation of China’s young patriots, who shall lead this rising power for the remainder of this century. 

and Professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University. He was a 

Cover image: Anti-Japan protesters hold portraits of the late Communist leader Mao Zedong, Chinese national flags, and a poster that reads: "September 18, National Humiliation Day" outside the Japanese Embassy in Beijing on September 18, 2012. (AP Photo / Alexander F. Yuan)

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The politics of historical memory determine China’s present. Will they set the course for its future? 

The Past's Transformative Power

In Chinese, the word “crisis” is composed of two characters, 

 means “opportunity.” For China, U.S. President Donald Trump’s trade wars represent both. During the 2016 presidential campaign, the then-candidate mainly targeted two countries, China and Mexico, blaming them for the U.S. trade deficit, the loss of American jobs, and the exodus of manufacturing, among other things. Since becoming president, Trump has followed through on his threats, pushing a hard line on a new North American Free Trade Act and launching opening tariff volleys against both countries (as well as Canada and the EU). While these battles have garnered much attention in the context of bilateral ties and, in the case of Mexico and Canada, a continental context, less attention has been paid to the new context that has emerged for the relationship between China and the three NAFTA countries. In the face of a changing world trade landscape, Beijing is looking to take advantage of new opportunities brought about by the tumult in North America and extend its fast-developing geo-economic agenda into America’s backyard. 

“China is really the unspoken fourth partner in NAFTA,” said Enrique Dussel Peters, a Mexican economist and head of the Center for China-Mexico Studies, in 

. “China has benefited the most. As Trump talks about Mexico robbing U.S. jobs, he’s really looking at the wrong country – not the right beneficiary,” he added.

That striking assessment was made in November, as the fifth round of NAFTA talks concluded in the Mexican capital with little progress made and tensions on the rise. One month earlier, a similar sentiment appeared in 

), a leading Chinese-language magazine run by the Foreign Ministry. If NAFTA negotiations face gridlock or collapse, write the authors, then China is in a prime position to benefit. Today, the talks haven’t collapsed, but according to some reports, “gridlock” would be a kind description.

While Chinese officials have focused their public comments on their own trade tussle with the U.S., this may well be the gist of the Chinese government’s strategic thinking about the North American situation – namely, with trust between Washington and its neighbors at a palpable low, and one of the world’s largest free-trade areas showing signs of possible fracture or weakening, Canada and Mexico will be increasingly eager to diversify their economic partnerships. China, as the world’s second-largest economy and 

, would seem to be an obvious alternative to the U.S., at least in part, for both countries. 

Could this moment be the springboard for Beijing’s great leap forward in North America?

In May, former Mexican President Vicente Fox told Fox Business that the country was formulating a “plan B,” involving China, should NAFTA negotiations fail. One 

 analysis says that especially since Trump entered office, Canada and China have been “

.” Could this moment be the springboard for Beijing’s great leap forward in North America?

Surely, China is watching the North American infighting and negotiating with an opportunity-seeking eye. But, of course, the tableau gets more complicated, with more potentialities and more inflections of strategy. Beijing is contending with its own tariff tug-of-war with the United States, or “the largest trade war in economic history,” in China’s words. Initiated by Washington amid a massive trade deficit and deep concerns over intellectual property theft, that war could 

 should the Trump administration follow through on plans to target an additional $200 billion of Chinese goods. The possibility is riling Beijing, whose trade surplus and foreign currency reserves have enabled the government to buy the loyalty of elites and to control and suppress any internal opposition. This situation between the world’s top two economies has North American implications as well. It raises the possibility that Canadian and Mexican products could stand in for some of what was previously imported into China from America. 

For example, China, the world’s top energy consumer and importer, could look to further increase its consumption of Canadian natural resources. The thirsty country represents a 

 for growing Canadian exports of oil and natural gas, and Ottawa is 

 to deliver fossil fuels east (a project that has generated controversy, but which now could become more appealing). In addition, Chinese technology giants are 

 in Canadian high-tech, all the more so as political tensions with the U.S. prompt investors to look elsewhere. 

Underpinning the adjustments that China looks to make in North America is the groundwork that it has already laid. Indeed, Beijing is not unprepared for the openings that it now sees, having begun its campaign in the continent well before Trump took office. 

While China’s trade with, and investment in, Canada and Mexico have paled in comparison to the U.S., the trend line is decidedly upward. In 2012, Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto and Chinese President Xi Jinping founded the Grupo de Alto Nivel Empresarial México-China, a partnership between more than 20 major companies, including tech giant Huawei and Aeroméxico airlines, to promote business cooperation. A “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” followed the next year. This major upgrade of bilateral relations included agreements to increase mutual investment in energy, mining, infrastructure, and high-tech, as well as boost China’s imports. Between 2014 and 2016, Mexico saw more than 40 deals with China valued at over $4 billion, whereas no previous year had seen more than five. Chinese national oil company CNOOC 

 to develop two deep-water blocks in Mexico’s Perdido Fold Belt in late 2016, as China looks to expand its oil production in North America and elsewhere. Chinese investment in Mexico has already 

 since then. Today, China is Mexico’s third-largest export destination.

China is Canada’s second-largest trading partner, after the United States. During Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Ottawa in September 2016, he and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau 

 by 2025 and accelerate negotiations on a free-trade agreement. Last year, another meeting between the two resulted in agreement to collaborate further on agriculture, tourism, and student exchanges. According to China’s Commerce Ministry, the total amount of merchandise traded between the two countries reached nearly $73 billion last year, with 15 percent year-on-year growth. 

A top goal of China’s North America strategy is to eventually sign free-trade agreements with both of the United States’ neighbors. While bringing down tariff barriers means major new opportunities for Chinese exports, Beijing also views such agreements as an effective way to deal with the multilateral trading systems of which it is not a part, such as NAFTA. “If we negotiate a free-trade agreement, this will greatly favor trade exchanges between our two countries. 

 from China’s side,” Chinese Ambassador to Mexico Qiu Xiaoqi said last year. 

However, even amid the trade tremors rippling through North America and notwithstanding the facts of China’s deepening economic footprint, that goal still faces significant hurdles. Having considered China to be a direct competitor in the North American market, especially as the two compete in providing cheap labor, Mexico was the last country to withdraw objections to Beijing’s WTO accession in 2001. Those tensions linger, and there is concern that any free-trade agreement would cost more Mexican manufacturing jobs and increase the country’s sizable trade imbalance (Mexico imports 14 Chinese products for each one it exports). 

For Canada, in particular, concerns over China’s labor practices, human rights and environmental records, and political ambitions have impeded efforts to forge closer ties. This spring, Canada blocked a billion-dollar takeover of a construction firm by a Chinese state-owned company, citing national security concerns. In April, Chinese Ambassador Lu Shaye said, “We have stressed many times… that we really want 

 or issues to not be included in the negotiation of an FTA.” 

China’s piqued interest in North America must also be viewed through a certain lens, or rather, as an extension of a certain road. While China’s rise over the past twenty years has been largely an economic phenomenon, the country’s foreign policy has become bolder, featuring more provocative behavior, since President Xi Jinping assumed and rapidly consolidated power. Trade issues have become especially political. This is evident in the Belt and Road Initiative, often referred to as “China’s Marshall Plan.” Also called “One Belt, One Road,” it promises to build highways, high-speed trains, pipelines, and shipping infrastructure to connect China to countries across Eurasia and North Africa by land and sea. The Chinese government has promised significant financial benefits and development support for participating nations. Xi sees the Initiative as a potent tool to expand China’s influence. 

While the Belt and Road plan does not include North America, there are links, and they may be increasing in the current climate. The Chinese-run Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), a newly created institution that supports the Initiative, gives nations feuding over trade with the U.S. an alternative to Western-led international financial institutions. Despite opposition from Washington, Canada applied to join the Bank in 2017, and it was approved this March. Among world’s top 25 economies, Japan, Mexico, and the U.S. are the only three non-members, but the recent presidential election in Mexico may change that list. 

Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the incoming president of Mexico, envisions the construction of a railway corridor across an isthmus in the south of the country that would work like a mini Panama Canal, linking the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans. His economic adviser, Gerardo Esquivel, says China “

” in the Belt-and-Road-style project. López Obrador has also stated his intention to join the AIIB. On August 2, he and members of his incoming cabinet met with China’s ambassador to discuss trade and investment. For China, Mexican involvement in the Belt and Road is not just about North America either; Xi was quoted as saying in September 2017 that the country is an “

 of the natural extension of Belt and Road construction in Latin America,” a region where Chinese interest has been conspicuous in recent years.

The rise of the Initiative has coincided with President Trump’s rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was a key feature of the Obama administration’s “Asia pivot.” In geopolitical terms, what was in large part a Chinese response to U.S. policy has become a proactive project, with Beijing aiming to pick up speed. Belt and Road’s potential to shift global power dynamics is especially worrying at a time when the United States is lessening its leadership on the world stage.

But back to NAFTA and North American tariff headaches. While Canada and Mexico may be more compelled than ever to diversify their trading bases, there is little doubt that they would prefer to mend ties with their neighbor in the middle (which is still the world’s top economy) and reach a beneficial new deal. The deep, geography-enabled links between the three North American countries amount to a prime example of what economists call “path dependence,” the tendency to maintain established relationships and practices. This is not a situation where China can easily replace the United States, even if it does make significant gains. 

However, in looking for leverage in the ongoing negotiations, both Canada and Mexico could well use the “

” if they choose, pointing out the potential opening for Beijing in the context of its broad geo-economic and geopolitical ambitions. That same card could also be flipped, with China assuming the role of a shared concern; as the Chinese article on NAFTA strategy notes, there are many Chinese products and manufacturing parts, such as auto parts and intermediate textile goods, that are exported to Canada and Mexico before reaching their final destination in the U.S., and an updated deal could include continental agreement on higher tariffs for such items.

Indeed, there are many roles that China is playing in the still-unfinished script of the North American trade drama. The controversial first line of that drama, of course, was written by Trump: “Make America great again.” Ironically, the phrase is nearly identical to Xi’s vision of “realizing the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Both men are taking action, allegedly toward those respective ends, but in highly disparate ways: While Trump’s behaviors have been described as nationalistic and anti-globalization, Xi has portrayed himself as a champion of globalization. For Trump, bringing manufacturing jobs back to the United States is a major part of restoring that “greatness,” and Canada, Mexico, and China stand in the way. China seeks “rejuvenation” in large part by pursuing bold economic and economic-political moves around the world. These convergences, as well as these divergences, have now met in North America.

) is the director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies and a professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University. He is a global fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kissinger Institute on China and the United States.

 is a junior fellow at the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University. His research focuses on U.S.-China relations and security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Cover photo: Chinese President Xi Jinping (right) gestures to Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau ahead of their meeting in Beijing, August 31, 2016. (Courtesy of AP)

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The continent’s economic infighting also creates a new context for China’s relationships with the three NAFTA countries. Could this moment be the springboard for Beijing’s great leap forward in North America?

In Trade Trouble, China Sees North American Opportunity

This June, as the world remembered the 25th anniversary of the Tiananmen Square movement and crackdown, much of the attention was focused on personal memories of the event. But at least as important, if not more so, is the fact that this was a turning point for China.

Though Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping started opening up China to the world and reforming the economy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was cautious about the types (and pace) of change in both the political and economic spheres. The Party made progress in both, and tried hard to maintain a balance between the two, meting out economic reform with political reform.

The CCP faced a major crisis in legitimacy. Protests in Tiananmen Square were seen as a challenge to the CCP’s continued rule, and Party leaders were forced to make a choice about how to deal with the situation. Drawing on historical experiences, they concluded that without a politically stable society, China would be unable to effectively pursue economic development. (To this day, the Chinese government believes so strongly in this theory of stability that it recommends it to leaders of other developing countries.)

In 1989, the Party’s leaders decided to use all possible resources to maintain a stable society while aggressively implementing economic reforms. Over the next several years, they quickly embraced market capitalism, free trade, and globalization; stock markets opened in Shanghai and Shenzhen, banking reforms took hold, and the Party endorsed a “socialist market economy.”

At the same time, the Party rejected the old model that balanced economic reform with political reform. Any hopes of democratization were effectively halted. Compared with 25 years ago, today’s China has less freedom of speech. The state has applied tight controls, and the government’s budget for maintaining social stability is higher than the defense budget.

’: the combination of political repression with a market economy and embrace of globalization.

For better and for worse, China’s dramatic transformation over the last quarter century is due, fundamentally, to the 1989 Choice and decisions and policies that stem from it.

And what of this transformation? Data can tell us interesting stories about individual facets of China’s path since the Party made the 1989 Choice, but what about the overall narrative?

Is China’s tale over the last 25 years a success story?

The Greatest Escape from Poverty in Human History

In 1989, China’s population was the largest in the world, but its gross domestic product (GDP), was only the world’s ninth largest. Twenty-five years later, China’s economy is the second largest in the world (after only the U.S., 

which it is projected to eclipse by 2019 at the latest

) and, by all appearances, will continue expanding in the years to come.

This rate of growth is astonishingly rapid. Yearly growth rates of up to 10 percent over two decades have grown China’s economy to 24 times its size in 1989. The U.S. economy, by contrast — despite robust economic growth over the past 25 years — is slightly less than three times its 1989 size.

Such measurements are calculated using current U.S. dollars at market exchange rates, which means that they don’t take into account the fact that a dollar buys more goods and services in China than it does in the U.S. (which in some ways inflates the size of the U.S. economy relative to China’s). Comparisons of purchasing power are fraught with difficulties, but holding for purchasing power parity, the World Bank estimates that in 2012, China’s GDP was $14.8 trillion, while the U.S.’s was $16.2 trillion — proportionally, a much smaller difference than the GDP gap calculated by using market exchange rates. The gap between the Chinese and American economies has been getting smaller and smaller, although this is partly due to the renminbi 

China’s economy is 24 times larger than it was in 1989.

The quality of the Chinese government’s economic statistics in general (and those used to calculate GDP in particular) has been a source of controversy, partly because there are internal political pressures to maintain the appearance of high growth rates. 

One recent report recalculated China’s GDP 

over the last few decades, and put the average yearly growth rate at 7.2 percent from 1978 to 2012; 

another study used satellite images of nighttime lights

 to estimate GDP growth, and found that China’s official numbers overstated the economy’s growth rate. By contrast, 

 that due to certain items being left out of GDP calculations (especially rural housing construction), China's current GDP growth is higher than the released figures. Regardless of these debates over the precise rate, it is unchallenged that China’s economy has grown exceptionally fast — especially since 1989.

Perhaps even more striking is the growth in China’s per person GDP, which is currently in the neighborhood of $6,000; in 1989, the same figure amounted to only about $300. This truly astonishing growth has outstripped all other countries with comparable starting points. In 1989, the per person GDPs of India and Kenya were $353 and $365, respectively; as of 2012, those figures stood at only $1,503 and $943. Egypt ended 1989 with a per person GDP twice as high as China’s; that ratio has now reversed, with Egypt’s per person GDP roughly half China’s size. Many countries have seen a rise in per capita GDP during this period, but there are almost none who started at the same level as China and have risen to comparable numbers today.

China’s per person GDP is more than $6,000. In 1989, it was just $307.

Still, though a massive improvement, this value of $6,000 only puts China in the World Bank’s “upper middle income country” bracket, along with countries like Peru ($6,800) and Iraq ($6,600). Compare this to a per person GDP of over $22,000 for South Korea, over $45,000 for Japan, and over $50,000 for the U.S., and it is clear that China still has much room for further growth.

Rocketing economic growth has led to a spectacular rise in living standards for the great mass of Chinese people. China’s percentage of people living on the equivalent of $2 a day (a common measure of poverty) has fallen from almost 85 percent to about 27 percent. The country’s ‘extreme poverty’ rate, defined as the rate of people living on $1.25 per day, has fallen from 60 percent in 1990 to less than 12 percent in 2009, according to the World Bank (more recently, 

 that by 2012, the rate fell to only 7 percent). While this rate still falls short of the living standards of developed countries, China’s achievements have been widely hailed as part of the greatest escape from poverty in human history.

In order to appreciate the scale of this development, we need to put it into context. Back in 1990, China’s extreme poverty rate was comparable to that of Zambia, here used as a representative of the world’s poorest countries. After the 1989 Choice, with radical economic reforms enacted, China’s extreme poverty rate started to drop. Ten years later, it was equal to India’s; ten more years after that, it was only one-third that of India. India has reduced its extreme poverty rate from 50 percent to roughly 30 percent since 1990, which is no mean feat, especially given the size of India’s population. However, during the same period, the proportion of Chinese people in extreme poverty plummeted to one-tenth its initial size. China is now in the neighborhood of countries like South Africa, and looks set to reduce its rate even further.

Higher up on the income scale, China’s middle class is growing rapidly and accessing more and better consumer goods. One illustrative example is passenger car ownership. Over the last 10 years, the number of cars purchased per month has grown sixfold, increasing from about 250,000 to over 1.5 million cars sold every month. In 2013, Chinese people 

 — 400 times as many as were purchased in the entirety of 1990, when fewer than 50,000 passenger cars were bought.

Though the growth in consumer goods is striking, China’s newly wealthy aren’t just spending their money on cars and other gadgets; they’re trying to secure upward-mobility for their families by capitalizing on opportunities that were previously out of reach — especially the chance to send their children to college in America. The number of Chinese students (on F or M visas) studying in the U.S. has increased substantially in the last few years. In 2013, almost one-third of all international students in the U.S. were from China.

At the top of the wealth pyramid, the number of Chinese people with more than $1 million in disposable assets (high net worth individuals) has increased 60 percent over the last five years. In 2013, there were 758,000 Chinese millionaires, the fourth largest amount in the world, 

according to a study by Capgemini Financial Services Analysis and the Royal Bank of Canada

Economic reform and globalization have brought China unprecedented wealth and power. These have come at a cost. The environment has paid a sometimes ruinous price for the rise in living standards. China’s carbon dioxide emissions have rocketed upwards and show no sign of stopping — a contrast to the European Union, where overall emissions have either held steady or marginally decreased, despite economic gains over the past 25 years. Even the U.S. has seen a plateauing in its emissions levels against a backdrop of substantial increases in economic activity. (Differing population sizes, of course, mean that China’s per capita emissions are not as high as its Western counterparts — the average Chinese person is currently responsible for roughly the same amount of annual CO2 emissions as the average European, and only about half as much as the average American.)

The growth in the sheer amount of economic activity — including driving all of those new cars — can explain some of the rise in pollution, but the nature of the energy used is also to blame. China leads the world in its consumption of coal, and new power plants are opening up every year. Indeed, the total amount of coal consumed in China is now almost as much as the amount consumed by the rest of the world combined. If the Chinese economy is to continue growing, more and more energy will be needed, and coal seems likely to continue as the fuel of choice.

The environmental impacts of China’s economic growth aren’t limited to problems of a global scope, like climate change; Chinese people suffer directly — and tangibly — from decreasing water quality, deforestation, desertification, and (perhaps most notoriously) air pollution.

In Beijing, the U.S. Embassy routinely collects air quality data, measuring the level of particulate matter in the air that is less than 2.5 micrometers in diameter — particles of dust, dirt, soot, smoke, and liquid droplets are all included in this measure. Because they can be inhaled and lodge deeply in the lungs, these small particles pose major health risks, 

according to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

The maximum level for a ‘non-harmful’ air quality rating is 12 micrograms per cubic meter. Over the last six years, the readings taken by the Embassy in Beijing were usually between 55.5 and 150.4 micrograms per cubic meter, a range that the EPA classifies as “unhealthy.” On January 12, 2013, 

 was a monstrous 568.6 micrograms — higher than even the uppermost bracket for the EPA’s worst air category, “Hazardous.” Based on 

 from Beijing’s municipal government, 2013 saw 58 days when the city’s air quality reading was above 200 micrograms per cubic meter.

The 1989 Choice has also taken its toll on Chinese society. The decision to pursue economic growth at the expense of political reform has led to several trends that realize some of the worst fears of those who advocated moderate reform before 1989. The jettisoning of the iron rice bowl and the dismantling of the social safety net — in addition to rising wealth from market activity — has led to a drastic widening of the gap between rich and poor.

The Gini Coefficient is a statistic that summarizes the complex phenomenon of income inequality in a single number — an assessment that reveals the degree to which China has abandoned the economic equality of old. Measuring the average difference between people’s incomes, the Gini can go from 0 (where everyone has the same income) to 1.00 (the equivalent of 100 percent, where one person has all the income).

Here, we plotted the most recent Gini coefficient for every country and ordered them from most equal to most unequal. Then, for comparison, we added China’s value from roughly 25 years ago. In 1987, China’s Gini score was about .3 — among the most equal countries in the world, though widely impoverished. By 2009, the same inequality measure had climbed above .42. Based on this number, China’s income distribution is more unequal than 63 percent of the countries with values collected by the World Bank. Instead of being in the realm of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway, China now has levels of inequality comparable to Angola, Venezuela, and Congo. After years without any official governmental reports on China’s Gini index, 

an independent report by a Chinese university in 2012

 revealed China’s score soared to a worrying new high: .61. This would make China the fifth most unequal country in the world.

Another way to measure inequality is in terms of the share of total income going to different sectors of society. Since 1990, the percentage of national income going to the poorest 10 percent of China has dropped by half — and the same is true for the lowest 20 percent.

Increasing inequality, while consistent with rising absolute levels of living standards, poses a potentially serious threat to the coveted social stability the CCP is obsessed with maintaining — which is likely why the Party has introduced new anti-poverty programs (like the Minimum Living Standard Scheme, which aims to guarantee a minimum income to registered urban residents by making up the gap between their income and the poverty line).

So, what is China’s story since Tiananmen?

The CCP’s narrative, which is believed by many people inside China, is that stability brought prosperity. Many people say that yes, the party made a lot of mistakes, but if any political change happens, stability will be lost, and China will immediately face a major crisis. This line of thinking holds that even though it’s troubling that the government has exerted tighter control over speech, the press, and the internet, China has suffered no major political change or turmoil — allowing the country to instead focus on economic development. Thailand and Ukraine are used as cautionary examples of the reality an unstable China would face. Democracy means suffering from political instability, which impedes economic development.

“Democracy means suffering from political instability, which impedes economic development.”

Qin Hui, a professor at Tsinghua University in Beijing, 

 to explain China’s ‘economic miracle.’ He sees the so-called “China model” as defined by “low welfare and lack of freedom paired with economic globalization.” Qin argues that China’s lack of democracy gives it a “low human rights advantage”: sweatshops and little-to-no welfare have made “made in China” irresistible in the globalized markets. He also suggests that China’s model will be difficult for other developing countries to replicate, especially those with democratic systems.

Given China’s rise in wealth and power, and its unprecedented reductions in poverty, it seems unlikely that anyone could wholeheartedly say that the 1989 Choice has produced a failure. Likewise, given the many problems resulting from this marriage of political repression and a globalized market economy, it seems equally unlikely that anyone could say the 1989 Choice produced an unqualified success.

Looking forward, even if China has, in some ways, profited from its embrace of globalization, how long will such a profit last? Is the current breakneck trajectory sustainable or not? It seems likely that there are unappreciated dangers lurking in China’s future. Has the 1989 Choice sacrificed long-term gains for short-term benefits?

In what is perhaps a parable for modern China, in 2012, a young boy from Anhui province 

 to raise the money to buy an iPad. Subsequently, he suffered renal deficiency.

China’s rise is one of the most significant and challenging issues in today’s international system — raising questions about peace, security, development, and prosperity in the 21st century. Answers to these questions depend on a full understanding of the 1989 Choice and its impact on China and the world.

is the Director of the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies and an Associate Professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University, and a Global Fellow at the Wilson Center. 

 is an Assistant Professor in the School of Diplomacy and International Relations at Seton Hall University.

Cover illustration by Zach Stanton

Interactive charts created using Datawrapper.

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In 1989, China's government made a choice to combine political repression, a market economy, and globalization.

Zheng Wang