Pro and Con on NATO Arms
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PERIODICALSFOREIGN POLICY & DEFENSE(from 10,000 troops in 1972 to about 1,000 today), the United Statesmight someday find itself in the awkward position of having a com-mitment to Taiwan without the means to meet it.Pro and Con "NATO Arms Standardization: TwoViews" by Dewey F. Bartlett and Jameson NATO Arms H. Polk, in AEI Defense Review (no. 6,1977), American Enterprise Institute,1150 17th Street N.W., Washington, D.C.20036.Standardization of military hardware, long an operational goal of the13-nation Atlantic alliance, is the "key" to NATO's survival as an effec-tive deterrent, according to Senator Bartlett (R.-Okla.). But GeneralPolk, former commander in chief of the U.S. Army in Europe and theSeventh Army, believes that standardization is generally not worth thetime, effort, or money required.Lack of standardized weapons and parts in the NATO force, saysBartlett, creates a "domino-like chain of inefficiency." The SenateArmed Services Committee, on which Bartlett serves, estimates thatNATO has lost 30 to 40 percent of its effectiveness because of its con-fused mix of weapons systems. The alliance now fields 31 differentantitank weapons (with 18 more under development), 7 different tanks,8 armored personnel carriers, 24 families of combat aircraft, 100 kindsof tactical missiles, and 50 varieties of ammunition. With NATO nationsplagued by rising manpower costs and faltering economies, distribu-tion of common equipment, Bartlett argues, could save $10-15billion ayear.But Polk questions Bartlett's estimates of potential savings. He sees agreater need for cooperation in battle rather than for peacetimeeconomies. Standardizing spare parts, he argues, is "impractical,costly, and idealistic." Efforts to standardize should be confined to"essential" items, such as fuel and ammunition. As for other duplica-tion, Polk concludes, "the best policy is to forget it."Bomb the Ban "Candor, Compromise, and the Com-prehensive Test Ban" by Donald R. Wes-iervelt, in Strategic ~ & i e w(Fall 1977),U.S. Strategic Institute, 1204 K St. N.W.,Washington, D.C. 20006.For two decades, the United States has sought to negotiate a treaty withthe Soviet Union to eliminate underground testing of nuclear weapons.But according to Westervelt, a staff member of the Los Alamos Scien-tific Laboratory, the problems inherent in such a "comprehensive" testban (current treaties cover only above-ground testing) could eventuallyresult in a shift of the strategic balance in favor of the Soviets. Hebelieves that only with a "limited" test-ban treaty-or none at a l l - c a nthe United States maintain its technological edge over the U.S.S.R.The Wilson QuarterlyISpring 197817