It may seem counterintuitive that gangs can exist in what is perhaps the ultimate tightly regulated environment. Gangs, however, have been thriving in American prisons since the 1950s, and are now ubiquitous. Why is it that the corrections system has been unable to eradicate gang activity from the facilities they run?

 by M. Garrett Roth and David Skarbek makes the case that gangs have actually become necessary elements within the prison system, allowing inmates to create and sustain an internal economy centered on contraband, eliminating much of the violence and disorder that would be present without them.

Through their examination of the California state prison system — the birthplace of the country’s most notorious prison gangs, including the Mexican Mafia, Nuestra Familia, and the Aryan Brotherhood — Skarbek and Roth discovered that correctional officers and prison authorities actually benefit from the existence of prison gangs, and have come to rely on gang hierarchies to maintain order, saving money in the process.

Skarbek and Roth cite statistics showing that while “the number of prison gangs and members has increased, prison violence has declined dramatically. The rate of inmate homicides declined 94% between 1973 and 2003 … [and] prison gang members are no more likely to engage in violent misconduct behind bars than non-gang inmates.” Gangs create powerful communities with influential leaders controlling member behavior. This allows for successful and controlled trade interactions between gangs, and actually prevents large-scale conflict by intimidating inmates who'd otherwise be likely to engage in violent behavior, thereby preventing disruptions of business activity.

Prison authorities acknowledge that it is impossible to eliminate all forms of prison contraband, especially in-demand items like alcohol, narcotics, and cell phones. In California, note the authors, 15,000 phones were seized from inmates in 2011 alone, and it is likely that many more went undetected. “During 11 days at one prison, officials used a device to detect more than 25,000 unauthorized calls, texts, and internet requests. Officials at the maximum-security prison at Corcoran even confiscated two cell phones from Charles Manson,” Skarbek and Roth write. “Contraband markets are working.”

Prison gangs prevent the contraband economy from becoming chaotic and inefficient, conditions that encourage violence. As there are no enforcement mechanisms to ensure trade is conducted fairly, inmates simply create their own. According to prison officials’ reports, inmates “cannot rely on correctional officers to enforce agreements made in drug deals, punish people who do not pay their drug debts, or knowingly protect a drug stash. For these illicit markets to operate, they must create extralegal governance institutions.” This is especially important as inmates are forced to interact with one another constantly, often for years at a time.

By creating what the authors term a “community responsibility system,” gang members streamline a prison’s internal economy, building relationships between gangs and making trade more efficient. Prison gangs typically have an established, hierarchical structure allowing for enforcement of rules regarding trade and gang interactions. They also have an interest in recruiting new inmates; the more unaffiliated inmates there are, the less efficient the community responsibility system becomes. In fact, Skarbek and Roth found that new inmates are actually encouraged to affiliate themselves with a gang by correctional officers for their own protection.

New inmates with a strong interest in obtaining contraband materials — drug addicts, for example — are particularly well-served by gang membership. There is no reason for a fellow inmate to trust that an unaffiliated individual will pay for goods sold to them. However, gang membership provides a guarantee that payment will be received, because prison gangs do business based on community responsibility. If a gang member buys something on credit from a rival gang, the purchaser’s entire gang is responsible for payment of the debt — and the seller’s gang can go to the leadership of the buyer’s gang to appeal for payment (whether it comes in financial form, or in violent retribution). This system of trust allows groups to continue to do business with one another, even if one member of either group turns out to be untrustworthy.

Skarbek and Roth write that aside from resolving trade disputes in a more orderly fashion, gangs help to prevent riots and “allocate scarce prison resources, such as benches and basketball courts, in the face of a shortage of such amenities.” This is why “the optimal number of prison gangs from the perspective of the warden is not zero.” If there are too many, of course, the prison must spend more to quell the resulting conflicts within and between gangs. If there are too few and the existing gangs are too large, the prison must use resources to encourage their breakup into smaller factions. In this way, prison wardens can “diffuse gang influence by maintaining the oligopolistic structure, which limits contraband but allows for orderly private allocation of prison-provided goods and dispute resolution.”

 for both wardens and gang leaders. For gang leaders, higher membership means an increased diversity of skills, and allows for a more sophisticated organizational structure — and more power over limited resources. But when membership becomes too large, there is generally an increase in internal conflict, signifying that the organization has reached a point of diminishing returns. Interestingly, when gangs grow too large to remain cohesive, they often split based on secondary characteristics, such as what part of the state they are from: “In California, for example, the existence of a single Hispanic gang within many prisons would be untenably large. Consequently, geography is employed as a secondary criterion. … Hispanic inmates sort into gangs based on whether they come from north California, southern California, or the Fresno area.”

Is the prison system held hostage by gangs? Skarbek and Roth suggest a broader view. “Riots and other displays of public violence are less frequent when gangs exist,” and the trading of contraband material is never going to be wiped out completely, particularly with current resource levels. Authorities, perhaps, can take advantage of the structured nature of gangs to keep prisons somewhat safer than they would be without them.

“Prisons Gangs and the Community Responsibility System”

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Prison gangs play a vital role in the prison economy, in enforcing order, andd — counterintuitively — in reducing violence.

The Behavioral Economist's Case for Prison Gangs

The rise of radical right-wing parties has been a particular concern for Europe over the last decade. Some commentators, 

comparing the current political situation

 to that of Europe in the 1930s. The 2014 European parliamentary elections did indeed see a collection of ultra-conservative parties (which, ironically, would like to see the European Union dismantled) gain significant ground, with the most discussed parties being Marine Le Pen’s French Front National (FN), Geert Wilder’s Dutch Party for Freedom (PVV), and Nigel Farage’s United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).

How can we explain the success in some countries and failure in others of radical right wing parties in Europe over the last twenty years? 

, Arizona State University Professor Lenka Bustikova proposes a unique theory

 that she believes may explain how radical right-wing parties — parties that are extremely nationalistic and socially conservative — gain and lose power, across very different countries and contexts. She argues that radical right parties are aggrieved by the political gains achieved by minority segments of their populations and mobilize to try to reverse those gains.

This explanation contrasts sharply with conventional academic explanations that give primacy to concerns about the stability of institutions and a loss of economic status for dominant groups. Bustikova explains, “Although adverse economic conditions can certainly create grievances that may later facilitate the rise of radical parties and contribute to their survival, grievances are too static to explain cross-national volatility over time.” Instead, she links the fortunes of radical right parties to the successes and failures of “ethnic and socially liberal parties on the left,” arguing that when these parties advance in social and political status, it polarizes the overall party system. This may seem like a subtle distinction, but it has important implications for the way radical right-wing parties are studied, perceived, and campaigned against.

On the opposite end of the political spectrum is what Bustikova terms “ethno-liberal” parties, which are very socially liberal and focus on advocating for ethnic minorities. She argues that “the presence and actions of a bilateral opposite polarizes the party system and increases issue salience.” Social issues and rigid ideologies tend to take center stage in such antithetical electoral contests. While parties can usually afford to take a more centrist approach to economic issues, “non-economic issues become salient when parties polarize; that is when politically organized minorities ascend to power and governments pursue pro-minority policies.”

By this definition, Europe’s right-wing parties are inherently reactionary, and form or mobilize to try to reverse gains already made by groups they oppose. Conversely, when there is a period of time in which the status quo is maintained and there are no major concessions to minority groups, radical right-wing parties tend to lose momentum.

In her examination of the fates of reactionaries in elections throughout European post-communist countries between 1990-2012, Bustikova found that out of 93 elections studied, radical right-wing parties won 43 times, with their electoral successes preceded mainstream/ethno-liberal governments in 37 of these cases. The political success of ethno-liberal parties often hinges on their involvement in coalitions with mainstream parties. Bustikova found that the “simple formation of a governing coalition between a mainstream party and an accommodation-seeking party increases the probability of the radical right’s success in the subsequent electoral cycle.” She also discovered that the more extreme the concessions, the more likely it is that the radical right-wing party will succeed in any given country.

One illustrative example is the violent ethnic conflicts that took place in Macedonia in 2002. Once the government had put a stop to outbreaks of violence, it expanded the rights of Albanians living in Macedonia, and made Albanian one of the country’s national languages. Reactionary right-wing parties mobilized and made significant gains in the following election cycle. Since then, they have recruited members based on rallying against “minorities with privileges.”

So how should Europe’s mainstream political groups combat the rise of the radical right? They can hardly abandon coalitions with ethnic minority political organizations, as a matter of both pragmatism and belief. There are dangers to almost any approach a mainstream party might take. For example, a mainstream party could itself veer slightly further right on the political spectrum to try to undercut the voter base of a radical right party. However, the results of such a tactic could differ dramatically from country to country. It has the potential to shut radical right parties out of politics completely, but it could also “make them martyrs of nationalist causes,” warns Bustikova.

Although this theory goes a long way in explaining the fortunes of radical right-wing political parties — possibly universally — it ultimately cannot provide a framework for combatting them. That is left to individual countries to decide, and will certainly be a domestic and international policy challenge in the years ahead in an increasingly globalized world.

On a more promising note for centrists and progressives, EU membership appears to affect the political trajectory of radical right parties. “EU membership mediates the effect of economic volatility on radical right voting,” writes Bustikova, “which suggests that the promise of EU membership has had a calming effect on the accession countries.”

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While some European countries remain examples of progressive governance, others have seen a marked rise in the influence of far-right parties. Why the disparity?


What Explains the Meteoric Rise of Europe's Radical Right?

Over the last 30 years, an extraordinary political reversal on education policy has occurred. In sharp contrast to Ronald Reagan’s call to “dismantle” the Department of Education, Republican President George W. Bush’s administration advocated higher levels of federal spending and involvement in education through “No Child Left Behind.” Likewise, in a departure from longstanding Democratic Party dogma, President Barack Obama has led a relatively hands-off approach to education by the federal government (save for his “Race to the Top” initiative). Curiously, this switch has taken place despite the fact that new policies advocated by each party have the potential to alienate significant components of their electoral bases, such as teachers unions for Democrats and small-government libertarians for Republicans.

How has such a reversal been possible in such a polarized political climate? 

, Christina Wolbrecht and Michael T. Hartney

 argue that such vast policy shifts aren’t as unusual as they may initially seem. In fact, they can be contextualized within a broader political pattern in American politics that can be traced back to the post-war period. They highlight “the central role of issue definition” and the fact that, more than anything else, the terms in which issues are defined are key to the process of policy-making. Issue definition determines which policy alternatives are considered and presented to the public, and once a policy path has been chosen and implemented, it becomes very difficult to change the terms in which an issue is thought about.

Wolbrecht and Hartney found that seven major themes have characterized national discussions of education in the United States since 1948: federal funding, racial inequality, minority groups, discipline and morality (encompassing things like school prayer and the nature of civic education), school choice, standards and accountability, and teacher quality. The fact that these issues have never been equally emphasized (at least simultaneously) helps to account for party see-sawing; it is the intermittent redefinition of the issue that has changed the scope of policy options surrounding education.

But how and why was the education issue redefined? The Supreme Court’s 1954 

 ruling that state-enforced segregation of schools was unconstitutional ensured that racial inequality would dominate the national conversation for the next two decades. “At the same time,” Wolbrecht and Hartney explain, “ the strained resources of schools as the Baby Boomers reached school age, the launching of Sputnik, and heightened attention to class inequality contributed to defining education in terms of the need for funding.” Liberal social movements of the 1960s and 1970s led to the reactionary rise of the Religious Right in the late 1970s and early 1980s; “the resulting ‘culture war’ permeated the politics of education. Education problems were increasingly defined in terms of values and discipline,” write Wolbrecht and Hartney. Attention was repeatedly drawn to the growing achievement gap between American students and students in other countries, as well as the variable quality of education between American states. This led to a new focus on accountability for student performance, often through standardized testing.

Historically, when education was associated with resources and inequality, Democrats were more vocal advocates of education reform. When education became associated with values, it was Republicans who were more active in pushing for change. Now that education is associated with testing and achievement, the parties have pulled closer together.

This shift from thinking about education in terms of racial inequality to thinking about it in terms of standardized achievement and curriculum building shaped ideas about what actions the federal government could conceivably take to reform education. Since the 1990s, the focus has been on comparative national and international achievement levels, and we have seen a change from deep partisan polarization in the 1980s to a significant level of agreement in the 2000s, despite rhetoric to the contrary.

Historically, when education was associated with resources and inequality, Democrats were more vocal advocates of education reform. When education became associated with values, it was Republicans who were more active in pushing for change. Now that education is associated with achievement, the parties have pulled closer together. This new ideological closeness on education reform has allowed for the implementation of policies that run counter to traditional party positions.

Despite the significant overlap between the two parties, there are deep divisions within them. For Democrats, teachers unions, civil rights organizations, and minority voters have typically been party strongholds. This was especially true in the 1950s and 1960s when equality and federal funding were the salient issues. However, when resources and inequality were superseded in the public mind by student achievement and values, the position of teachers unions within the debate changed significantly. “[For Democrats] the shift in the definition toward excellence [meant that] they increasingly backed standards and accountability and teacher quality reforms over the opposition of teachers unions.”The fact that Democrats have continued to focus on standards and accountability shows that how an issue is defined in the public mind is often more important than how individual interest groups would prefer to define the issue.

Republicans, on the other hand, have historically relied on social conservatives and supporters of small government as influential members of their electoral base. The former have encouraged government involvement on issues like school prayer and school choice, but typically oppose the establishment of a common curriculum, while the latter tend to oppose federal interference in education because of its potential to expand the size and reach of the federal government. “Republicans have chosen to advocate for a bundle of policies that offer something for every stake-holding member of their coalition: school choice and value policies for social conservatives, and standards, accountability and teacher quality reforms for business interests.”

Wolbrecht and Hartney’s research suggests that party leaders do not consciously shape party positions, but instead react to changes in public conceptions of issues. This theory is not confined to education, and can be applied to most social and political issues debated today. By contextualizing policy shifts, we can better understand the political times we live in and perhaps look at issue definition more objectively, creating room for a greater number of policy solutions.

“'Ideas About Interests': Explaining the Changing Partisan Politics of Education” 

Christina Wolbrecht and Michael T. Hartney, 

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Reagan wanted to dismantle the Department of Education. Bush passed “No Child Left Behind.” Obama has taken a relatively-hands-off approach. What gives?

How Democrats and Republicans (Mostly) Flipped on Education

Religion is visibly influential in the realms of domestic politics and international relations: the rise of Islamism across the Middle East, the spread of Pentecostalism and fundamentalist Christianity in South America and Africa, hotly contested votes within the Anglican Church that allowed women to become bishops in the United Kingdom — the list goes on.

This very visible factor, though, has been downplayed by international relations scholars of the past half-century; in a recent article in 

, Samantha May, Erin K. Wilson, Claudia Baumgart-Ochse, and Faiz Sheikh term this phenomenon “secular bias,” defined by “the unquestioned acceptance of the secularist division between religion and politics.” May (

) seek to understand whether the world is indeed experiencing an overall “religious revival,” or if we are simply better at recognizing, in our increasingly globalized and interconnected world, religio-political undercurrents that have always been present.

The idea of an inevitable secularization process is uniquely European, rooted in the official separation of church and state in Christian countries over the last 400 years. The authors argue that this prevents contemporary Western IR scholars from taking into account the ways religion and politics are intermingled in Western, supposedly secular, nations — and allows experts to exclude religion as an important factor in Western, particularly Western European, politics. In fact, “non-Western states are more likely to recognize the European process of ‘secularization’ for what it truly was… a particular Christian and post-Christian historical process, and not, as Europeans like to think, a general universal process of human or societal development.”

The assumption that secularism is value neutral, while religion is value charged, is also being called into question, and scholars increasingly see in secularism a collection of values that are a direct result of the Treaty of Westphalia, drawn up in 1648 to put an end to inter-country and civil wars between European Catholics and Protestants. Built into the Westphalian system is the assumption that religion is inherently violent, and without the separation of church and state there can only be chaos; any fervent religio-political activity, then, is seen as an attack on the system of state sovereignty. This idea has remained politically salient despite the progression of European nations from monarchies to constitutional monarchies to democratic republics.

The fact that the secularization model is founded on post-Christian European historical processes is problematic for several reasons. “European exceptionalism, which elevates European ideals over others, functions to create hierarchies between religions so that secularization is a process of disseminating the ethos, ethics, cosmology, and quotidian practices of hegemonic religions across secular societies, not simply sequestering religion.” All religions become “Protestantized” in the European mind, making it difficult to assess accurately the true natures of other belief systems: “All religions that do not fit neatly into what religion ‘ought to be’ become subordinate and problematic.” Western governments, for example, often attempt to separate public life and private belief, which may make sense in a Protestant-Christian context, but is not always possible with other faiths. Not all religions have the public-private distinction built in to Christian orthodoxy, and religions like Islam and Judaism often focus on orthopraxy instead, where “outward behavior and norms not only signify internal belief, but are necessary in constituting them through performative actions.”

But what should the secularization model be replaced with? Many academics lean toward a “post-secular” model, which would be used to “account for the resilience of religion in the modern industrial era.” Others believe that religion never faded from view in the 20th century, and was merely understood and academically categorized in a different way in terms of its place in public life. When used in this sense, “post-secularism” refutes the validity of the entire concept of linear “secularization”, rather than representing a transition from a secular to a post-secular age.

The 1648 Treaty of Westphalia ushered in a commitment to early forms of church-state separation. However, official state religions still existed; it was the idea of religious tolerance that allowed subjects to (theoretically) privately practice whatever religion they chose, but it also kick-started the relegation of religion to the private sphere. It brought freedom but also official marginalization. “The re-placing of religion into the private sphere has not only theoretically separated religion from politics, but also devalued it, in that the public sphere is seen as politically superior to the private.” Some scholars argue that the world is currently undergoing a “deprivatization” of religion, meaning that religions are rejecting this marginalization, accounting for their increased public activity, but this is perhaps not globally applicable. In fact, over the course of the 20th century, religious belief and activity either increased or remained stable everywhere in the world except Western Europe.

When examining religion, mainstream secularization scholarship has often focused on the political within the religious; new scholarship tends to focus more on non-state actors and forms of religion-state interaction in which the state is not automatically assumed to be superior and public, and religion inferior and private. This is leading to a better, more accurate understanding of what global religious activity means for both nation-states and supra-national entities like the European Union and international organizations like the United Nations.

Ultimately, the authors call for an academic reassessment of secularization as an inevitable and linear process. The theory has defined religion as something private, personal, and completely based on internal beliefs, and scholars are increasingly aware of the fact that this is not an accurate definition of religion. Religions signify a lot more to their adherents than belief in the supernatural, and they are certainly not static or incapable of innovation and development, as theories of secularization often imply. Certain religions have gained in political strength and reach over the last century precisely because of their ability to change and remain relevant in peoples’ everyday lives. “Through symbolism, rhetoric, images, narratives, histories, myths, values, and experiences, religious ideas and influences continue to intervene in, and unsettle, the supposedly ordered rational nature of secular politics.”

It is increasingly clear that the delineation of the public and private areas of life as represented by the secularization model is no longer — and perhaps never was — an accurate depiction of the reality of life anywhere in the world. The authors, and indeed many up-and-coming IR scholars, advocate for a “post-secularist” understanding of interactions between religion and politics, and acknowledge that the two cannot be neatly separated. “Many Western theorists presuppose secularism for the nation-state framework… [which] may not in reality be a necessary component for the nation-state model.”

This idea has radical implications for the conduct of Western foreign policy and the way it attempts to — or refrains from — attempting to rebuild failed or unstable states, or encouraging democratization. “If the discipline is capable of understanding religion in its own language, without the need to ‘translate’ it into secular discourse,” the authors write, “IR can attribute a structural dimension to religion.”

“The Religious as Political and the Political as Religious: Globalization, Post-Secularism and the Shifting Boundaries of the Sacred”

 by Samantha May, Erin K. Wilson, Claudia Baumgart-Ochse, Faiz Sheikh, 

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We accept the role of religion in politics throughout the Middle East. Why do we ignore its role in Europe?

Foreign Policy Experts Ignore the Role of Religion in Western Politics

Throughout Europe, the halls of parliaments ring with the voices of organized partisan discord. Britain has its political fights between the Tories, Labour, and the Liberal Democrats. France has its center-left Socialist Party and center-right UMP. Meanwhile in Poland, political parties remain weak, poorly organized, and have yet to weave themselves into the country’s social fabric. The majority of Poles do not identify as members of parties, and the parties themselves are thought to be irrelevant at the local level — just 29.5 percent of the country’s local elected officials are party-affiliated. The European country with the next lowest measurable figure is France, with 60 percent. Why is Poland such an extreme case?

, Adam Gendzwill and Tomasz Zoltak of the University of Warsaw write that in many formerly communist or Soviet bloc countries, “local politics is closer to the model of political localism, but simultaneously functions with particularly fragile political parties — weakly institutionalized and disliked.” The prevailing attitude in the region is that in a true democracy, parties aren't necessary to take care of local affairs. In fact, it is widely felt that entrenched parties — and the political patronage that comes along with them — only serves to make a municipality less democratic.

Democracy was not established in Poland until 1990. Under communist direction, the central government prevented party competition and, at least nominally, took care of all bureaucratic and infrastructural issues at the local level. After communism fell, power devolved to the local level.

Gendzwill and Zoltak point out that after the 1990 local elections, about three-fourths of the newly elected officials lacked prior experience in governmental structures. “The ideology of local government reform was to a large extent anti-partisan … it referred to the ideas of local activism, volunteerism, and the resources of civil society.” Voters were suspicious of parties, believing they could never truly serve local interests and would instead always be looking out for themselves and the special interest groups that funded them. In response, “local independent politicians managed to organize their own stable networks of supporters and clients and … cultivate an image as actors in a separate sphere of politics, distant from parties and free from their flaws.”

In elections in most industrialized nations, incumbent candidates tend to have a significant advantage over their challengers because they have experience and are usually well-known by the electorate. Poland is no different; in fact, the authors argue, in Poland, municipal-level voting “is frequently understood as a plebiscite or a vote of confidence in the mayor.” Political experience, personal charisma, and the strength of the local network created are generally more significant factors for candidates than party affiliation, or lack thereof. Because this is what is valued by local voters, candidates do not need to rely on a national party structure for resources and support.

Polish political parties that compete at the national level will often try to affect the outcome of local elections by placing chosen candidates in local races as non-partisans, which the authors term “independent camouflage.” In general this strategy has failed; once elected, their candidates are not beholden to that party simply because, if they want to be re-elected, they must respond to local voter demands. The history of and the attitudes of its citizens toward democratization in Poland, then, is still deeply felt and has become entrenched in today’s electoral process. The significant advantage enjoyed by incumbent candidates in Polish municipal elections shows that voting trends apparent in 1990 are still evident today and the “anti-partisan spirit, so strongly present during the beginnings of local democracy in Poland, [has been] maintained and institutionalized.”

Gendzwill and Zoltak observe that a gradual decline of over-arching political parties’ stronghold on voting populations is evident in most 21st century democracies; voters no longer trust parties as much as they once did, and are no longer as active in them as they once were. They remain strong instruments for candidates to use during national elections, but, as voters identify with them less and less, are not as useful at the local level. In Europe, more generally, “calls for a new institutional design which could flexibly mix markets and networks with traditional bureaucracy entailed particular demands that mayors should become neutral leaders responsible for local economic growth.” In this regard, Poland is an extreme case of a more general trend.

If this trend continues — if, for example, more supranational, integrated organizations like the European Union are created and assume greater importance than individual nation-states — parties may eventually become less relevant at the national level as well. What would fill the void?

“Why Do Non-partisans Challenge Parties in Local Politics? The (Extreme) Case of Poland”

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland

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Europe has many powerful, and partisan, political parties, but the anti-partisan spirit, so strongly present during the beginnings of local democracy in Poland, has been maintained and institutionalized.


Partisan politics dominate Europe. What makes Poland different?

In the post-Cold War debate over the development and ownership of nuclear weapons, complete disarmament has become an increasingly viable option. Disarmament advocates, however, have curiously failed to employ strong moral arguments against the continued existence of nuclear weapons, preferring to instead focus on political and strategic security. That should change, writes Paolo Foradori in 

, and nuclear disarmament advocates would be wise to embrace a new potential partner: the Catholic Church.

Although the political tenor of the Cold War prevented nuclear abolition from becoming a viable long-term option, the politics of the issue has changed — even Henry Kissinger and George Shultz now advocate disarmament. But Foradori cautions against allowing disarmament to be seen as a simply technocratic cause; the movement has the potential to be revolutionary, but can do nothing effective without grassroots momentum.

It is hard to dispute the fact that nuclear weapons use would “violate longstanding moral principles of proportionality in the use of force,” writes Foradori, “and that it is wrong to kill the innocent and to cause excessive destruction.” Enter the Roman Catholic Church.

As of 2013, there are approximately 1.2 billion people who identify as Catholic. With its ultra-organized and hierarchical structure, the Church has incredible potential to influence the opinions and beliefs of hundreds of millions. Throughout history, the Vatican has tended to support the theory of “just war”, rather than outright pacifism. “Its core argument,” says Foradori, “is that the use of force in international affairs is morally legitimate and justifiable under certain conditions and limitations … government cannot be denied the right of lawful self-defense, once all peace efforts have failed.” Theoretically, in order to be “just,” war must be conducted between legitimate countries with the intention of bringing about a swift peace, and civilians must be protected as much as possible.

The Church supported nuclear deterrence during the Cold War, but rejected the indiscriminate use of nuclear weapons as immoral, as confirmed in 1965 at the Second Vatican Council. Since Vatican II, however, the Church has reversed course. Currently, it supports the idea that deterrence is tolerable only as part of the progression toward total disarmament, and does not consider it a permanent mechanism for preventing nuclear war. The 1983 U.S. Conference of the Catholic Bishops declared total disarmament the only morally acceptable solution. In 2005, the Vatican asserted that “it is evident that nuclear deterrence is preventing genuine nuclear disarmament.” That posture has continued under Pope Francis, who has declared that “the Holy See does not countenance the continuation of nuclear deterrence, since it is evident it is driving the development of ever newer nuclear arms.”

The spectre of nuclear war will continue to haunt the world until nuclear weapons no longer exist; the potential for nuclear warfare will only increase, in spite of deterrence strategies and non-proliferation efforts. Foradori argues that nuclear weapons and deterrence are “poorly suited to countering the main security threats of the twenty-first century: international terrorism, failed states, asymmetric warfare, transnational crime, piracy, cyberwarfare, migration pressures, energy shortages, contagious diseases, and natural and man-made disasters.” It is for these reasons, as well as increasing questions about the morality of the continued existence of nuclear weapons, that nuclear disarmament has become a truly feasible and truly global strategy.

“Calls for disarmament have a universal validity that cannot be accused of concealing national interests, as politico-security arguments can.” Moral arguments are potent, but underused, tools in the quest to ban nuclear weapons, and grassroots public support is absolutely essential for disarmament to take place. A colossal organization like the Catholic Church, with the potential to mobilize the moral beliefs of millions — both Catholic and non-Catholic — would be a compelling addition to the arsenal of abolitionists.

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Policy wonks shouldn't be the only ones campaigning for a nuke-free world.

Nuclear Disarmament Should Be Considered A Moral Issue

Despite airing for only three seasons — from 1966 to 1969 —

 is widely considered one of the most culturally influential series in American television history. In many ways it was a progressive offering, featuring a multi-racial cast, and male and female characters who worked together as equals. In the years since it went off the air, one criticism it has been repeatedly charged with repeatedly is sexism. 

 the position of female characters on the show and examines not whether 

 was sexist, but why it portrayed women the way it did.

 made its debut in the fall of 1966 on NBC. This was its second incarnation; the network had turned down the original pilot for the series, partly because certain female characters had not tested well with audiences. 

A female character named “Number One”

 induced a particularly strong reaction. “Not only did men hate the character, but women hated her as well, calling her ‘pushy’ and ‘annoying’ and criticizing her for ‘trying so hard to fit in with the men,” writes Vettel-Becker. Any hint of “masculine” qualities in female characters was strongly rejected by test audiences. The show’s producers were instructed to make some drastic changes if they wanted the show to make it to air.

Some of the biggests changes made were to the characters’ costumes, which had originally been unisex. When 

 finally premiered, “the women of Starfleet wore short, close-fitting tunics that emphasized their feminine curves and highlighted their legs, their thighs sheathed in transparent black hose, their calves and feet in snug high-heeled boots.” Vettel-Becker argues that because the women of 

 were engaged in an occupation so vastly different from what was socially acceptable at the time — 

the first female candidates for NASA’s astronaut program were not accepted until 1978

 — it was essential that they appear as feminine as possible to quell any social anxieties dredged up by their existence. The costumes and mannerisms of 

’s female characters, writes Vettel-Becker, “may have soothed anxiety over the possibility of de-feminization by appearing and acting ultra-feminine, overcompensating for their relinquishing of domesticity and their adopting of scientific or technological career fields.” This ultra-femininity was expressed through both clothing and romantic dependence on male characters.

“Starfleet women were the futuristic version of Helen Gurley Brown’s ‘Single Girls,’” writes Vettel-Becker. “They did not cook, clean, raise offspring, or get married … they are characterized as competent professionals.”

The series’ female characters often took on nurturing roles in addition to the duties associated with their occupations. This , it seemed, was what was required to keep American audiences happy while they were experiencing a profound upheaval in gender relations in their daily lives. This was a time when the proportion of women in the workforce was steadily increasing, the women’s rights movement was gaining traction and visibility, and many women felt that marriage and a retreat to domesticity could be postponed or refused in favor of career advancement. The idea of men and women working alongside one another in the workplace made Americans of both genders uneasy.

Although the show is often retrospectively charged with sexism, Vettel-Becker asserts that the women of 

 actually constituted strong role models for female fans in the 1960s. “Starfleet women were the futuristic version of 

Helen Gurley Brown’s ‘Single Girls.’

 They did not cook, clean, raise offspring, or get married,” she writes. “Despite the visual objectification of [female characters like] Rand and Uhura, they are characterized as competent professionals.” Female commanders on par with Spock made appearances every so often from rival civilizations. For female viewers, “such characters would be a fantasy projection, a way for them to imagine themselves in such a position — commanding a starship and its crew while enjoying the pleasures of fashionable attire, comfortable furnishings, and sexual companionship on one’s own terms.”

When interviewed in later years, many of 

’s lead actresses did not see their costumes as demeaning or sexist, saying instead that to them mini-skirts were a sign of sexual liberation rather than oppression. Indeed, young women in the ‘60s were beginning to adopt miniskirts as a fashionable expression of modernity and freedom from the domestic sphere. Many were encouraged by 

Helen Gurley Brown, who became the editor of 

) to use their femininity to get ahead in the workplace. “A masculine woman will never be taken for a man in a man’s world,” wrote Gurley Brown, “she will be considered a failed woman.” Vettel-Becker sees this theme as omnipresent in 

 writing “whether inherent, an act to play, or a mixture of both, femininity was one tool 1960s women had that men did not, and they did not want to lose it. Only one of the two major markers of femininity could be sacrificed, either domesticity or beauty, but not both.” Examined from the vantage point of today’s third-wave feminism, the revealing outfits worn by the women of 

can seem like instruments of objectification, but Vettel-Becker argues that many women viewed them as tools for getting ahead rather than something demeaning that they were forced to wear.

 retained a loyal female fan base throughout its first run, and women played a great part in the massive letter-writing campaigns that took place before and after its third season, designed to convince NBC to keep the show on the air. Many women wrote fan letters expressing gratitude to the show’s creators saying that the series inspired and encouraged them to pursue careers in technology and the sciences. As Vettel-Becker writes, “although critics have tended to regard the women in 

 as little more than sex objects on display for the pleasure of men … I would argue that in 

, beauty functions as a metaphor for humanity, and therefore it is beauty that humanizes outer space, that soothes anxiety over the terrifying unknown.”

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Starfleet women were the futuristic version of Helen Gurley Brown’s 'Single Girls' —they did not cook, clean, have kids, or get married. They were competent professionals.

Star Trek's Underappreciated Feminist History

As cartel violence throttles Mexico, a renewed interest in the border, human security, and the drug trade has taken hold in America. These complex, intertwined issues are at the heart of everything from 

debates on housing undocumented unaccompanied minors

 Yet, while the issue has been thoroughly discussed, one angle remains curiously underexamined: the experience of American Indian communities along the U.S.-Mexico border.

Areas where American Indian reservations meet the Mexican and Canadian borders have seen some of the country’s highest increases in both drug trafficking and abuse. 

 how this situation developed and what it means for members of the the Tohono O’odham Nation, whose Arizona-based reservation abuts the Mexican border for some 75 miles.

The Tohono O’odham reservation consists largely of mountains and desert — inhospitable terrain that is difficult to patrol, much to the delight of drug smugglers. Though the reservation’s size accounts for less than four percent of the total length of U.S.-Mexico border, between five and 10 percent of all marijuana produced in Mexico is transported through Tohono O’odham territory, according to Revels & Cummings. The U.S. government has designated the reservation as a “

,” with the amount of narcotics seized on the territory drastically increasing over the last 15 years. In 2008, roughly 201,000 pounds of marijuana was seized on the res; in 2009, marijuana seizures rose to 319,000 pounds.

Why the sudden increase? Perhaps counterintuitively, Cummings and Revels argue that one factor is the increased border security along the U.S.-Mexico border. Prior to the 9/11 attacks, there were several transborder entry points open only to Tohono O’odham people, an accommodation made in recognition of the native Arizonan population’s strong familial and social ties with O’odham living just across the border; after 9/11, these checkpoints saw their security resources retired to high-traffic areas, and smugglers saw the reservation crossings as opportunities for easier entry into the United States. Though security has since been enhanced at those reservation checkpoints that remain, O’odham who know the land are courted by drug smugglers to help them make it across the border.

The increase in drug trafficking has spilled over into almost every other aspect of reservation life. Where other racioethnic groups have seen a decrease in violent crime over the past several decades, American Indian communities have suffered from rising incidences of violence over the past 30 years. According to Revels and Cummings, "tribal law enforcement officials across the [United States] consistently report that most violent, personal, and property crimes on reservations relate to drug trafficking, drug abuse, and gang activity,” which “often lead to other indirect consequences such as accidental death, injuries, suicide, domestic violence, and sexual abuse."

The increasingly militarized nature of border reservations like that of the Tohono O’odham has fundamentally changed life in those communities: They are no longer peaceful or safe places to live, and not a single resident is unaffected by the realities and spillover effects of the drug trade. Homes are regularly broken into by smugglers and their affiliates. Residents are routinely searched by law enforcement, their movements restricted on their own land. Those who assist independent drug smugglers who are not attached to major cartels are at risk of being attacked by members of dominant drug cartels who want to eliminate competition and retain their near monopoly on the business. "The psychological burden this type of environment places upon individuals," write Revels and Cummings, "coupled with the constant sense of fear, is immeasurable."

If the problem is so widely acknowledged within the community, why is it slow to improve? Revels and Cummings outline a number of reasons, revealing that part of the answer lies in the complicated history between American Indian tribes and the U.S. federal government. Like most tribes in the U.S., the Tohono O’odham technically have complete sovereignty over their reservation. As part of this sovereignty, the reservation has its own law enforcement system which is not tied to state-level government and can determine its own punishments for minor crimes. Yet, reservation law enforcement officers are severely restricted compared to their to state and county brethren: They are not allowed to arrest non-Indians, they lose all enforcement powers when not on reservation property, and those who are detained must be quickly handed over to U.S. authorities. This makes things particularly difficult for Tohono O’odham officials, since the reservation is made up of several unattached land areas. It also leaves them reliant on federal and state authorities, who have far more access to the funding and technology necessary for capturing and deterring trafficking.

Even within the reservation, there is only so much ground tribal law enforcement agencies can cover with limited resources. Staffing of officers on reservations is only 20 to 25 percent of the levels attained in comparable US high-crime-rate areas. High levels of extreme poverty on the reservation — four times higher than the rest of Arizona — drive desperate residents to participate in drug trafficking to make money or spiral into substance abuse to numb the pain. “Smuggling can garner a destitute O’odham a quick $3,000 to $5,000 for hustling drugs just one time,” write Revels and Cummings, “and is often the best job opportunity available.”

It’s a paradox. The tribe’s resources are limited. They spend money to reduce drug trafficking, but don’t have enough to make a substantial improvement. With funds going to direct action along the border, little is left for the creation and improvement of social programs that may help the average resident. Some residents see drug smuggling as a quick way to help pay the bills, and so participate in the trade even as the tribe spends money to combat it.

Yet there are reasons to hope. Tribal revenues are up, which may allow for increased investment in education (which could help to combat poverty and reduce the attractiveness of drug trafficking). State, local, and federal officials are aiming to improve coordination with reservation law enforcement, the Border Patrol has introduced cultural sensitivity training for its officers, and new counter-trafficking measures grant O’odham officers access to advanced technological tools.

Revels and Cummings are optimistic about this upward trajectory, advocating further expansion of the legal capabilities of Tohono O’odham law enforcement, and a continued strong, but perhaps more respectful federal presence to reduce cross-border trafficking and protect vulnerable O’odham.

“The Impact of Drug Trafficking on American Indian Reservations with International Borders”

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American Indian reservations on the U.S.-Mexico border have seen some of the country’s highest increases in both drug trafficking and abuse.

A Forgotten Front in the Drug & Border Fights: Tribal Reservations

Over the past 30 years, organized religion has grown at an astonishing rate throughout China, while the state’s officially endorsed religious tradition — atheism — has remain unchanged. 

An independent survey conducted in 2007 by Shanghai University found

 that around 31 percent of those Chinese polled considered themselves to be religious — three times higher than government statistics reported at the time. Similar surveys have asked respondents whether they worship gods in any form; in one study, 63.2 percent responded in the affirmative, indicating that the practice of religious rituals is more widespread than identification with an organized faith.

Boston University Professor Robert P. Weller writes about the phenomenon in a recent article in 

. “Temples to local gods have popped up like mushrooms over broad sections of the rural countryside,” he writes, while “Islam is increasingly visible as Muslims from China’s far west migrate to the heavily populated east side of the country.” Christianity has grown almost everywhere, and “Daoist and especially Buddhist temples are reviving quickly as well.”

It has been difficult for the Chinese government to keep up with these rapid changes. By the time of Mao’s death in 1976, most forms of religion and religious expression in China had been deemed threats to the security of the state and thoroughly suppressed. Now, China’s government is largely forced to improvise when it comes to creating policy on religious issues. At the moment, only five religions are legally recognized: Buddhism, Daoism, Islam, Protestantism, and Catholicism. To maintain their official status, each is required to have an organized representative entity that works closely with the government to ensure that their ideals and objectives align. Since a religious tradition cannot be recognized without this formal organizational structure, any activity that takes place outside of the designated traditions is technically illegal — including the small number of Chinese who practice religions like Hinduism or Judaism, as well as the millions who visit local temples and worship indigenous gods and spirits.

Weller terms the current government strategy for dealing with public extralegal religious activity as a “one-eye open, one-eye closed” policy. “It is as if government officials agree to pretend that they cannot see, so long as followers agree to pretend that they are not breaking the rule,” writes Weller. “The state has created an open space where religion has fermented and expanded, even without a stable legal environment to support it.” This tactic — which has been historically successful in totalitarian European countries — allows unrecognized religions to continue to exist (and, in some cases, thrive) in the public sphere, while allowing for the possibility of government repression at any moment with a ready excuse: combatting flagrantly illegal activity. Thus far, Beijing has been taking action almost exclusively against groups or individuals they deem socially disruptive or who have the potential to deviate from state interests.

Why would the government choose to operate this way? Why not simply add other religious traditions to the existing state-recognized five — a move that would expand the number of legitimate religions while pulling those religions closer to the state? Weller’s answer is that the state sees significant advantages to having some forms of religion remain outside the regulatory system: It requires religions to enter the public sphere peacefully, out of fear of a crackdown. In most cases, “such situations encourage active self-censorship which is one of the reasons the policy continues,” writes Weller. “Occasional acts of repression become necessary to remind people that there is a line that cannot be crossed, even if it is invisible.”

Weller notes that “sometimes the point of a law is to state a moral ideal rather than to regulate actual practice. … Nominal acceptance of the conventions of the law may be more important to officials than substantive obedience.” On the one hand, allowing too many interest groups to become a part of the state structure in China would necessarily mean that the government would lose some of the strength in its grip on the country. On the other hand, religious practice has expanded so greatly in China that it would be foolish for the government to attempt to repress all unrecognized faiths — the state receives domestic backlash already over its authoritarian surveillance practices and censorship of art and the Internet. Of course, Beijing could decide to drop the pretense that only five religions exist in China, but for now it is clear that the benefits outweigh the costs of looking the other way.

“The Politics of Increasing Religious Diversity in China”

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While religious practices have grown in China, the government maintains a stance that puzzles some, but which has surprising benefits for Beijing.

Shannon Mizzi